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This thesis assesses the state of democracy in Jordan over a period of twenty years 
(1990-2010), and revisits the claims of incompatibility between democracy and both 
Islam and Islamism. It subjects the claims to theoretical and empirical tests. This is 
possible through a case study of Jordan. The state was established by Britain, and is 
ruled by a dynasty, which highlights its lineage to the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad.  
Jordan also allowed the Muslim Brothers to take part in the process characterised by 
King Hussein in 1989 as the ‘resumption of our democratic life.’ 
Incompatibility is taken to mean that Islamic teachings prohibit adopting democracy 
as a system of government, as Qutb and Mawdudi have argued; and that democracy 
cannot take root in a Muslim society because the state and church (mosque) are 
inseparable, as argued by Lewis and others. The thesis outlines the procedure Muslim 
jurists use to declare an act or a notion to be allowed (halal) or forbidden (haram). It 
also engages with various democratic theories including the argument that democracy 
is ‘an essentially contested concept.’  
The thesis establishes that, theoretically, Islam is not incompatible with democracy, 
whether as claimed by Qutb and Mawdudi, or Lewis and Huntington. Moreover, the 
thesis posits that if the democratic audit establishes that Jordan is a democracy, the 
compatibility of democracy and Islam is validated empirically. The audit revealed that 
Jordan was not a democracy. The roles of Islam and Islamism in hindering the 
development of democracy in Jordan were examined. The evidence indicated that they 
did not. Therefore, other reasons were examined, such as rentierism, Arab-Israel 
conflict, and Rustow’s modernisation theory. The latter offers the most plausible 
explanation, as Jordan has not satisfied Rustow’s four antecedents to democracy. 
The Islamist groups have not yet managed to be in power through democratic means. 
It remains debatable whether they will adhere to democracy after it brings them to 
power. The case of Jordan provides counter-evidence that the Islamists can hold the 
belief that Islam provides a superior form of government, but can simultaneously play 
by democratic rules. One could even argue that in Jordan there was a case of a 
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In October 1989, King Hussein of Jordan declared that the country would return to 
‘democratic parliamentary life’. This thesis presents an assessment of the state of 
democracy in Jordan since the resumption announced by the king. After a period of 
twenty years (1990-2010), the case for an assessment is self-evident: neither early 
nor late. 
The appraisal is based on data provided by Jordanians who live in Jordan, through 
two questionnaires and elite interviews. One questionnaire consists of fifteen 
questions. The other has ninety. The interviews are with officials, activists, and 
others—men and women. The backbone of the thesis is a democratic audit, which is 
an empirical tool used to assess the state of democracy in a given country.  
The assessment is presented and discussed after several hurdles are cleared. The first 
is what is meant by democracy. The second is why democracy matters. The third 
hurdle is whether Islam has something to say about democracy. Specifically, whether 
Islam is a substitute for democracy, or offers alternative forms of it. The fourth 
hurdle to be negotiated is whether Islamism is inimical to democracy.  
Negotiating the third and fourth hurdles is important because the absence of 
democracy in the Arab and Muslim worlds is attributed often to the incompatibility 
of democracy and both Islam and Islamism. The incompatibility of democracy and 
Islam is taken to mean two things. The first, as argued by some Muslims, is that 
Islam’s teachings prohibit democracy as it does other things such as usury (riba) for 
instance. The second meaning is as argued by some scholars of democracy who base 
the claim of incompatibility on different grounds, such as secularism, which in their 
view, cannot prevail in Muslim majority states because Islam is inseparable from the 
state.  
After the above-mentioned hurdles are cleared, a fifth set will arise in relation to the 
democratic audit: whether democracy can be measured. If so, what shall be audited; 
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what criteria are used; and how the assessment is carried out. These questions will be 
discussed as well. 
Jordan’s case provides all the elements needed to achieve two goals. The first is an 
assessment of the state of democracy. The second is to test empirically the validity of 
the claims that democracy is incompatible with Islam and Islamism. The elements 
needed to conduct the research on these two tracks are that (a) Jordan is a Muslim 
majority state; (b) it is a modern state at least in the sense that it was created in the 
twentieth century; (c) it is ruled by a dynasty which claims descent from Quraysh—
the tribe of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad; (d) it has a Muslim Brothers (MB) 
movement which was formed in the 1940s and operated legally since then; and (e) 
unlike Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt, Jordan allowed the MB and its political party, the 
Islamic Action Front (IAF), to take part in the parliamentary and municipal elections 
which were held during the twenty years under assessment. 
A conventional approach to argue that democracy and Islam/ism are incompatible is 
theoretical. In this thesis, the task is approached theoretically and empirically. There 
are Muslim jurists (fuqahā’) and others who declare that democracy and Islam are 
incompatible. They base their arguments on their interpretation of verses in the 
Qur’an. Instead of choosing different verses to make the opposite argument, the 
thesis outlines a procedure they use (or should use) to declare something 
in/compatible with Islam. This procedure leads to the conclusion that democracy is 
not incompatible with Islam. The claim of incompatibility is made by others, 
Muslims and non-Muslims, either because of certain prerequisites for democracy, or 
a certain exceptionalism that characterises Islam. These claims will be engaged with 
according to the arguments on which they are based.  
The empirical part will either support or undermine the conclusion of compatibility. 
If the democratic audit finds Jordan to be a democratic state, then neither Islam nor 
Islamism can be regarded as incompatible with democracy. If Jordan is not 
democratic, all possible reasons must be identified, including Islam and Islamism. If 
either has hindered democracy in Jordan, the claim of incompatibility will be 
substantiated by empirical evidence. The empirical part on its own, however, is of 
prime importance as it produces a detailed assessment of the state of affairs in Jordan 
in relation to society, government, the media, and other institutions. 
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Aims of Thesis 
The thesis has two major aims. The first is to conduct a democratic audit to assess the 
state of democracy in Jordan. The second is to revisit and reexamine the claims of 
democracy’s incompatibility with Islam and Islamism. 
Research Questions 
The research questions to be answered in this thesis are as follows: 
(1) How democratic is Jordan?  
(2) Do the findings of the democratic audit confirm or undermine the 
claims that Islam and Islamism are incompatible with democracy? 
Time Frame 
The thesis is concerned with a period of twenty years, beginning with King 
Hussein’s announcement in 1989 that elections will be held in Jordan, the first of 
their kind since 1967. The period ends with the elections of a new House of Deputies 
(HoD) in November 2010. Events outside this time span will be referred to where 
necessary for contextual purposes. It is noteworthy at the outset that towards the end 
of 2010, the Arab states, including Jordan, saw waves of protests to demand change. 
In some countries, the protests sought the removal of the head of state. In other 
countries, such as Jordan, the demands were for reforms. Upon reflection on the 
impact of these events on my thesis, I have decided to adhere to my original plan. 
Although I followed the events in Jordan with a great deal of interest, the data have 
been gathered before the protests broke out. In other words, the data were not 
influenced by being collected during a volatile period. 
Moreover, not limiting the period of the assessment entails the risk of derailing the 
thesis and diverting it towards dealing with current affairs. It is unrealistic to expect a 
PhD thesis which had started five years earlier to deal in depth with fast-moving 
events that happen to erupt while the writing of the thesis is in final stages. 
Therefore, limiting the assessment to the specified period is dictated by the 
requirements of scholarly research, and may offer insights into the events that 
erupted afterwards. 
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Clarification of Some Terms  
The thesis dos not use the term ‘methodology’ in the section which outlines how the 
research was conducted. As van Wagenen (1991, p. 66) explains, ‘Methodology 
refers to the general study of methods’. In contrast, method ‘refers to the particular 
method,’ used. As defined by Brewer (2000, p. 2), methodology is ‘the broad 
theoretical and philosophical framework within which methods operate and which 
give them their intellectual authority and legitimacy’. Therefore, the accurate term to 
use is method/s. 
The second term to clarify is ‘theoretical framework’. The theories that inform the 
thesis, and constitute its theoretical framework, are those which I found to be better 
at explaining and resolving the research problems. That they inform the thesis does 
not mean that I have adopted them uncritically, as will be shown later.  
The third term that needs clarification is ‘literature review’. As to be expected, I refer 
throughout the thesis to what other people have written (literature). The purpose is 
different from that of the section labelled as literature review. In this section, the 
purpose is to situate my research in relation to other literature on democracy, Islam, 
Islamism, and Jordan. In other sections, references to literature have other purposes, 
such as to support an argument, criticise one, or illustrate a point. 
Throughout the thesis, I use Islamism and Islamist for reasons explained in the 
chapter on the compatibility of democracy with both Islam and Islamism. 
Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters and an epilogue. The first chapter consists of 
three parts. The first outlines the methods and procedures used in pursuing the 
research. It explains why they were adopted. In the second part, I discuss the 
democratic theories that inform the thesis. The literature pertaining to Jordan, 
democracy and Islam/ism is reviewed in the third part. 
The second chapter focuses on the theoretical issues pertaining to democracy and 
both Islam and Islamism. In addition to the need to engage with these important 
theoretical issues, it is also necessary to discuss them because they are considered by 
some scholars as responsible for the absence of democracy in the Muslim world. The 
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chapter has two parts. The first seeks to identify whether Islam has something to say 
about democracy. It outlines the claims of incompatibility between democracy and 
Islam. Additionally, the link, if any, between democracy and Islam, is approached 
from two perspectives: (a) whether Islam itself is an alternative to democracy; and 
(b) whether Islam offers alternative forms of democracy, such as shura. The second 
part discusses Islamism and democracy, and the claims that they are incompatible.  
In the third chapter, I set the ground for the empirical part of the thesis. I address 
issues that can prompt scepticism, such as whether it is possible to measure 
democracy. If it can be, how it is measured; what is measured; and what standards 
are used. In addition to these important theoretical issues, examples of assessments 
of democracy in Jordan are provided. Of interest in these examples are their methods 
and criteria. Therefore, the advantages of the democratic audit become clearer. 
The fourth chapter provides the necessary background which contextualises issues 
that will be raised in the democratic audit. This chapter covers the modern history of 
Jordan: how it became a nation-state and the kings who have ruled over it so far. The 
second part briefly outlines the political system in Jordan. In the third part, the role of 
Islam in Jordan is discussed—including the suggestion that linage to Prophet 
Muhammad provides a basis of legitimacy to govern. The fourth part focuses on the 
economy, which is classified by some scholars as a ‘rentier economy’. This aspect is 
relevant because there are arguments which associate lack of democracy with 
rentierism. The fifth part discusses the connection between Jordan and Palestine, 
owing to the entanglement of the history and politics of both, and the fact that nearly 
half of Jordan’s population are of Palestinian origin. This, too, has implications for 
the democratic audit. 
The fifth chapter also provides the background that contextualises the discussion of 
whether Islamism is inimical to democracy. Therefore, a brief history of the Muslim 
Brothers Society in Egypt is provided, because some scholars suggest Islamism 
started with its emergence. It also has organic links with other MB organisations in 
the Arab world, including Jordan. The bulk of the chapter, however, will focus on the 
MB/IAF and their attitude towards democracy in Jordan. 
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The empirical part of the thesis begins with chapter six. A macro-analysis approach, 
which covers the fifteen overarching questions of the democratic audit, is taken in 
this, the seventh and eighth chapters. In all three chapters, the question is stated and 
then the marks collected from the questionnaires are provided in tabular forms. After 
that, the topic of the question is discussed in light of the data to illustrate the possible 
reasons for giving high or low marks. 
In the ninth chapter, a microanalysis approach is taken. This chapter examines in 
further detail the state of democracy in Jordan by presenting and discussing data 
collected through the full questionnaire of the democratic audit. The two questions 
with highest and lowest marks in each sub-category are selected. In the event of a tie, 
both questions are included. More than thirty questions not covered in the previous 
chapters are discussed in this one. 
The tenth and final chapter summarises the conclusions of the research.   I examine 
why democracy has failed to take root in Jordan to date. The reasons cited by 
scholars and others for this failure are outlined. Their plausibility and limitations are 
discussed. The conclusion of the thesis is that Rustow’s antecedents of democracy 
are best at explaining the failure. Due to the dramatic events that erupted in the Arab 
world during 2011, the thesis ends with an epilogue to discuss briefly their potential 
impact on the arguments and conclusions made in the thesis. 
Theory, Practice, and Ideology 
Hoffman (1988, pp. 3-10) discusses two issues which scholars have debated. The 
first is whether it is possible for political theory to ‘exist as a purely academic 
enterprise’ if it is connected to ‘practical politics’. The second issue is that ideology 
must stay away from political theory, as ideology prevents one from exercising 
‘critical judgement and rational justification’ (p. 7). Hoffman disagrees with the 
proponents of both ideas.  
In recognition of the importance of this debate, I have decided to mention at the 
outset of this thesis that I am inclined to agree with Hoffman. As far as I am 
concerned, I will identify issues I am aware of, so that any marks of ideology or 
judgemental values are identified. 
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I have no ideology in the sense that I am not a Marxist, capitalist or follower of 
another type of ideology. However, I do subscribe to a number of principles, 
including social justice, freedom, equality, and universality of rights. I understand 
secularism to be a mere separation of state and religion, not as anti-religion. It 
respects an individual’s right to believe and practise his or her religion freely.  
I am not an Islamic or Islamist. Therefore, my research is not concerned with 
extoling Islam or Islamism. I believe democracy is the best form of government 
despite the fact that it can be manipulated in relation to the outcome of elections, and 
that it has been used as a tool to justify military interventions. However, I do not 
subscribe to the notion of the end of history. It is easy to make claims and 
predictions. As shall be seen in the thesis, some scholars have made various 
predictions. They have been proved unfounded.  
I opted to drop honorific titles such as pasha and sir, because in my view, they 
perpetuate the aura of inequality and imperialism. My research was self-funded at all 
stages. All expenses related to field trips were also self-funded. Therefore, I owe no 
individual, research institution, or government any favour or debt that may have an 
influence on the conduct of the research. 
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Chapter 1  




This chapter consists of three parts. The first outlines the methods used in the 
research project. In the second, various democratic theories are cited to illustrate the 
debates about what democracy means and to identify the theories that inform this 
thesis. In the third part, literature pertaining to democracy and Islam/ism in Jordan is 
reviewed and critically evaluated to identify the gaps that this thesis fills.  
PART 1: RESEARCH METHODS 
The research project uses mixed methods. The overarching method is qualitative, 
narrowed down and applied to a case study. The main element of the case study is a 
democratic audit to assess the state of democracy in Jordan after twenty years of 
initiating a process that has been referred to as a democratic one. The democratic 
audit is based on two questionnaires: a short one for macro-analysis, and a long one 
for microanalysis. The questionnaires have been supplemented with elite interviews. 
Moreover, the methods are based on ‘grounded theory’. Each element will be 
outlined below, but the question to be answered at the outset is why the mixed 
methods approach is used. 
Broadly speaking, research methods fall into two categories: qualitative and 
quantitative. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, pp. 14-26) point out that proponents 
of each category ‘engaged in an ardent dispute’ for more than a hundred years, and 
that ‘purists emerged on both side’. They define the mixed methods research as 
follows: 
the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative 
and qualitative research technique, methods approaches, concepts or 
language into a single study [their emphasis]. 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie explain that mixed methods research ‘rejects dogmatism,’ 
which places restrictions on a researcher’s choice (p. 17). Although they advocate 
mixed methods research, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie accept that it has ‘weaknesses’, 
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such as being ‘more expensive’ and ‘more time consuming’. It also places on the 
researcher the burdens of carrying out qualitative and quantitative research (p. 21). 
Such ‘weaknesses’ are neutralised by several advantages, which include enabling a 
researcher to ‘answer a broader and more complete range of research questions’ (p. 
24). 
In explaining the merits of qualitative research, Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 10-11) 
assert that ‘the nature of the research problem’ dictates the choice of method. This 
reason, I suggest, applies to this thesis. The democratic audit of the state of 
democracy in Jordan makes it unavoidable to use mixed methods. It should be 
stressed however that the mixed methods in this research project are applied in a 
coherent, logical way, not in a disjointed, aimless one. A better description is 
‘integrative research’ which is also suggested by the same two authors.  
As explained by Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 10-11), qualitative research is ‘any 
type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or 
other means of quantification’. They indicate that even if part of the data is 
quantitative, what matters is that ‘the bulk of the analysis is interpretive’. The 
purpose, they argue, is to carry out a ‘qualitative analysis’ which they define as ‘a 
nonmathematical process of interpretation’.  
Furthermore, Strauss and Corbin (pp. 10-11) identify three components of qualitative 
research: (1) the data; (2) the procedure used to interpret the data, and (3) the written 
and verbal report (this thesis and the viva, in my case). 
My research project has used questionnaires to collect data. However, it remains 
within the boundaries of qualitative research. Although I use some basic 
mathematical procedures when analysing the data, the purpose is not to make 
generalisations based on the results of the mathematical operations. For example, 
when I calculate the average of marks given by the respondents, I do not use it to 
conclude that an x% of Jordanians believe, agree, disagree, prefer, or reject. Instead, 
I use the marks to explore the reasons that prompted the respondents to give high or 
low marks. 
As defined by Yin (1994), case study research method is ‘an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
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the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (p. 13). 
Therefore, as a research method, case study is an effective approach when dealing 
with a complex and broad issue such as democracy and its incompatibility with 
Islam/ism. 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 534) defines case study as ‘a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings’. Furthermore, she points 
out that case study research mixes data collection methods such as archives, 
interviews, questionnaires, and observations’ (p. 534). 
Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 221) lists five misunderstandings surrounding case study 
research.1 The first is of a general nature and suggests that ‘theoretical (context-
independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-
dependent) knowledge’. The second is that it is not possible to ‘generalize on the 
basis of an individual case; therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific 
development’. The third misunderstanding identified by Flyvbjerg is that case study 
approach ‘is most useful for generating hypotheses; that is, in the first stage of a total 
research process, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and 
theory building’. The fourth misunderstanding is based on a perception that the case 
study method ‘contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency to confirm the 
researcher’s preconceived notions’. The final misunderstanding leads sceptics to 
believe that it is not possible through the case study approach to summarise and 
develop general propositions and theories on the basis of specific case studies. 
Case study is an established method. Some researchers have used it to study not only 
a country, but narrowed it down to an individual such as Rachid al-Ghannouchi, 
Hassan al-Turabi, and Bernard Lewis—to name but a few. Again, the nature of the 
research problem points to which method is appropriate and valid. Van Wagenen 
(1991) argues that the best justification for research is that ‘it allows us to 
understand’, and he warns against justifying research on the basis that ‘it has 
practical applications’ (p. 114). The corollary of this warning is that research should 
not be justified by the need to make generalisations, as these are inherently flawed.   
                                                 
1
 I encountered scepticism about case study approach during the stages of discussing my proposal and 
reports regarding the progress of my research. 
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The interviews I conducted during the course of the research fall within the category 
of ‘elite interviews’. As defined by Dexter (1970) an elite interview is one ‘with any 
interviewee […] who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given 
special, non-standardized treatment’ (p. 5). Although Dexter is aware that ‘elite’ 
connotes superiority and he is unhappy about that, he argues that alternative terms 
are not more satisfactory. He further argues that ‘out of necessity,’ elite interviews 
have ‘been adopted much more often with the influential, the prominent, and the 
well-informed than with the rank-and-file of a population’ (p. 6). 
I interviewed twenty-three people in Jordan; I endeavoured to have a cross-section of 
political views. The list of interviewees includes former high ranking officials, 
activists, women, Muslims and Christians. The interviews I conducted were semi-
structured. I would prepare core questions for every interviewee. The questions 
would cover common themes, but would also seek unique information from the 
individual interviewee, in relation to his/her position and perspective. This formula 
allowed me to ask follow-up questions that seek out further information or 
explanations for what would otherwise be brief or unclear answers. The interviewees 
chose the venue and time. Some of them preferred their offices; others their homes. 
In securing an appointment, I sought the help of various individuals either to provide 
me with a contact number, or to help in getting the appointment. 
A democratic audit, as defined by Beetham (1994, p. 25), ‘is the simple but 
ambitious project of assessing the state of democracy in a single country’. It is 
accurate to suggest that it is ‘ambitious’; it is not simple. However, the democratic 
audit and related issues will be outlined and discussed separately. 
To conclude this section, it is necessary to restate that the methods adopted in the 
thesis are the reflection of the nature of the problem being researched, and that mixed 
methods are used integratively, not discreetly. 
Research Resources 
The data used in this thesis consist of interviews, two questionnaires, primary 
sources, secondary sources, and online sources. As regards primary sources, the 
research has sought to use as many primary sources as possible, such as policy 
documents and campaign manifestos. It is inevitable to use secondary sources. These 
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include books, periodicals, newspapers, magazines and reliable websites, namely, 
official websites and/or those that are well-established and the individuals/parties 
behind them are known. Moreover, several field trips were made; one coincided with 
the tenth anniversary of the accession to the throne by King ‛Abdullah II; another 
during the elections of November 2010; and a third took place after waves of weekly 
of protests to demand reforms (April 2011). 
Constraints and Limitations 
Arrangements to set up interviews require time. An introduction by a local who 
personally knows the interviewee facilitates making an appointment. During the 
interview itself, some interviewees prefer to speak in generalised terms, instead of 
addressing the specifics of the question. 
It is known that the Jordanian authorities prosecute individuals who make critical 
remarks of the regime, especially of the king and the ruling family. Therefore, one 
should not expect the interviewees to express frank views to someone they are 
meeting for the first time, and where the interviewer is using a tape recorder. 
Moreover, it is known that books can be banned if they are considered to contain 
critical views of Jordan. The authorities may initiate legal proceedings if an author 
lives in Jordan. 
The implications of these constraints and limitation for the thesis are minimal. The 
number of interviewees and the diversity of their backgrounds and affiliations 
produced a clear and balanced picture of the state of affairs in Jordan.  
A Note on Using The Qur’anic Verses 
When a discussion requires referring to a certain verse in the Qur’an, I have provided 
the verse in Arabic and then an English translation. Initially, I wrote a footnote to 
indicate that relying on the English translation would be problematic. At the latest 
stage in writing this thesis, I chose to write this note because the point it raises is 
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very important. It does not matter how a certain word, such as shura, is translated in 
the various translations of the Qur’an, whether consultation or deliberation. My 
discussion is based on the Arabic text, not the translation. 
I have chosen to rely on the translation by Tarif Khalidi (2009). I switched to 
Khalidi’s translation because he used ‘measured modern English’. Another reason is 
that he has chosen not to ‘force a meaning’ on ambiguous verses. He has also sought 
to achieve a ‘balance between the familiarly modern and the alienating archaic, while 
preferring at all times as literal a rendering as possible’ (p. xxi). This may help make 
the translation more accessible. However, relying on a translation of the Qur’an 
carries the risk of basing a discussion on meanings and connotations in a foreign 
language. Therefore, I reiterate that my discussion is based on the verses in Arabic. 
PART 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
‘A theory,’ as defined by Brewer (2000, 192), ‘is a set of interrelated abstract 
propositions about human affairs and the social world that explain their regularities 
and properties’. He also explains that theories are not ‘descriptive statements’ (p. 
192). Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 18) note that the role of the theoretical 
framework is to explain ‘the main things to be studied—the key factors, constructs or 
variables—and the presumed relationship among them’. 
Back in the 1950s, Dahl (1956) observed that ‘there is no democratic theory but 
democratic theories’ (p. 1). One can easily imagine that they must have multiplied 
fifty years later. The first challenge to face a researcher is the definition of 
democracy, one that goes beyond the denotation of the Greek term which means rule 
of people. Before that, however, I shall outline arguments about democracy, 
beginning with the one that contests the notion itself, then different arguments that 
contest models, conceptualisations, cultural compatibility, and prerequisites for 
democracy. After that, I shall refer to the arguments that define democracy. 
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Democracy: Contesting the Concept 
Haynes (2001) states ‘defining democracy is a tricky task’ (p. 8). Keane (1991) 
acknowledges that ‘the concept of democracy is currently dogged by confusion’ (p. 
168). Hoffman (1988, p. 131) emphatically states: ‘Democracy is without doubt the 
most contested and controversial concept in political theory’. Similarly, Saikal 
(2003) suggests that ‘democracy is an overloaded concept. Historically, it meant 
different things to different people’. He further explains that ‘there is no consensus 
[in Western countries] as to precisely what the concept means and how best to 
express the idea’. He also points out that there is no ‘widespread agreement among 
theorists and practitioners as to whether democracy is a form of government, a 
method of choosing a government, or a term applied to a whole society’ (p. 111). 
One finds that scholars approach the definition of democracy with some hesitation. 
Reference is often made to Gallie ([1956] 1968) who argued that democracy is an 
‘essentially contested concept’. Therefore, the logical start for this discussion is 
Gallie’s argument. 
According to Gallie (1968), there are concepts that are essentially contested, such as 
religion, art, science, democracy and social justice (p. 168; my emphasis). To fit the 
classification, a concept must meet five conditions (pp. 161-168): 
(I) The concept in question must be appraisive in the sense that it signifies or 
accredits some kind of valued achievement. [Emphasis in original]. 
(II) This achievement must be of an internally complex character, for all that 
its worth is attributed to it as a whole. 
(III) Any explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to the 
prescriptive contributions of its various parts or features [...] the accredited 
achievement is initially variously describable. [Emphasis in original]. 
(IV) The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of 
considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances; any such 
modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance […] any such 
achievement [is] ‘open’ in character. 
(V) [E]ach party recognises the fact that its own use of it is contested by those 
of other parties. 
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In order to distinguish an essentially contested concept from those which are 
‘radically confused’, Gallie has two more conditions (p. 168): 
(VI) [T]he derivation of any such concept from an original exemplar whose 
authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept. 
(VII) [T]he probability or plausibility, in appropriate senses of these terms, of 
the claim that the continuous competition for acknowledgment as between the 
contestant users of the concept enables the original exemplar’s achievement 
to be sustained or developed in optimum fashion. 
Gallie characterises democracy as a term which is ‘complicated, highly emotionally 
charged and confusing’. He rejects the temptation to clarify the confusion. He 
proceeds to explain how the term, democracy, meets those seven conditions, and 
therefore validates the argument that democracy is an essentially contested concept 
(p. 178). 
Gray (1977) speculates that such concepts ‘occur characteristically in social contexts 
which are recognizably those of an ideological dispute’ (p. 333). Gray is sceptical 
about Gallie’s characterisation of essentially contested concepts, and considers 
Gallie’s to be essentially contested itself (p. 339). Birch (1993), however, points out 
that concepts and their contestability change, and what might have been contested 
before may eventually cease to be (pp. 8-9). 
Contesting the notion of democracy and what it means takes different forms. One 
way is to argue that there is more than one model of democracy. Scholars have 
referred to models of democracy in broad and limited senses of the term. According 
to Macpherson (1977), a ‘model’ means ‘a theoretical construction intended to 
exhibit and explain the real relations, underlying the appearances, between or within 
the phenomenon under study’ (pp. 2-3). Held (1995, p. 5), on the other hand, is more 
specific in his use of the term ‘model’. He identifies three models for democracy: (1) 
direct or participatory democracy; (2) liberal or representative democracy; and (3) 
one-party democracy.  
Macpherson’s definition of a model is theoretical and seems close to the next 
argument to be outlined below, namely, different conceptualisations of democracy. 
Held’s use of the term, model, is more descriptive of how democracy is practised. He 
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also indicates that as regards the third model, ‘some may doubt whether it is a form 
of democracy at all’ (p. 5). The two uses of model suggest that the talk about ‘models 
of democracy’ is vague, and it can be understood only when the individuals using it 
explain what they means by it. 
Connolly (1995) notes that ‘Macpherson’s explorations of the democratic ideal 
occurred in the context of several debates’, such as  the ‘pluralist-elitist debate, [...] 
the clash between participatory and representationist ideals of democracy, the 
relation between economic equality and democratic citizenship, [and] the 
comparative superiority of capitalism or socialism’. However, Connolly concedes 
that these debates ‘have now been displaced’ (p. 76). 
In the discussion above, Held identified ‘liberal or representative democracy’ as a 
model, but there are two elements in need of clarification: representative democracy 
and the link between democracy and liberalism. 
‘Is direct democracy preferable? Is it still possible?’ Asks Sartori (1962, p. 253). If it 
was possible for the people of a Greek city-state to meet in one place, it is no longer 
possible to accommodate the people of a nation-state in one venue. Consequently, 
direct democracy is usually seen in smaller bodies, clubs for instance, or on certain 
occasions, such as referenda. The more practical form of democracy is representative 
democracy, where voters choose people to represent them in parliament or similar 
bodies empowered to enact laws and hold the executive branch of government 
accountable. Sartori points out that all modern democracies are indirect, namely, 
people are governed by the representatives they elect (p. 252). 
The relationship between liberalism and democracy is a more complex issue, and 
arouses debates between the supporters of both, especially with regard to the right 
balance between the two. As Bobbio (1990, p. 25) correctly points out: ‘As a theory 
of state […] liberalism is modern, whereas democracy as a form of government is 
ancient’. Gray (1995) explains that ‘liberalism is no older than the seventeenth 
century’. He notes that the first use of the term ‘liberal’ to describe ‘a political 
movement’ occurred in 1812 by a Spanish party, the Liberales. Before that, it was 
used by ‘Adam Smith when he referred to “the liberal plan of equality, liberty and 
justice”.’ (p. xi). 
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As Dworkin (1983) explains, one aspect of liberalism is concerned with government 
and the individual. In this respect, liberalism requires that the ‘government must be 
neutral on matters of personal morality, [and] that it must leave people free to live as 
they think best so long as they do not harm others’. The other aspect of liberalism, 
according to Dworkin, is concerned with economics. In this regard, liberalism 
requires the government ‘to reduce economic inequality, both through the 
management of the economy and through the welfare programmes that redistribute 
wealth to soften the impact of poverty’. 
Zakaria (2004, p. 20) notes that most of the European countries by 1940 ‘adopted 
important aspects of constitutional liberalism—the rule of law, private property 
rights, and increasingly, separated powers and free speech and assembly’. He further 
notes that before the twentieth century, ‘most countries in Western Europe were 
liberal autocracies or, at best, semi-democracies. The franchise was tightly restricted, 
and elected legislatures had little power’ (p. 20). 
In view of the above, one often finds the adjective illiberal added to democracy to 
suggest that it is an inadequate form of democracy, which lacks the personal 
freedoms and elements of the capitalist system—primarily the market economy. For 
instance, although Iran holds regular elections, and its people have elected several 
presidents since the creation of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, Iran is referred 
to as illiberal democracy (Zakaria 2004). 
Liberalism nonetheless is preferred by some to democracy. Sartori (1962) refers to 
Kant’s ‘blunt rejection of democracy as being a form of tyranny rule’ (p. 262). 
Sartori also indicates that Madison and Hamilton, two of the Founding Fathers of the 
United States, ‘did not think different from Kant on the subject’ (p. 288). Such a 
view is not extinct. As Held points out, Hayek distinguishes ‘between liberalism and 
democracy,’ and that Hayek has stated that ‘if democracy means “the unrestricted 
will of the majority” he is “not a democrat’’.’ (Hayek 1982, p. 39 in Held 1987, p. 
248). 
The idea that democracy is an unrestricted, irrational rule of the majority is out-
dated. Sartori (1962, pp. 460-461) has argued that ‘without liberty, democracy has no 
meaning’. Fifty years later, Beetham (2004, pp. 61-75) echoes the same argument: 
18 
democracy and freedom are inseparable. ‘Without freedom,’ Beetham asserts, ‘there 
can be no democracy’ (p. 61). Bobbio (1990, p. 37) summarises the debate about 
liberalism and democracy by saying that ‘democracy can be seen as the natural 
development of liberalism’. This conclusion, however, is not contradictory because it 
does not imply that democracy has continued since the Greek city-state. It 
specifically applies to the re-emergence of democracy in modern times, and the 
debates that surrounded liberalism and democracy.  
I subscribe to the views of Sartori, Beetham, and Bobbio. This, however, does not 
conclude the discussion about democracy.  
Another way of contesting the notion of democracy is to suggest that there are other 
conceptualisations in non-Western cultures which reconcile democracy with cultural 
identities. Esposito and Voll (1996) accept Gallie’s argument that democracy is a 
contested concept, and go on to say that other cultures have something to offer. To 
engage with this view, I shall refer to Philip Hitti (1948, p. 15) who suggests that the 
Arab clan is run along democratic lines: 
In judicial, military and other affairs of common concern the sheikh is not an 
absolute authority; he must consult with the tribal council composed of the 
heads of component families. His tenure of office lasts during the good-will 
of his constituency. 
To avoid giving the impression that the above interpretation stretches the comparison 
with democracy, it is necessary to show that Hitti refers to the Arab as democrat (p. 
15): 
The Arabian in general and the Bedouin in particular is a born democrat. He 
meets his sheikh on an equal footing. The society in which he lives levels 
everything down. The Arabian almost never uses the title malik (king) except 
in referring to foreign rulers.  
Esposito and Voll (1996, p. 23) also suggest that al-Mawdudi has developed an 
Islamic concept of democracy. I shall discuss their suggestion and the concept in the 
chapter about democracy and Islam/ism. I will limit myself here to pointing out that 
in making the argument that other cultures have different conceptualisations of 
democracy, Esposito and Voll disagree with the next argument in this discussion, 
namely, that democracy cannot take root in all cultures. 
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Democracy and Cultures 
The idea that democracy can only prosper in specific cultural or religious settings 
belongs to Max Weber who has argued that capitalism and democracy required 
Christian Protestant ethics. As regards Islam, Weber compared it to Judaism and 
concluded that it ‘lacked the requirement of a comprehensive knowledge of the law 
and lacked the intellectual training in casuistry which nurtured the rationalism of 
Judaism’ (in Hunter and Malik 2005: pp. 11-12). Weber was not an orientalist who 
had immersed himself in studying Arabic and Islam. Therefore, his conclusion 
should be met with scepticism.  
Rodinson (1977, p. 91) contradicts Weber and reaches the conclusion that ‘the Koran 
accords a much larger place to reason than the scared books of Judaism and 
Christianity’. In addition, Francis Fukuyama (1992, pp. 220-221) disagrees with 
Weber: 
Weber’s account of democracy is, as usual, historically rich and insightful. 
But he portrays democracy as something that could only have arisen in the 
specific cultural and social milieu of a small corner of the Western 
civilization. 
Fukuyama is dismissive of the arguments that there are ‘cultural “prerequisites” for 
democracy’ and calls for treating them ‘with some scepticism,’ because ‘cultures are 
not static phenomena like the laws of nature; they are human creations that undergo 
continuous process of evolution’ (p. 222). However, as shall be seen in another 
chapter, Fukuyama contradicts himself when it comes to Islam and democracy. 
Prerequisites for Democracy 
There is a variety of other prerequisites which scholars argue should be satisfied 
before democracy can work as a system of government. Huntington (1991) 
summarises factors that are supposed to ‘explain democratization’ (pp. 37-38). The 
list includes factors such as being ‘a British colony’ and ‘occupation by a 
prodemocratic foreign power’. If the latter factor was true, it would have produced 
democratic states in the Arab world, whose regions were occupied by Britain and 
France. 
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Lipset (1959) identifies a relationship between democracy and development by 
looking at indices related to ‘industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education’. 
However, he warns against concluding that ‘an increase in wealth, in the size of the 
middle class, in education, and other related factors will necessarily mean the spread 
of democracy or the stabilizing of democracy’ (p. 103). His warning is sound as the 
wealth acquired by the oil-producing countries in the Arab world did not lead to 
democracy, despite the fact that the wealth also led to an increase in education, 
industrialisation, and urbanisation. 
In Przeworski’s studies of the link between democracy, dictatorship, and per capita 
income, he  points out that ‘democracies survive in wealthy countries’ because ‘the 
potential increase in income that would result from establishing their dictatorship is 
not worth the sacrifice of freedom’ (2005, p. 8). Furthermore, Przeworski notes: 
‘Democracy can survive in poor countries but only under special conditions, namely, 
when the distribution of income is very egalitarian’ (p. 9).  
 Rustow (1967, p. 228) identifies four ‘antecedents of democracy’. They are: 
(1) A history anywhere from 40 to 130 years of administrative and 
educational modernization. 
(2) A stable geographic context for the political system throughout the 
same period. 
(3) A tradition, dating back at least one, two or three generations of 
parties […] that provided some organic link between rulers and subjects, and 
that were able to involve progressively larger groups in the political process. 
(4) [T]enacious and bitter conflicts between major social or political 
groups over issues of profound concern to them (pp. 228-229).  
I shall first clarify the difference between modernisation and modernity. The former, 
as explained by Charlton and Andras (2003), is a ‘process’ not a ‘state’, and it ‘can 
be seen as the general mechanism by which the social transformation from 
agricultural dominance to domination by trade and industry takes place and the 
permanent continuation of this process’ (p. 5). They further explain that ‘almost all 
societies are at least partially modernized’ [...] and that ‘no society is “completely” 
modernized’ (p. 5). 
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In contrast, modernity, as defined by Berger (1979, p. 101), is ‘the transformation of 
the world brought about by the technological innovations of the last few centuries, 
first in Europe and then with increasing rapidity all over the worlds’. As defined by 
Giddens (1991, p. 1), modernity is based on ‘modes of social life or organisation 
which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which 
subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence’. However, 
modernity is not limited to technology. As Berger notes, it had ‘economic, social and 
political dimensions, all immense in scope’. One of its consequences on 
‘consciousness’ was ‘fundamentally uprooting beliefs, values, and even emotional 
texture of life’ (p. 101). ‘Modernity,’ Giddens (1991) argues, ‘is universalising’. He 
asks whether modernity is ‘distinctively Western’. His answer is yes, because 
modernity rests on ‘the nation-state and systematic capitalist production’, which, 
according to Giddens, ‘have their roots in specific characteristics of European 
history’ (p. 174; italics in original). 
It is interesting to note that states in Europe, even those who are members of the EU, 
do not agree that there is a pan-European identity, and each state insists on its own 
national identity. Even in some states, such as the UK and Belgium, there are 
national identities that make a British and Belgian identity more of an official 
construct. However, all this is ignored in the discussion of notions such as democracy 
and modernity. The West and Europe become something specific, which Giddens 
uses to make generalisations in order to contrast the West with the East. 
Other scholars are less interested in whether modernity is European or not. They 
have concerns about the impact of modernity where it has prevailed in the West. For 
instance, Berger (1979, pp. 102-110) identifies five dilemmas brought about by 
modernity: (a) abstraction (e.g. capitalist markets, bureaucratised state, and large 
cities); (b) futurity (the future is the primary orientation); (c) individuation 
(separation of individual from collective entities); (d) liberation (not determined by 
fate); and (e) secularization (a threat to the plausibility of religious beliefs). 
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However, I suggest that the religious revival movements of the 1970s and 1980s 
undermined the assumptions regarding religious beliefs and secularization.2 
Of the people who theorised about modernity, I find Rustow (1967) to be the most 
satisfactory. He suggests that modernisation ‘transforms both man and society, but 
most of all man’s mind,’3 and ‘implies an intellectual, a technological and social 
revolution’ (p. 3). I suggest that this provides a better approach to looking at 
modernity and its impact on non-Western, non-European peoples. 
Muslims generally have no problem with the technological aspect of modernity: 
whether it is cars, TVs, telephones, computers or other technological equipment.4 
The social impact of modernisation is a more complex issue. People take time to 
adjust. For example, the education of women was considered unnecessary because a 
woman would most likely get married, and thus stay at home. This attitude however 
has changed. Parents care about education of their daughters and sons. Moreover, the 
social transformation does not necessarily follow the Western route. People have 
adopted and adapted selectively. This, in my view, undermines the unwarranted 
concern about modernity being Westernisation. However, the process of 
modernisation does bring with it the some aspects that cause concern even in the 
West, such as the abstraction and individuation. 
The third transformation, the intellectual, is the hardest, and the slowest. When one is 
brought up to believe that Islam has all the answers, it is hard to accept that there are 
answers in other notions, such as democracy. I suggest that the intellectual 
transformation in the Muslim and Arab world not only has begun, but has taken root. 
A final point made by Rustow which needs to be brought into this discussion is that 
modernisation is ‘a continuing process, […] and no society can claim to be 
completely or definitively modern’ (p. 16). This, in my view, is a valid conclusion, 
                                                 
2
 In 1999, Berger acknowledged that he and others who wrote on ‘secularisation theory’ were wrong: 
‘The world today, with some exceptions […], is as furiously religious as ever was and in some places 
even more’ (p. 2). 
3
 Throughout the book, Rustow uses man. This will make him liable to a feminist critique. 
Modernisation affects men and women. 
4
 Only a tiny minority would oppose the technological aspects. In Saudi Arabia, some people opposed 
TV broadcasting; so did Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the rejection of technology is selective, as 
these people may oppose TV broadcasting, but do not mind radios or cars. 
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and it deprives Giddens and others of the basis on which to say that modernity is 
Western or European. ‘Modernization,’ Rustow suggests, ‘as an analytical concept 
has the advantage of being ethically neutral’ (p. 8). Having examined other analytical 
concepts (in this chapter and others), I am inclined to agree with him, even though a 
completely ‘ethically neutral’ position is impossible. However, to endeavour to be 
ethically neutral is necessary. Moreover, it is a better approach than using analytical 
concepts that are laden with ideological, religious, and cultural prejudices, not in 
terms of being a personal preference, but in terms of validity of conclusions reached 
when a particular analytical concept is used. 
Before I conclude my discussion of modernity and Rustow’s modernisation theory, I 
propose to elaborate on why I have found it preferable to other theories in relation to 
Jordan, despite being considered evolutionary and deterministic. 
In the methods section of the thesis, I have quoted  Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 10-
11) who argue that ‘the nature of the research problem’ influences the selection of 
method. The same applies to choice of theory. I have approached the assessment of 
the state of democracy in Jordan with an open mind, and the democratic audit itself is 
not based on a prejudgment about the state of democracy in Jordan. As can be seen in 
the concluding chapter, other theories were outlined and engaged with, but they were 
not as plausible at explaining the state of democracy revealed by the audit. The 
modernisation theory is not dead. It can be found in different forms in many studies, 
such as those by Przeworski who argues that there is a link between democracy and 
per capita incomes. Therefore, choosing the modernisation theory is objectively 
justified. 
Moreover, although I find Rustow’s reasoning more convincing, I do not uncritically 
adopt his theory. He is wrong to consider modernisation ‘tantamount to 
Westernization’ in the cases of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire (p. 11). He is also 
wrong to have considered Lebanon a democracy and its ‘religious denominations’ a 
substitute for political parties in his four antecedents (p. 228). The Lebanese Civil 
War, which erupted in the 1970s and continued to the 1990s, has demonstrated that 
Lebanon was not a democracy, and that some members of the various ‘religious 
denominations’ were capable of committing unspeakable crimes against members of 
24 
other communities. The Lebanese example negates the argument that religious 
denominations can be a suitable substitute for political parties. 
The different theories about what democracy means, its models, and 
conceptualisations lead some scholars, such as Mouffe (2000), to note that there is no 
agreement on how to characterise the ‘type of democracy established in the West in 
the course of the last two centuries’ (p. 1). Amongst the names used in this regard: 
‘modern democracy, pluralist democracy, constitutional democracies [and] liberal 
democracy’. Mouffe, however, has contributed to the confusion by theorising about 
‘radical democracy’ which she describes as ‘the only alternative’ and urges ‘the Left’ 
to ‘adopt a different attitude towards liberal democracy’ (1995, p. 1). This makes it 
clear that the confusion is not real. 
Whitehead (2000) acknowledges the diverse connotations of democracy in different 
cultures, and that it is not possible to ‘assume some underlying continuity of meaning 
for the term’ since the Greek city-state (p. 8). However, he pleads for some 
agreement on the meaning (p. 8): 
Even those who regard ‘democracy’ as an inherently normative label may 
have good reason to favour clear and impartial procedures for evaluating the 
status of claimants to the title. And even those who regard a ‘minimalist’ or 
‘procedural’ definition as incomplete or culturally biased must consider what 
may be lost if this consensual language is replaced not by universal 
commitment to a more ambitious definition but by an inability to agree on a 
standard meaning, with the resulting licence for subjectivity and arbitrariness. 
Moreover, as Ottaway (2007) suggests: ‘There is no reason to challenge at the 
theoretical level the idea that democracy is a political system superior to all others’ 
(p. 604). I agree with second part of her statement. Theoretical challenges are 
abound. However, unless and until a better system of government emerges and 
proves itself to be superior to democracy, liberal democracy is the best model 
available, despite its defects and the arguments that it is a Eurocentric notion. 
That democracy is not a ‘perfect’ notion and system of government is not in dispute. 
Lefort (1988) acknowledges that ‘democratic institutions have constantly been used 
to restrict means of access to power, knowledge and the enjoyments of rights to a 
minority’ (p. 19). However, he stresses that ‘democracy is instituted and sustained  
by the dissolution of the makers of certainty. It inaugurates a history of which people 
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experience a fundamental indeterminacy as to the basis of power, law and 
knowledge’ (p. 19; italics in original). He goes further and suggests that ‘philosophy 
owes [a great deal] to the democratic experience’ (p. 20). 
Evolution of Definitions of Democracy 
Lipset (1959) defines democracy as ‘a political system which supplies regular 
constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials’ (p. 71). In Finer’s 
definition (1970) ‘democracy is government which is derived from public opinion 
and is accountable to it’. He further explains that the public opinion’ should be 
‘overtly and freely expressed’. The third pillar of the Finer’s definition of democracy 
is that the will of the ‘majority prevails’ (p. 63). 
There is a problematic element in Finer’s definition: the ‘public opinion’. One reason 
is that he uses it as a substitute for the ‘people’ when they are different. Another 
reason is that there is a need to measure public opinion.5 This is usually done in 
polls, whose accuracy and reliability are never certain. In a democracy, however, the 
tangible public opinion (of the majority) is known only after the results of the 
elections are declared.  
Rustow (1967) also offers a definition in which he characterises democracy as ‘a 
modern political system and an egalitarian device,’ and ‘a method of popular 
government; it presupposes the existence of a government and of a people’ (p. 230-
231).  
Schumpeter ([1942] 1976, p. 269) explains that what he calls the ‘classical’ theory of 
democracy envisages a ‘common good’, which is achieved by the people through 
electing individuals who represent them. The classical theory assumes that people 
have ‘a definite and rational opinion about every individual question,’ and, on that 
basis, they elect the individuals who will represent them and ‘who will see to it that 
that opinion is carried out’. However, the decisions that can be made through 
democracy must not be contrary to some values and ideals. For instance, it will not 
be acceptable through democratic means to allow ‘the persecution of Christians, the 
burning of witches and the slaughtering of the Jews’ (p.242).   
                                                 
5
 Even the public is hard to define, and there are multiple publics in a state. Also, the broadest possible 
public hold more than one opinion at a time, and can change opinion overnight. 
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Democracy, Schumpeter argues, is ‘a political method,’ and ‘an institutional 
arrangement,’ whose aim is to reach decisions, ‘legislative and administrative’ 
(p.242). He challenges the basic assumptions of the classical theory of democracy. 
His definition of the ‘the democratic method’ is the ‘institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (p. 269). 
In relation to democracy in South Africa, Deegan (1999) adopted the Schumpeterian 
‘general model of the competitive theory’ because ‘Schumpeter defined democracy 
not as a utopian concept concerned with ideal societies, but rather as a descriptive, 
realistic and empirically accurate process (p. 3). She points out that  ‘pluralism is 
identified with liberalism and the acceptance of certain values’, such as ‘freedom of 
speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, 
which a government would be unable to violate’ (p. 3). 
Brynen, Korany, and Noble (1995) warn against ‘the ethnocentric dangers of reading 
processes derived from one set of historical and political circumstances into other, 
very different, contexts’. However, they also warn against considering democracy to 
be dependent on ‘the eye of the beholder’. Therefore, they argue convincingly that 
‘some conceptual rigour is necessary if the notion of democracy is not debased to 
mean all things to all people’ (p. 4). Moreover, O’Donnell (2007) contends that 
‘there is agreement in most of the contemporary world that, whatever it means, 
democracy is a normatively preferable type of rule’ (p. 3). Sadiki (2004) seems to 
agree partly with O’Donnell, but argues that ‘a normative standpoint should not 
mean overlooking, for instance, cultural specificity’ (p. 54).  
As Huntington (1991) explains, there have been three approaches to democracy since 
the middle of last century. As a form of government, Huntington writes, ‘democracy 
has been defined in terms of authority of government, purposes served by the 
government, and procedures for constituting a government’. The debate continued 
from the 1940s until the 1970s, when Schumpeter won the argument. Huntington 
notes that there are issues of ‘ambiguity and imprecision when democracy is defined 
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in terms of either source or authority and purposes’. Consequently, he adopts the 
procedural definition of democracy advanced by Schumpeter (p. 6). The advantage 
of the procedural definition of democracy, Huntington (1991) explains, is that ‘it 
provides a number of bench-marks […] that make it possible to judge to what extent 
political systems are democratic, to compare systems, and to analyse whether 
systems are becoming more or less democratic’ (p. 7). 
Dahl (1989) has developed some benchmarks. He also uses the term ‘polyarchy’ and 
considers it the highest level of democracy. According to Dahl, polyarchy has two 
main characteristics: (a) citizenship is extended to a relatively high proportion of 
adults, and (b) the rights of citizenship include the opportunity to oppose and vote 
out the highest officials in government. Furthermore, seven institutions are required 
to attain polyarchy: (1) elected officials; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive 
suffrage; (4) right to run for office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative 
information; (7) and associational autonomy (p. 220). 
‘Democracy,’ as succinctly stated by Keane (1991), ‘is best understood as a system 
of procedural rules with normative implications’ (p. 168). The rules are about 
making decisions, and ‘through which procedures such decisions are made’. The 
normative implications, according to Keane, must include: ‘equal and universal adult 
suffrage; majority rule and guarantees of minority rights […]; the rule of law; and 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of assembly and expression and other liberties’ 
(pp. 168-169; italics are in original). 
Interestingly, al-Ghannouchi’s (1993) view of democracy is similar to Keane’s. He 
argues that democracy has shakl wa madmūn (a form and content/implication). The 
madmūn recognises the value of the human and gives him rights such as equality. He 
emphasises that a system which is based on the recognition of  dignity of the human 
being is the best (1993, p. 77).  
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Keane’s definition of democracy is the one adopted in this thesis.6 Nonetheless, the 
principle of rule of law requires a cautionary note. It is a very important principle. 
However, even dictators use the law as a tool of oppression. Therefore, it is 
necessary to have transparent mechanisms of enacting laws, and a supreme court 
should be the final arbiter as to whether a law is constitutional or not. 
To conclude this part, I would like to state that its purpose has been to establish a 
definition of democracy which informs this thesis. I approach the assessment of 
Jordan’s state of democracy on the basis that it means liberal, representative 
democracy (Sartori 1962) and is a system of procedural rules with normative 
implications (Keane 1991). It will be an absurdity to engage in an exercise to assess 
the state of democracy in Jordan if it is carried out on the basis that democracy is a 
meaningless concept. The discussion, however, will continue in the following 
chapters. 
PART 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this part, I shall review some primary and secondary sources. The former includes 
a speech by King Hussein in which he announced holding elections, and policy 
documents of the MB/IAF. The secondary literature includes published books and 
unpublished PhD theses. 
(A) Primary Sources 
In the speech to the nation delivered on 7 October 1989, King Hussein says that 
many people believe that ‘we are knocking on the doors of a new era only because 
we are resuming our democratic parliamentary life’ (my emphasis). 7 He explains 
that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in June 1967 is the reason for not 
exercising democracy for twenty-two years, as it ‘was impossible to hold such 
elections’. King Hussein’s statement has two parts. The parliamentary part of the 
                                                 
6
 In 2009, Keane published a new book: The Life and Death of Democracy. He stresses that the book 
‘most certainly stands on the side of democracy, with new arguments’ (p. xxxiii). 
7
 Posted on King Hussein’s official website (http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/speeches_letters.html).  
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statement is correct. There was a parliament before June 1967. The elections for its 
HoD were held in April 1967, a couple of months before the 1967 war. King 
Hussein’s characterisation of that parliamentary life as democratic is problematic in 
view of the previous definitions of democracy. If one uses Lipset’s definition (1959), 
the political system in Jordan before 1967 did not provide ‘regular constitutional 
opportunities for changing the governing officials’ (p. 71). 
Elections on their own, however, do not make a country or a political system 
democratic.8 Political parties were banned in Jordan since 1957. Civil and political 
freedoms were restricted. Even the elections of 1989 were held while political parties 
were banned. They became legal to form and operate in 1992. 
King Hussein warned in the speech of the dangers of mixing politics and religion, 
citing the example of Lebanon, where the civil war was still going on: 
With attempts to exploit religion for political purposes and their 
repercussions on Lebanon, in the form of warring organizations, militias and 
parties, we should be very cautious as to what is intended to be portrayed or 
become a Christian-Islamic strife in Lebanon.  
This paragraph reflects the king’s unease at how Islamic candidates might act in the 
campaign, given that the MB was allowed to participate in the elections. However, 
he only chose to appeal to the conscience of the candidates and voters to act 
responsibly. 
I shall now refer to major MB/IAF documents: three electoral manifestos (1993, 
2003, and 2007), and the MB/IAF’s ‘vision’ for reform in Jordan (2005). The 1993 
manifesto introduces IAF to the electorate, emphasises its Islamic nature, and 
explains the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ (p. 1). The introduction also stresses the 
importance of the Palestine question. The manifesto of 1993 is a booklet of fifty-four 
pages which contain a detailed programme. Any suggestion that the IAF/MB run on 
a single slogan is baseless. Moreover, the four documents have a great deal in 
common. One can consider them as slightly modified versions of each other. The 
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 In relation to the notion of ‘elections without democracy’, Sadiki (2009) extensively demonstrates 
that the Arab world has seen a phenomenon he calls ‘electoralism’ and ‘election fetishism’ between 
1975 and 1997 (p. vii; italics in original). 
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introductions to the manifestos of 2003 and 2007 are much shorter, and they contain 
language that is less religious. The fact that the manifesto of 1993 was IAF’s first 
could explain the need for a longer introduction and the use of the religious language, 
which relied on quoting the Qur’an and hadith.  
Moreover, the four documents of IAF/MB have a major common theme in relation to 
freedoms and democracy in Jordan: dissatisfaction, which led to boycotting the 
elections in 1997 and 2010. A democratic audit of Jordan will help establish the 
extent of democracy in Jordan, and consequently will indirectly test the IAF/MB 
claims with regard to the defects of democracy in Jordan.  
(B) Secondary Sources 
This part of the review covers research carried out by al-Sharah (1997); Robinson 
(1998); Boulby (1999); Lynch (1999); Wiktorowicz (2001); Lust-Okar (2001); 
Moaddel (2002); Noyon (2003); al-Braizat (2003); Knowles (2005); Lucas (2005); 
Schwedler (2006); Brown (2006); Jamal (2007); Massad (2001), and Gunning 
(2009). 
Boulby (1999) studies the MB movement in Jordan from 1945 to 1993. She points 
out that in the elections of 1989, the movement ‘shied away from references to an 
Islamic state and indeed focused on the general compatibility of Islam and 
democracy’. Consequently, the movement attracted support from Palestinians and 
Transjordanians ‘whose primary concern was democratization rather than 
Islamization’ (p. 107). 
In addition, she refers to the fact that the MB took part in the elections of 1954, and 
had done so ‘for pragmatic reasons, namely, in order to increase political influence’. 
In the 1980s, Boulby notes, the movement ‘made much of the compatibility of its 
political goals with liberal democracy,’ and ‘stressed the central role of the Islamic 
principle of shura as being similar to the notion of parliamentary representation’ (pp. 
115-116). She also notes that although ‘the attainment of liberal democracy was not 
the Brotherhood’s ultimate goal the movement nonetheless served as a liberating 
force in Jordanian politics’ (p. 116). 
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Although Boulby’s research and mine share interest in the MB and democracy in 
Jordan, her research spans a period of nearly fifty years, and stops at 1993, a few 
years after the elections of 1989. The focus of my research is a period of twenty 
years (1990-2010) during which six rounds of elections took place.  
Schwedler (2006) refers to the point of compatibility of Islam and democracy when 
she quotes ‛Abd al-Latif ‛Arabiyyat as saying that IAF sees ‘democracy as 
contemporary form of Shura, a mechanism through which we can govern in 
accordance with God’s laws’. She points out, however, that ‛Arabiyyat explained 
that the ‘ultimate sovereignty lies in the hands of God, and not the people, as 
“Western” versions of democracy demand’ (p. 157). 
Schwedler’s approach is comparative. She seeks to examine ‘the implied causal 
link between inclusion and moderation’ (p. 2). She has chosen to compare the IAF 
in Jordan and the Islah (Reform) Party in Yemen. The two parties are Islamic in 
orientation, and both participated in competitive elections which took place in the 
two countries. While interest in IAF is common, my research is not comparative. 
Mine seeks to establish how democratic Jordan is. 
Al-Braizat (2003) examines the issue of Islam and liberal democracy with Jordan as 
a case study. His thesis is highly relevant, as it deals with Jordan and the 
in/compatibility between Islam and liberal democracy. Al-Braizat disagrees with the 
culturalist/orientalist tradition dominating the literature on Islam and Middle East 
politics which argues that ‘there is an inherent incompatibility between Islam and 
political modernity’ (p. 14; emphasis in original).  
Al-Braizat’s approach is empirical. He conducts a poll which leads him to conclude 
that Islam and democracy are not incompatible and that Muslims in Jordan are keen 
on democracy. According to al-Braizat, ‘rational choice theory has a lot to offer in 
explaining why Arab states have not democratised yet’ (p. 16). He faults the scholars 
who use ‘the Freedom House scores for the twenty three Muslim countries as a 
representation of “democracy and individual rights” in these countries’ and fail to 
recognise ‘that these scores represent regimes’ performance not attitudes of the 
populations at large’ (p. 44). 
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Although al-Braizat revisits the claim of incompatibility of Islam and democracy, he 
does not examine the issue from the perspective of Muslims who have said that Islam 
and democracy are incompatible. Moreover, although rational choice theory can 
partly explain the absence of democracy in Jordan, one remains in doubt as to 
whether people truly wish to live under an undemocratic system of government, 
despite al-Braizat’s finding that there was no incompatibility between Islam and 
democracy. 
Lucas (2005) examines the other side of the coin of the incompatibility claim, 
namely ‘the features of authoritarian regimes that facilitate the stability of autocracy’ 
(p. 1). He seeks to explain how the ‘Jordanian regime managed to survive external 
challenges and control domestic threats’. Lucas asks: ‘Can the Jordanian monarchy’s 
success help explain the surprising durability of authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
world?’ His method is based on the ‘institutional approach,’ which ‘blends the 
culturalist, structuralist and rationalists accounts’ (p. 1). The culturalist element in 
the blend is a cause for concern, especially in light of the fact that the culturalist 
tradition has been criticised, not least in Al-Braizat’s PhD thesis referred to above.  
Moreover, as Lucas points out, his study ‘concerns itself with the Jordanian regime’s 
manipulation of institutional rules in three venues: political parties, the Jordanian 
Parliament […] and the press’ (p. 7). This is relevant to my research as these issues 
are addressed in the democratic audit. However, the democratic audit covers many 
more issues, and the time period of interest in also different. 
Wiktorowicz (2001) studies not only the MB, but other Islamic groups, specifically 
the Salafi movement. His study is useful in alerting researchers to the need to avoid 
sweeping generalisations, namely, that because the relationship between the MB and 
regime was cordial in the past, it would remain so permanently. Subsequent events 
support his inclination not to generalise. Ever since the MB/IAF became the main 
opposition group in Jordan, the conflicts with the government have been on the 
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increase, especially during the premiership of Ma‛ruf al-Bakhit, who had harsh 
words for the leadership of IAF/MB for boycotting the municipal elections in 2006. 
 In one chapter, Wiktorowicz looks at the organisations that belong to the Islamic 
movements. He notes that these organisations are dominated by men (p. 88). He 
attributes this to the fact that ‘the Islamic movements themselves are dominated by 
men,’ and to the ‘Islamist values of segregation, which separates men and women 
and typically places women in less public role’ (p. 88). This is hardly surprising. 
Religious movements are conservative in nature, especially in the Muslim world. The 
examination of the MB’s attitude towards women and their rights required deeper 
analysis. 
Noyon (2003) examines Islam and politics in four countries: Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia 
and Algeria. According to Noyon, there are four currents within the IAF (p. 92):  
(1) The pragmatists are those who ‘advocate working with the government by 
consensus’. 
(2) The activists focus on ‘domestic political reform, international Muslim 
solidarity, and non-normalization of relations with Israel’. 
(3) Traditional conservatives concentrate on ‘reforms of the sharia religious 
education’. 
(4) Ultra-Conservatives are ‘doctrinaire on social issues and rejectionist on 
foreign policy’. 
If the foreign policy concerns relations with Israel, and/or the USA, one can see why 
the rejectionist term is used by Noyon. A state’s foreign policy, however, is not 
based on the attitude towards a single issue or one country. Jordan has relations with 
many countries. Therefore, to use the attitude towards the ‘peace process’ in the 
Middle East as a basis to describe a group as ‘rejectionist’ is not justified. 
Noyon points out that ‘Westernized elites tolerate inept, corrupt and repressive 
regimes out of fear that an Islamic regime would not guarantee their rights and would 
be more socially repressive’ (p. 25). One wonders whether these elites adopt this 
attitude only out of concern with their rights. There is also a possibility that these 
elites have common interests with the rulers and the fear Noyon refers to is a pretext. 
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Moreover, it is untenable to argue that there are always two choices: authoritarianism 
or a very conservative way of life. Although the point about Westernised elites is 
brief, Noyon makes a good case for why the Islamists should be included in the 
political process (p. 95): 
If change is to be based on the model of multi-party, democratic system, it 
will of necessity involve the question of integrating political Islamists who 
address the interest of merging classes and social trends and who seek to 
participate in government.  
In relation to Jordan, this kind of advice has been heeded but, as has been argued by 
Robinson (1998), what happened in Jordan was ‘defensive democratization’, as will 
be outlined below. 
Brown’s study (2006) of IAF/MB is highly relevant to my own research. Brown 
notes that IAF ‘may be the most democratic party in the region in terms of internal 
operations’ (p. 3). He further notes that the IAF ‘has built an impressive set of 
democratic structures internally. Party leaders are elected by membership and there is 
regular turnover in top positions’ (p. 6). Brown’s sole focus is the IAF/MB. In 
contrast, my research project has sought to explore the conditions in which the 
IAF/MB operate, and to assess the state of democracy in Jordan. 
Al-Sharah’s PhD thesis (1997) is about the process which was launched in 1989. He 
states that his objective is ‘to explore and analyse the political liberalization in 
Jordan,’ and ‘to review Jordan’s experience with representative institutions at earlier 
periods’ (p. 1). The most relevant part of his study is the period between 1989 and 
1993. Even in this part, his approach is broad in that he looks at all parties, not just 
the MB/IAF. Al-Sharah concludes that ‘[a]n unwritten pact seems to exist between 
the monarchy and the Islamists, resulting in what could be described as the major 
potential opposition following the rules of the liberalization process’ (p. 323). 
Wiktorowicz (2001) makes a similar point in relation to the MB when he notes that it 
‘never seriously challenged the legitimacy or power of the ruling regime’ (p. 95). In 
contrast, ‘the Egyptian Brotherhood experienced violent clashes with president ‛Abd 
al-Nasser’. Although Wiktorowicz mentions the ‘relatively cordial and cooperative 
relationship with the Hashimite monarchy’ (p. 95), he also refers to issues on which 
both sides disagreed, such as the British presence in the country; the relationship 
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with the Shah of Iran in 1978 and 1979; Jordan’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq 
War; and keeping diplomatic ties with Egypt when other Arab states severed them 
after the signing of the Camp David Accords (p. 99).  
Moaddel (2002) studies the relationship between the state and religious movements 
in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria. In the three Arab countries, he studies the 
relationship with the MB. In Egypt there is an active Christian Coptic religious 
movement which is not included in Moaddel’s book. Nonetheless, my thesis shares 
Moaddel’s interest in studying Jordan and the relationship between the MB and the 
state. Moaddel advocates a notion of ‘Jordanian exceptionalism’ because unlike 
Syria and Egypt, there has been no persecution of the MB in Jordan. Moaddel 
suggests that ‘the state’s inclusionary policy towards the MB solidified the MB-
Hashimite alliance’ (p. 3). This is another uncritical view of the relationship between 
both sides. It is untenable in light of subsequent events and the change of monarch in 
1999. Moreover, the suggestion of an inclusionary policy is in need of scrutiny to 
establish whether, and to what extent, it is inclusionary. The democratic audit asks 
specific questions in this regard. 
The validity of the statements about a pact, written or not, between the regime and 
the MB, is not sustainable when one looks at the period up until 2010. The MB/IAF 
boycotted the elections in 1997 and 2010. The relationship between King ‛Abdullah 
II and the MB/IAF is different from the one maintained by King Hussein. Moreover, 
the relationship between the governments and the MB/IAF became adversarial. 
Boulby (1999) examines the issue of popularity of the MB in the elections and 
attempts to explain it. Despite incomplete information about the breakdown of 
election results with regard to gender and occupation, she notes (p. 105): 
Analysis of this regional breakdown of the Brotherhood’s vote highlights 
its ability to appeal to all social classes and both Palestinians and 
Transjordanians. The Brotherhood was elected in the urban centers of 
Amman and Irbid which have the kingdom’s highest concentration of 
Palestinians, ranging from the wealthiest to destitute camp-dwellers. The 
movement also won seats in the richest constituencies of Amman, home 
of the East Bank and Palestinian business elite.  
Therefore, Boulby disagrees with the suggestion that the appeal of the MB can be 
explained by ‘a single universal economic or political explanation’. She quotes other 
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scholars, such as Davis, Marty, and Appleby, who disagree with downplaying the 
importance of religion in people’s lives (p.106). 
Boulby’s study is realistic in its approach, especially when she recognises the fact 
that the MB enjoys the support of a cross-section of the population of Jordan. 
However, she too repeats the criticism of the Islamic movements in general that their 
ideology is vague, and their ‘political agenda’ is ‘ill-defined’ (p. 115). The MB/IAF 
documents briefly reviewed above do not support this conclusion. However, in 
fairness one can say that these documents were not available at the time she 
conducted her research in Jordan.  
Noyon (2003) observes that Jordan ‘has allowed Islamists more freedom to organise 
and more autonomy in their social and political activities than have most other Arab 
states’ (p. 81; emphasis added). There is some generalisation here, especially 
regarding the political activities towards which the government still shows hostility, 
and often prevents political activities from taking place. 
Robinson (1998) considers Jordan a ‘rentier state’, namely, one which depends on 
‘international rents instead of direct taxation for a disproportionate share of its 
government revenues’ (p. 389). In relation to the elections of 1993, Robinson 
disagrees with the suggestion that the popularity of the Islamists declined. He notes 
that ‘they did so well in an electoral system clearly designed to work against their 
interest’ (p. 399). The measurement of their success is reflected in winning ‘more 
than a quarter of all parliamentary seats’, which is equivalent to ‘a third of all non-
quota seats’ (p. 399). 
Robinson attributes the success of MB/IAF to three factors: (a) being ‘the best-
organised’ group which was able to provide ‘social services in places where the 
government had little such presence’; (b) the candidates ‘were seen as pious, selfless, 
and incorruptible’; and (c) the Palestine question and support from the Palestinians in 
Jordanian cities (p. 399). 
Lust-Okar (2001) studies political parties in Jordan, including the MB and IAF. She 
points out that in the 1950s, ‘the Muslim Brotherhood never gained more than four 
seats, or 10 percent, of Parliament in any one election. Hizb al-Tahrir fared worse, 
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gaining only one seat in the 1954 and 1956 elections’ (p. 558). In contrast, the 
MB/IAF ‘won twenty-two seats in the 1989 elections, and sixteen in the 1993 
elections’ (p. 558).  
In explaining the change of fortunes, Lust-Okar attributes the success to three 
reasons. Firstly, the MB ‘operated openly during the 1970s and 1980s […] as a social 
organization’. Secondly, the MB built ‘organizational strength’ as a result of having 
its headquarters in Jordan (unlike other parties). Consequently, the MB ‘built social 
service organizations such as hospitals and charities that raised its profile and 
strengthened its relationship with the masses’. Thirdly, ‘the Islamists have benefited 
from regional conditions’, namely, ‘the ‘Iranian Revolution and the increased 
activity of Islamist political organizations across the region’. Consequently, the MB 
was able ‘to capitalize on this regional rise in popularity’ (pp. 558-559). 
The reasons cited by Robinson and Lust-Okar are in need of re-examination because 
the MB/IAF could not sustain the good results achieved in 1989 and 1993. The 
questions to be answered in this regard are related to whether the MB/IAF have 
exhausted their appeal, become less organised, or there is some other reason. 
Knowles (2005) has studied the political economy of Jordan since 1989, which 
makes his study highly relevant. Knowles focuses on the political economy and does 
not address the issues of incompatibility of democracy and Islam/ism, or the state of 
democracy in Jordan. He firmly places Jordan’s economy in the rentier category. The 
relevance of this characterisation is that there are suggestions that democracy is 
unlikely to establish a foothold in a rentier state. For example, Robinson (1998, p. 
390) notes that one of the characteristics of a rentier state is the ‘depoliticization’ of 
the society. He observes that ‘rentier states are better situated to resist demands for 
significant democratic expansion if the fiscal crisis is limited in scope and time […] 
Conversely, if a rentier state is compelled by budgetary realities to permanently 
extract greater resources from its own society (namely, through taxation), then 
demands for greater inclusion and substantive political restructuring would be 
difficult to resist’ (p. 389).  
Moreover, Robinson characterises the process which started in Jordan in the late 
1980s as ‘defensive democratization’. His argument is that ‘the process is best 
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understood as a series of preemptive measures designed to maintain elite privilege in 
Jordan while limiting the appeal of more fundamental political change’ (p. 387). He 
points out that King Hussein has ‘sought to undermine the only social force legally 
able to disrupt key regime policies, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, and its 
political party, the Islamic Action Front’ (p. 387). According to Robinson, 
‘Parliament’s primary task was to legitimate King Hussein’s political agenda’ (p. 
393). In this regard, the democratic audit covers the role of parliament in contributing 
to democracy. Therefore, there will be a detailed assessment which may support or 
undermine the assertion. 
Al-Sharah (1997) concludes that ‘Jordan has emerged as the most democratically 
open country in the Arab world, in the sense that all political groups and tendencies 
including the Islamists, can participate in the political process’ (p. 323). It is not clear 
what al-Sharah means by ‘most democratically open’ and why he only chose to make 
the comparison in the context of the Arab world. One is left in doubt as to whether 
there are democratic countries in the Arab world, and how he can reach the 
conclusion that Jordan is the most democratic. His assessment is not based on one of 
the various methods used to assess the state of democracy in a given country. 
Schwedler (2006) asserts that Jordan does not even come ‘close to meeting the most 
basic manifestations for democracy’ (p. 2). Lynch (1999) clarifies that his study is 
‘not a comprehensive political history of Jordan, or an overview of the Jordanian 
political system’ (p. 31). His study is related to international relations theory. 
However, of interest is his assertion that since 1989 ‘political discussion in Jordan 
has become remarkably free and open on even the most sensitive topics’ (p. 31). This 
is another example of an assessment not based on well-defined criteria. 
Robinson (1998) uses ‘democratization’ and ‘liberalization’ when he refers to the 
process which started in 1989. When he uses the former he says it ‘has not followed 
the same path as the recent democratic transitions’ elsewhere in the world. When he 
uses ‘liberalization’ he argues that it is ‘a series of pre-emptive measures designed to 
maintain elite privilege’ (p. 347). In these assessments/judgements, there are no 
criteria mentioned with regard to how they are reached. 
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Milton-Edwards (1993) quotes Finer (1970) who classified Jordan as ‘façade 
democracy.’ She tests whether this is still valid and concludes that although there 
have been changes since 1989, ‘there is little evidence to contradict Finer’s 
classification of Jordan as façade democracy’ (p. 201). Therefore, one must first 
identify Finer’s criteria before further discussion of the point. 
Façade democracy, as defined by Finer (1970), is ‘a system where liberal-democratic 
institutions, processes, and safeguards, are established by law but in practice so 
manipulated or violated by a historic oligarchy as to stay in office’ (p. 441). Taking 
this as a crude form of measurement, one can say Milton-Edwards conclusion is not 
erroneous. However, the criteria she used were not detailed enough. Moreover, after 
the war of 1967, Jordan suspended parliamentary life, and after the clashes of 
September of 1970, there were no institutions that could be appropriately called the 
‘liberal democratic institutions, processes and safeguards’. It is correct, however, to 
observer that the prime concern of the ruling dynasty is to stay in office, by means of 
manipulation and violation as Finer observes. 
Finer’s criteria are not calibrated well-enough to measure various aspects of a 
democratic system. This situation leads one to search for better criteria to assess the 
state of democracy in a given country. The democratic audit provides a detailed 
assessment. 
Jamal (2007) studies barriers to democracy in the Palestinian territories, Jordan, 
Egypt, and Morocco. She explains that ‘the discourse on civil society has remained a 
key feature of democracy promotion initiatives’ (p.1). She sets out to test whether 
civil society organisations (CSOs) in these countries ‘promote or depress’ 
democracy. In her view, the relationship of associations to clientelistic and 
authoritarian governments is dramatically different from that between associations 
and democracies’ (p. 3). In relation to Jordan, Jamal refers to the Jordanian law 
concerning voluntary and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) which gives the 
authorities ‘the right to enter the offices of any NGO to review its records’ (p. 121). 
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Because Jamal studies civil society in four countries, one can see that her treatment 
of each country is brief. While her contribution to the field of civil society is 
valuable, the assessment of the state of democracy is not her concern. The 
democratic audit asks relevant questions about civil society which will draw a clearer 
picture for this sector and the overall state of democracy in Jordan. 
Massad (2001) studies identity making in Jordan. He explains that his intention is ‘to 
describe and analyse the processes through which peoples and territories that were 
constituted as a nation in 1921 came to accept this designation and within a few 
decades began to agitate for political rights based on it’ (p. 14). The most relevant 
part of Massad’s study is his discussion of the Palestinian-Transjordanian relations. 
The discrimination against the Palestinians, he suggested, ‘became increasingly 
institutionalized: there was less government representation, less employment in the 
public sector, fewer academic opportunities, and less access to public funds’ (pp. 13-
14). 
 Although my research covers Palestinian-Transjordanian relations in the context of 
the histories of Jordan and Palestine as well as the context of the democratic audit 
vis-a-vis the agreement on citizenship, my approach is unrelated to Massad’s. His 
research belongs to cultural and identity studies. 
Gunning (2009) studies Hamas, which is the armed group of the MB in Palestine. I 
chose to include his book in this review because of the organic link been the MB/IAF 
in Jordan and MB/Hamas in Palestine. Gunning studies Hamas’s documents and 
interviews its leaders to establish how decisions are informed by political and 
democratic theory. Gunning says: ‘Political theory informs both Hamas’s utopian 
worldview, and its day-to-day decisions’ (p. 55). I would agree with him to a limited 
extent in that the leaders of Hamas are educated people, some of whom would be 
familiar with political theory and informed by it. However, I cannot agree with him 
that when Hamas leaders meet to make a decision they would discuss political theory 
and how it can inform the decisions they need to make. 
Gunning disagrees with the arguments that Hamas is incapable of change. ‘Politics,’ 
Gunning notes, ‘is never static. Neither are political organizations’. He further 
explains that ‘Hamas has changed since its inception’ (p. 2). The evidence supports 
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Gunning’s contention. For instance, Hamas did not participate in the elections after 
the Oslo Agreement, but participated and won in 2006. The same principle applies to 
MB/IAF in Jordan. They change too. 
Literature review: conclusion 
There are five gaps in the literature reviewed above. The first gap is related to time. 
The literature reviewed covers part of the period of interest (1990-2010), and stops at 
the elections of 1993. This reflects a surge in interest in Jordan after King Hussein 
decided to hold elections in 1989, and appears to have subsided after a while. None 
of the studies reviewed above assesses the state of democracy in Jordan over a period 
of twenty years. Because the assessment was for a period of several years after the 
elections of 1989, the reliability of conclusions is in question. For instance, that the 
MB or IAF is the most organised party in 1989 and 1993 explains the high number of 
seats in the elections of these years. However, the same factor fails to explain the 
dwindling number of seats in subsequent elections, which went down to six in 2007. 
None of the studies was in a position to evaluate the process at a juncture which calls 
for such an evaluation, namely, after a period of time which is equivalent to a 
generation.  
Second, there is more focus on the MB/IAF than on the government in assessing the 
democratic process. The slogans, programmes or lack thereof, and the appeal of the 
MB/IAF are examined. Yet a detailed assessment of the state of democracy is absent, 
especially the role of the government in improving or hindering the state of 
democracy.  
The third gap is related to methods. With the exception of al-Braizat, who conducted 
a poll, other researchers used in-depth interviews and ethnographic research 
methods. Therefore, there is a distinct advantage to using the democratic audit to 
produce a detailed assessment by Jordanians. The audit enables comparison with 
countries that have been audited, or will be in the future. 
A fourth aspect is that a case study of more than one country has advantages, 
especially in attempting to reach generalisable conclusions. However, a distinct 
disadvantage is that limitations on time and word count of a book or thesis force the 
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authors to summarise heavily the case of each country to an extent that leaves one 
disappointed at the lack of depth. 
A by-product of conducting a democratic audit of Jordan is to test the method of the 
audit. A great deal of importance is attached to methods in research projects. No 
researchers can get away with a thesis or a report without outlining the methods used. 
Methods that have been used over time, and have become established, require less 
justification, as they have been tested repeatedly and the scepticism about them has 
subsided. In the case of the democratic audit, there was an opportunity to use a new 
method and test it at the same time. Even if the method proved unreliable, which I 
hasten to add it was not, there would still be a benefit in testing the procedure to 




Islam, Islamism, and Democracy 
 
 
This chapter constitutes the theoretical track of the thesis. It focuses on the claims of 
incompatibility between democracy and both Islam and Islamism. The part 
concerned with the claims made by Muslims examines their religious justifications. 
The chapter also addresses the issue of whether democracy and shari‛a can co-exist. 
In the discussion of Islamism, the chapter engages with some of the proposals to 
safeguard against changing the democratic nature of the system if the Islamists come 
to power. 
PART 1: ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
Islam1 is a religion which emanated in the cities of Mecca and Medina in what is 
currently known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Its Prophet, Muhammad, preached 
a message that there is only one god, Allah, and that he is his messenger. A statement 
to this effect brings a non-Muslim into Islam. When Muhammad started to preach the 
new message, he and his followers were persecuted in Mecca. Consequently, he 
instructed them to emigrate to Medina and he joined them there.  
In Medina, the Muslims practised their religion freely, and were able to attract more 
followers. Their strength increased over the years. They were able to re-enter Mecca 
and rid it of idols worshiped by its people. Islam branched out of Mecca and Medina, 
and over the centuries, Muslims conquered vast areas of the world. It is currently 
followed by a billion people; the majority of whom are non-Arabs. 
Prophet Muhammad belonged to the strongest tribe, Quraysh, which had its 
prominent families and subclans, from which old and modern dynasties take their 
names—such as the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Hashimite of Jordan. 
The history of Islam is full of power struggles and internal conflicts. The first 
occurred immediately after the death of Muhammad. The dispute was about who was 
                                                 
1
 The information contained in this section is very basic for a Muslim. Many books introduce and 
explain Islam to non-Muslims. See for instance John Esposito’s Islam: The Straight Path.  
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the most deserving to succeed him: someone from the people who emigrated with 
him from Mecca; someone from the people who welcomed him and his followers in 
Medina; or someone from his extended family, such as his cousin ‛Ali. The outcome 
of this dispute was the selection of Abu Bakr, the friend of Muhammad, and his 
father-in-law, whose title became the successor (khalifa, caliph). 
The early disputes produced two branches of Islam: Sunni and Shi‛i. In the former, 
Prophet Muhammad’s statements and actions (sunna) are given paramount 
importance, only second to the Qur’an. In the latter, Muhammad’s cousin, ‛Ali (the 
fourth caliph) and members of his family have a special status, and are considered 
infallible.  
The Sunni branch is the larger one. The CIA (2010) estimates that it ‘accounts for 
over 75% of the world’s Muslim population, while the Shi‛i ‘represents 10-
20% of Muslims worldwide’. The Shi‛a are concentrated in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and 
Lebanon. Shi‛i communities, however, live in many other countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, the Gulf states, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. 
Religious practices and interpretations vary from one Muslim country to another. 
There are variations even within the same country and within the same branch of 
Islam. In Jordan, 92 percent of the population are Sunni Muslims (CIA 2007, p. 329). 
Therefore, whenever Islam is mentioned in the thesis, it refers to the Sunni branch 
which is followed by the majority of Muslims worldwide, and by the vast majority of 
the people in Jordan. It is also the official religion in Jordan. 
Islam and Democracy: The Incompatibility Claims 
The claims of incompatibility between democracy and Islam fall into two categories. 
The first is that of Muslims, parties or people, who base their arguments on religious 
grounds, or more precisely, on their interpretations of the Qur’an and sunna. For 
instance, such a claim is made by Hizb al-Tahrir (1990), al-Mawdudi (1976), and 
Qutb ([1964] 1979). The second category is that of scholars, such as Bernard Lewis 
(1990), Samuel Huntington (1991 and 1997), Francis Fukuyama (1992), Daniel Pipes 
(1997), and Martin Kramer (1997). Their claim of incompatibility is based on 
different grounds, which will be outlined below. 
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 Leaving these claims aside for a moment, it is necessary to outline the way 
according to which something is considered allowed (halal), or forbidden (haram) in 
Islam, and by extension compatible or not. Arriving at such a conclusion is part of 
what is known as the fundamentals of jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh)—a discipline of 
religious studies which  produced the many rules related to inheritance, marriage, 
and other aspects. I shall focus on the forbidden because it relates to the 
incompatibility claim. 
As Zedan ([1976] 2004, pp. 113-180) explains, when there is a need to establish a 
rule, a Muslim jurist (faqīh) will resort to four major sources: the Qur’an, sunna, 
ijma‛ (consensus/unanimity), and qiyas (analogy/comparison). Al-‛Awwa (2006, pp. 
149-150.) confirms that the evidence found in these sources has hierarchical power, 
namely, that the evidence found in the Qur’an carries more weight than that found in 
the sunna. In other words, the procedure referred to here is not that of a particular 
faqīh or scholar. Also, for the sake of added clarity, if the evidence is found in the 
Qur’an, one does not proceed to find evidence to contradict it in the other sources. 
I shall use this procedure to explain how a faqīh can establish what the rule should be 
vis-a-vis a matter that Muslims want to practise in line with Islam’s teachings. 
For something to be declared forbidden in Islam, ideally there has to be a clear 
instruction in the Qur’an explicitly stating that it is prohibited. For the sake of 
illustrating the point, I shall outline how it can be decided that gambling and drinking 
alcoholic beverages are forbidden. A faqīh will first consult the Qur’an. He/she will 
find the following verse (5:90): 
 ِناَطۡي ﱠشلا ِلَمَع ۡن ﱢم ٌسۡجِر َُملاۡزَلأاَو ُباَصَنلأاَو ُرِسۡيَمۡلاَو ُرۡمَخۡلا اَمﱠِنإ ۟اُونَمآ َنيِذﱠلا َاھﱡَيأ اي ُهُوِبَنتۡجَاف 
 َنوُِحلُۡفت ۡمُكﱠلََعل 
O believers, wine and gambling, idols and divining arrows are an 
abhorrence, the work of Satan. So keep away [emphasis added], that you 
may prevail.2 
On this matter, the Qur’an has something to say, and the instruction is very clear: 
keep away! A faqīh does not need to go further. If one follows this procedure and 
applies it to democracy, one needs to search the Qur’an for the term ‘democracy’ to 
                                                 
2
 The English translation is by Tarif Khalidi. See my note in the methods section on verses of the 
Qur’an and their translations. 
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see what it says about it. Democracy is not mentioned in the Qur’an. Therefore, one 
cannot say it is forbidden in Islam by reference to a clear instruction. This leads to 
the second stage in the search for evidence. 
The next step is to search in the sunna; in particular, the authentic statements of 
Prophet Muhammad,3 or things that he had done. It should be noted that the sunna 
does not contradict the Qur’anic instructions: it may explain them; it may elaborate 
upon them; and it may introduce something not mentioned in the Qur’an. For 
instance, how Muslims pray is not described in the Qur’an, but the Prophet taught 
people how to do it. Muslims now perform prayers according to how Prophet 
Muhammad taught his companions, not according to a manner prescribed in the 
Qur’an.  
It has been established that the Qur’an did not take a stand on democracy (using the 
very term). What about the sunna? If the Prophet forbade democracy in a statement 
or an action, then Muslims will treat that as a powerful religious instruction to refrain 
from practising it. Nothing in the collections of the sayings of Prophet Muhammad 
contains instructions about democracy. Therefore, one finds no guidance on the 
matter to declare democracy incompatible with Islam. This leads to the third stage in 
the process of searching for evidence. 
When guidance cannot be found in the Qur’an or sunna, a faqīh will look for a 
consensus of the views of the companions of Prophet Muhammad.4 According to 
Zedan (2004, p. 149), the rule that the mother was entitled to a share in cases of 
inheritance was established through the rule of unanimity/consensus. The 
companions of the Prophet all verified the fact that he, Abu Bakr, and ‛Umar applied 
this rule and gave the mother a share of one sixth. If one attempts to find a rule 
concerning democracy, one will not find guidance in unanimity/consensus. 
                                                 
3
 The statements attributed to Prophet Muhammad vary in their reliability of authenticity. The 
authentic ones are included in volumes compiled by Bukhari and Muslim. However, even the 
authenticity of the statements in these volumes is not accepted by all, but this is a different point. 
4
 In my view, the notion of consensus is problematic. However, my concern here is to illustrate the 
procedure as used by the Muslim scholars of fundamentals (usūliyyūn). 
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Therefore, one has to search for guidance in the next stage: qiyas 
(analogy/comparison). 
The Qur’an instructs Muslims to avoid alcoholic beverages, as outlined above. It 
does not mention drugs: marijuana, opium, heroin, and similar substances. However, 
because drugs are similar to alcohol in the effect on the mind, it is not illogical to 
declare drugs forbidden. Applying the same to democracy, a scholar has to find 
something comparable to democracy, and declare it to be halal or haram, in line with 
what it is being compared with. If democracy is comparable to something permitted, 
then it is compatible with Islam. If it is comparable to something that is forbidden in 
Islam, then it is incompatible with Islam.  
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the procedure has other stages 
which include ijtihād and interests. However, once a faqīh reaches the stage of qiyas, 
the rule ceases to be based on a source that is considered incapable of interpretations. 
By making comparisons, two contradictory conclusions are possible. The first is that 
there is nothing halal in Islam that is equivalent to democracy in order to declare the 
latter as such. The other conclusion is that there is something allowed in Islam and 
equivalent to democracy, and therefore it is possible to declare the latter permissible. 
The notion to compare democracy with in this case is shura, which has two 
meanings: consultation and deliberation. It is mentioned in the Qur’an in a context 
that encourages Muslims to practise it. Both conclusions will be justified by their 
proponents by contesting what shura means and requires. 
A whole sura, 42, in the Qur’an is called shura. Verse 42:38 mentions a few traits of 
Muslims, which include the practice of shura: 
 َةَلا ﱠصلا اوُمَاَقأَو ْمِھﱢبَِرل اُوباََجتْسا َنيِذﱠلاَو َنَْيب ىَروُش ْمُھُرَْمأَو ْمُھ  َنُوِقفُني ُْمھَانْقَزَر ا ﱠمِمَو  
Those who answer the call of their Lord and perform the 
prayers; Those who settle their affairs through common 
deliberations;5 [emphasis added] Those who expend from 
what We provided them. 
                                                 
5
 The translator seems to have contradicted himself and did not choose literal rendering. It is 
noteworthy that one can see the part of the verse about consultation in parliaments in the Muslim 
world.  
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In another verse (3:159), the Prophet is instructed to consult with the Muslims: 
 
 ُفْعاAَف َكAِلْوَح ْنAِم ْاوA ﱡَضفَنلا ِبAَْلقْلا َظيAِلَغ ًاَّظف َتنُك َْولَو ُْمَھل َتِنل ِّﷲ َن ﱢم ٍةَمْحَر اَِمَبف
 ُْمَھل ِْرفَْغتْساَو ُْمھْنَع ِرَْملأا يِف ْمُھْرِواَشَو  ْلA ﱠكََوَتف َتAْمَزَع اَِذإAَف  ﱡبAُِحي َّﷲ ﱠِنإ ِّﷲ ىAَلَع
.َنِيل ﱢكََوتُمْلا 
It is through God’s mercy that you are gentle towards them. 
Had you been cruel and hard of heart, they would have 
dispersed from your presence. So forgive them and ask God’s 
pardon for them and seek their counsel in all affairs. 
[emphasis added]. When resolved upon a matter, put your 
trust in God, for God loves those who put their trust in Him. 
However, when and how to consult, and whether the outcome of the consultation 
process is to be followed or not, is the subject of different views. Al-Būtī (2003), a 
traditional Muslim preacher,6 says that Prophet Muhammad engaged in consultation 
with his companions. The consultation is obligatory when there is no clear 
instruction in the Qur’an or sunna regarding a certain issue. Moreover, consultation 
is also a necessity in cases of war, peace, and treaties. According to al-Būtī, 
consultation is mandatory in these only two situations. However, he points out that 
the ruler is not required to follow the advice given to him by the people consulted (p. 
237).  
Al-Ghazali (1990) rejects the views that are similar to al-Būtī’s, namely that shura is  
is highly limited, highly procedural, and devoid of any usefulness to the people being 
governed. He agrees that shura is not used to decide what is allowed or forbidden 
according to Islam. He explains that shura covers worldly and ordinary matters, such 
as collecting taxes and declaring a war. He further argues that it is ‘suicidal to leave 
decisions on these matters to rulers who claim they are geniuses’ (pp. 45-47). Al-
Qaradawi (1974) agrees with al-Ghazali’s view on shura. He considers it binding as 
well (pp. 227-229). Moreover, Gharaybeh (2000), a Muslim scholar who also served 
in the senior leadership of the IAF, dedicated a chapter to the issue of shura (pp. 295-
328). He argues that shura includes the right of the nation to elect the leader, and that 
it entails acceptance of majority rule. 
                                                 
6
 By traditional I mean someone who wears certain attire, which includes a turban. 
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I shall now return to the claims of incompatibility, having contextualised the 
procedure of declaring an act or a notion to be permitted or forbidden in Islam. 
Incompatibility Claims: Muslims  
The claim of incompatibility between Islam and democracy is made by the 
Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir), which was established in 1953 by the Palestinian, 
Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani. According to the leader of Hizb al-Tahrir, ‛Abd al-Qadīm 
Zallūm, ‘democracy is a man-made system of government,’ and the ‘term itself is an 
alien one’. Moreover, Zallūm argues that ‘democracy is related to the principle of 
separation of state and religion’. All these elements, according to Zallūm, make 
democracy unIslamic (1990, pp. 2-4). 
Contrary to the suggestion made by Esposito and Voll (1996, p. 23), al-Mawdudi 
(1976, p. 159) claims that Islam and democracy are incompatible. Islam, he argues, is 
‘the very antithesis of a secular western democracy’. In arguing the case of 
incompatibility, al-Mawdudi makes two contradictory arguments. In one he argues 
that Islam and democracy are incompatible. In another, he talks about the 
‘democratic essence’ of Islam and coins a term for it: ‘theo-democracy’ (pp. 148-
170). I suggest that Esposito and Voll (1996) unjustifiably ignored one part of al-
Mawdudi’s argument and adopted the other. The part they ignored specifically refers 
to ‘secular western democracy’. 
I have discussed briefly in the first chapter how it is erroneous to consider democracy 
or modernity European or Western. Al-Ghannouchi (1993) argues that ‘the 
democratic system as is in the West remains, in the absence of an Islamic one, the 
best system that resulted from the development of human thought’. He further argues 
that ‘the defects of the [Western] democratic system’ should not be used as an excuse 
‘to reject it’, because it is ‘better than tyranny’ (p. 87). 
On what basis does al-Mawdudi declare that Islam and democracy are incompatible? 
Al-Mawdudi attaches a great deal of importance to the notion of ‘sovereignty of 
God’, and contrasts it with the sovereignty of people. ‘All prophets,’ argues al-
Mawdudi, ‘conveyed to mankind the guidance which was revealed to them and asked 
to acknowledge the absolute sovereignty of God [emphasis added] and render 
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unalloyed obedience to him’ (p. 149). He further argues that the ‘belief in the unity 
and sovereignty of Allah is the foundation of the social and moral systems 
pronounced by the prophets’ (p. 158). 
Al-Mawdudi’s argument (1976, p. 158) is based on the notion that democracy is 
about the sovereignty of people. To him and to other like-minded people, there is 
only one sovereignty, and it belongs to Allah. His evidence is in verse 2:30: 
ِيف ٌلِعاَج يﱢِنإ ِةَِكئَلاَمِْلل َكﱡبَر َلَاق ِْذإَو  ِضَْرْلأا ًَةفِيلَخ  ُِكفَْسيَو َاھِيف ُدِسُْفي ْنَم َاھِيف ُلَعَْجَتأ اُولَاق 
 َُملَْعأ يﱢِنإ َلَاق ََكل ُس ﱢدَُقنَو َكِدْمَِحب ُحﱢبَُسن ُنَْحنَو َءاَم ﱢدلا  َنوَُملَْعت َلا اَم.  
And remember when God said to the angels: ‘I shall appoint a 
deputy [vicegerent] on earth,’ and they answered: ‘Will you place 
therein one who sows discord and sheds blood while we chant 
Your praises and proclaim Your holiness?’ God said: ‘I know what 
you do no,’  
The context of the verse is unrelated to democracy, or to how human beings should 
govern others on earth. However, as Abou El-Fadl (2004) points out: ‘God’s 
vicegerent does not share God’s perfection of judgment and will’. Therefore, what he 
calls ‘constitutional democracy’ can constitute ‘a basis for pursuing justice and thus 
for fulfilling a fundamental responsibility assigned by God to each one of us’ (p. 6). 
Furthermore, al-Ghazali (1990, pp. 44-45) indicated that people detected that his 
view on shura was different from al-Mawdudi’s. He explained that al-Mawdudi was 
of the view that shura should not undermine the executive branch of government. Al-
Ghazali suggested that this was the case in modern systems of government. 
However, the ruler was not except from abiding by shura. 
Al-Mawdudi argues against democracy because it relies on the sovereignty of 
people. He suggests that ‘if the people dislike any law and demand its abrogation, 
howsoever just and rightful it might be, it has to be expunged forthwith’ (p. 160). 
This is the wrong characterisation of how a democratic system of government works, 
whether in relation to how laws are enacted; how people behave in a democracy; and 
how laws are repealed.  
I suggest that when al-Mawdudi formulated his argument concerning the sovereignty 
of God, he was responding to the arguments of his time. When democracy is 
presented as the ‘sovereignty of people,’ he will respond that the sovereignty of God 
51 
is paramount. I would recall what Huntington (1991, pp. 5-7) said about the debates 
amongst scholars concerning the meaning of democracy, and that they continued 
until the 1970s, when the procedural definition became dominant. In other words, al-
Mawdudi engaged in a different debate: that of authority and purpose of government. 
Therefore, al-Mawdudi’s interpretation constitutes no basis for rejecting democracy 
and declaring it incompatible with Islam. 
Sayyid Qutb7 ([1964] 1979) argues that Islam and democracy are incompatible. He 
employs the notion of sovereignty of God, but calls it hākimiyya. He uses a phrase 
which appears in the Qur’an in 6:57, 12:40 and 12:67: 
b لاإ مكحلا نإ 
Judgement [Sovereignty] belongs solely to God. 
The term ‘hukm’, from which hākimiyya is derived, appears in these verses and 
others. When one examines the meaning of ‘hukm’ where it appears in the Qur’an, it 
is clear that the meaning is not a state, regime, or government. It is usually in a 
context which states that the ultimate judgement belongs to Allah and that he is the 
final arbiter. In Khalidi’s translation of these three verses, he uses ‘judgement’ twice 
and ‘sovereignty’ once. 
There is, however, an artificial point being made when Qutb says that sovereignty 
belongs to Allah, because a practising Muslim does not dispute that. Even a king or 
president who offers prayers acknowledges that Allah is superior to him. Therefore, 
there is no contradiction between the existence of a sovereign state with a ruler 
(hākim) and the sovereignty that belongs to Allah, because the sovereignty of state 
and that of Allah are two different notions. 
Qutb does what Karl Popper (1963) warns against: to seek ‘confirming evidence’ for 
a theory and to disregard ‘refutations’ (p. 36). This approach, in Popper’s analysis, 
leads to some instances of ‘myths’, namely when a theory is not formulated ‘in a 
testable form’ (p. 38). In explaining his views, Popper refers to Marx’s ‘theory of 
history’ and how its followers rejected ‘refutations’ by others. Consequently, they 
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‘could not open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence for 
[their] interpretation of history’ (p. 35). 
Interestingly, another verse in the Qur’an (4:59) is used in Saudi Arabia to confer 
legitimacy on the ruling dynasty and demand obedience of the people. One can only 
speculate whether Qutb would consider this verse compatible with his argument that 
hukm belongs to Allah, or it can be delegated in full or in part to those in charge of 
the affairs of Muslims (uli al-amr/رملأا يلوأ). 
Qutb marshals verses, in whole or in part, in support of an argument, although the 
apparent context seems unrelated. He goes to an extreme when he defends ‘God’s 
law’ [shar‛a Allah/ﷲ عرش]. For instance, he says [p. 96]: 
The interest of mankind is embedded in God’s law, as Allah 
handed it down and as conveyed by his messenger. If one day, it 
appeared to mankind that their interest is in violating what was 
enacted to them by God they first would be deluded. 
[…] 
And second they would be kafir. No one who claims that one’s 
interest is in what violates the law of Allah remains for a moment 
of this religion and a member of the people of this religion. 
The passage above shows how easy it is to declare that a Muslim is not a Muslim 
(kafir) by simply accusing him of violating Allah’s law.  
However, Qutb’s views did not go unchallenged. The leader of the MB in Egypt, 
Hassan al-Hudaybi (1977) faulted Qutb for declaring a Muslim a kafir, marshalling 
counter-evidence from the Qur’an and sunna. He also addressed the points made by 
both al-Mawdudi and Qutb about the sovereignty of God, arguing that there were 
many areas in which it is left to man to make laws (pp. 103-113). 
Furthermore, Yusef al-Qaradawi (2001), in his memoirs, faults Qutb for declaring 
Muslims kafirs. Qaradawi wonders why Qutb disregarded verses related to jihad that 
make the concept broader than characterised by Qutb. He further deplores Qutb for 
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accusing those who oppose his views (a) of stupidity and of lacking knowledge, and 
(b) of being psychologically weak and influenced by the orientalists.8 
‛Abdullah al-Nafisi (1999) attributes the appeal of Qutb to the young Muslims who 
are going through intellectual transformation in their lives to ‘his martyrdom, which 
added meaning to what he used to preach. It made his ideas and reality identical. This 
is the honour a mujahid [fighter] wants to be inscribed on his grave’ (p. 37). Al-
Nafisi also attributes Qutb’s appeal to the latter’s simple writing style, which ‘lacks 
the philosophical abstraction, and intellectual dryness’. His ideas were written in a 
‘literary style, and dominated by overflowing emotions of an ideological preacher’ 
(p. 38). 
Qutb went further than arguing that hākimiyya is Allah’s prerogative. He also 
considered Muslims to be in a state of jāhiliyya that should be changed by following 
the example of Prophet Muhammad and how he managed to spread Islam. He did not 
spare ‘even Muslims who pray, observe Ramadan, and perform the Hajj’ (p. 105). He 
amalgamated all societies, Muslim and otherwise, and considered them to be in a 
state of jāhiliyya (pp. 88-93). 
The logical and pressing question here is what is jāhiliyya? This has become a term 
that in Arabic refers to the era before Islam. Those who refused to accept 
Muhammad’s new message were described as jahilūn (singular jāhil). The 
contemporary meaning of jāhil is an ignorant person, or someone who is not aware of 
certain things (a child is considered jāhil). In the contemporary meaning, jāhiliyya is 
the state of ignorance. But was that its meaning 1400 years ago? 
Language: Old and New Meanings 
How is it possible for al-Mawdudi and Qutb to quote a verse and argue that it 
stipulates a clear-cut instruction in the Qur’an? After exhausting the four stages 
outlined above, it becomes possible to resort to ijtihād: making a reasoned 
judgement. To prevent ijtihād from being abused, there is a rule which says ‘no 
ijtihād with the text’ (صنلا عم داھتجا لا). Therefore, one who is in favour of Qutb’s 
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argument may say that with a verse like that used by Qutb (6:57 for instance), there 
is no room for interpretation that democracy is acceptable in Islam. Is this the case?  
Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid (2007, pp. 88-105) tackles this matter and puts it in context. 
Abu Zaid accepts that there are instances where a rule in the text is clear and it does 
not allow for an interpretation. One such instance is preventing sons from marrying 
their mothers (2:30). In such an instance, I expect that anyone will agree that this is a 
sensible, clear-cut rule that should not allow interpretations which lead to negating it. 
Abu Zaid specifically deals with the term jahiliyya, referred to above. As used by 
Qutb and others9, it means a state of ignorance and lack of knowledge (p. 56). Abu 
Zaid points out that this meaning is not the one from the time of Prophet 
Muhammad. It meant then a lack of control of emotions. He cites from the same era 
Arab poetry in which the derivatives of the verb, ja-ha-la, are used to demonstrate the 
original meaning of jahiliyya. He quotes one of the most famous poems of pre-
Islamic time, known as mu‛allaqat (The Seven Odes), which were posted on the 
walls of Ka‛ba.  
One of the Odes belongs to ‛Amr ibn Kulthūm. It contains a verse which clearly 
shows that the meaning of jahiliyya at that time did not mean a state of ignorance: 
انيلھاجلا لھج قوف لھجنف ،انيلع دحأ نلھجي لا لاأ 
So let no man act foolishly against us, 
Or we shall exceed the folly of the foolhardiest10 
Moreover, Abu Zaid argues that apart from some instances of clear-cut instructions, 
the room to interpret the Qur’an is much wider than Muslims are led to believe. He 
argues that the interpretation of the Qur’an always takes into consideration the 
reasons why some verses were handed down to the Prophet. The interpretation 
process also takes into account the meanings of words at the time of the Prophet. He 
points out that some scholars like al-Mawdudi and Qutb gave words meanings not 
intended when the verses were handed down. In Qutb’s case, the word ‘hukm’ 
which, as pointed out earlier, appears in several verses, does not mean the state or the 
government in today’s usage. 
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Giving words in the Qur’an a contemporary meaning is also cited by ‛Abdelwahab 
El-Affendi (2008) in an article about the phenomenon in which jailed Islamists 
reconsidered their earlier views.11 Sayyid Imam was one of those who did so, after he 
had argued in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US that terrorism 
is Islamic because it is mentioned in the Qur’an (8:60). 
 ِطَاب ﱢر نِمَو ٍة ﱠُوق ن ﱢم ُمتْعََطتْسا ا ﱠم ُمَھل ْاو ﱡدَِعأَو  ِلْيَخْلا َنُوبِھُْرت  نِم َنيِرَخآَو ْمُك ﱠوُدَعَو ِّﷲ ﱠوْدَع ِِهب
 ْمِِھنوُد  ِلِيبَس ِيف ٍءْيَش نِم ْاُوِقفُنت اَمَو ُْمھَُملَْعي ُّﷲ ُُمَھنوَُملَْعت َلا  َأَو ْمُكَْيِلإ ﱠفَُوي ِّﷲ َنوَُملُْظت َلا ُْمتن 
Prepare against them whatever force and war cavalry you can gather 
to frighten [emphasis added] therewith the enemy of God and your 
enemy, and others besides them whom you do not know but God 
does. Whatever you expend in the cause of God will be returned in 
full to you, and you shall not be wronged. 
As El-Affendi points out, Sayyid Imam declared that those who think that terrorism 
is not Islamic are kafirs because they are opposed to what this verse says. El-Affendi 
is right to point to this abuse of the language and the Qur’an. His condemnation of 
such an abuse is well justified. 
It is possible to raise an issue regarding the views of Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid, given 
that the book, in which he criticised the Islamic discourse, was the subject of legal 
proceedings, and the courts ruled against him. The proceedings were initiated against 
him in Egypt to declare him an apostate (murtad: someone who renounces Islam) and 
accordingly to annul his marriage to his Muslim wife. Abu Zaid refused to renounce 
his views and left Egypt. He died in July 2010. 
The reason why some overzealous Muslims directed their wrath at Abu Zaid is 
because he asked whether the rules of interpreting a text can apply to the Qur’an. His 
answer is in the affirmative, because ‘in the final analysis religious texts are nothing 
but linguistics texts’ (p. 204). He rejects the notion that the divine and the human are 
in conflict (p. 206). (Such a conflict is evident in the arguments of Qutb and al-
Mawdudi above). He concludes that religious texts are human texts because they 
belong to language and the cultures of a specific historic period (p. 209). Therefore, 
the language and its cultural milieu are a point of reference in explaining and 
interpreting texts which include the Qur’an (p. 209). 
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To illustrate his point, Abu Zaid refers to verses which he says Muslims of old times 
did not understand literally. One such verse is 64:17, which talks about giving Allah 
a loan.12 No interpretation of the Qur’an suggests that the reference to a loan to Allah 
is literal. Therefore, Abu Zaid is correct in arguing that the references to trade, 
buying, selling, and loans in the Qur’an reflect the language of an era known for 
trade. This is mentioned in the Qur’an in sura 106, about Quraysh and the two 
trading caravans which travel in the winter and summer. 
The Egyptian appeals court which ruled against Abu Zaid decided that his writings 
deny that the Qur’an is the word of God (al-‛Awwa 2003, p. 107). This conclusion 
was reached after citing verses that assert literal meanings, such as God having a 
throne (2:255: His throne encompasses the heavens and earth), and the existence of 
jinn (15:27: The Jinn We created beforehand, from the fiery wind). This approach is 
not different from that of Qutb when he quotes the verses that say ‘hukm’ belongs to Allah. 
I suggest that it is possible to reconcile an individual’s belief that the Qur’an is the 
word of God, and, at the same time, interpret the verses in a way that does not accept 
the literal meaning. The Qur’an was presented to the Arabs in their language, 
namely, in a man-made language.13 Arabic existed before the Qur’an, and the Arabs 
followed certain grammatical rules in using it. A man-made language is understood 
according to the cognitive abilities of humans at a certain point in time. Whether 
words, any words, are those of God, a poet, novelist, columnist, or another author, 
how they are understood hinges on the reader. If a reader understands words in a way 
not intended by the author, or not as other readers understood them, it does not 
follow that this reader has denied that the author wrote those words. 
Moreover, although cognitive abilities of humans are ever-increasing, the corollary 
of this is that they are always limited. Consequently, human beings can only 
understand meanings in line with the cognitive capacity at a particular time. 
Interpreters of the Qur’an before modern times were not in a position to interpret it in 
a manner consistent with modern scientific discoveries and advances. Now, one can 
find many Muslim preachers and jurists explaining these discoveries by referring to 
verses in the Qur’an. For example, a verse about how a foetus develops in the womb 
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(24: 14) is said to match the scientific description of the process. A different 
interpretation, therefore, does not mean a change of belief and that the words are not 
of God. 
The argument above, I should point out, will not satisfy people who are atheists or 
agnostics. It may satisfy only the people who believe in God but differ on how to 
understand and interpret a holy book: literally or not. 
When Abu Zaid criticised the Islamic discourse, he was logical and scientific in his 
approach and analysis. Significantly, also, Abu Zaid did not rubbish Islamic beliefs. 
He spoke respectfully of Islam throughout the book. In attempting to rationalise the 
interpretation of the Qur’an, Abu Zaid served Islam in his own way, while those who 
persecuted him perpetuated ignorance which did not reflect well on Islam and 
Muslims. 
Having discussed the claims of incompatibility made by Muslims, I shall now 
discuss Esposito and Voll’s arguments concerning Islamic democracy, whose 
elements, they suggest, include tawhid, caliphate, and shura (1996, pp. 21-32). 
Tawhid 
The importance of tawhid is encapsulated in the first pillar of Islam: the statement 
that ‘there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger’. This principle 
does not accept the notion that there are other Gods, or that God has a son or 
children. The notion of trinity is not accepted in Islam as it contradicts the principle 
of tawhid. Moreover, the principle is extended to mean that there is no need for 
intermediaries between God and people (Muslims), whether the intermediary is a 
holy person, a revered object such as a statue, or the grave of a saint. The use of an 
intermediary is known as shirk, which means God has partners of sorts. The Arabs 
before Islam used idols in rituals that they thought made them closer to God. 
Muhammad’s message was against that. 
Al-Mawdudi’s emphasis on tawhid is unnecessary because a Muslim does believe 
there that are no other Gods but Allah. A Muslim says this many times a day. The 
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intermediary part is the problematic one. There are people who seek help of pirs, or 
visit tombs asking God to grant their wishes, such as recovering from an illness, or 
having children. These practices used to be common; they still exist. I suggest that 
there is a link between wealth and education and these practices. In the past, a 
desperate infertile woman would go to a holy place to pray and ask God to enable her 
to have children. An infertile woman now would seek a medical solution. 
The people who engage in such practices do not consider them shirk because they 
have already acknowledged that there is no God but Allah. The father of Wahhabism, 
Muhammad ‛Abd al-Wahhab, considers them shirk, and these practices are not 
allowed in Saudi Arabia. However, they are not banned in other Muslim countries. 
I suggest that the importance al-Mawdudi attaches to tawhid is related to this aspect 
(shirk). Al-Mawdudi has argued in the past that al-Ahamadiyya sect is not Islamic, 
and sought to declare it as such. Al-Mawdudi’s concern about shirk is artificially 
connected to the notion of democracy. A Muslim ruler may feel great, and may 
create a cult of personality around him. Some people may fear him; others may love 
him. However, this form of ‘worship’ is different from worshipping Allah at certain 
times of the day. Moreover, if democracy was implemented in Muslim countries, the 
chances of creating cults of personality decrease, because the office holder has to 
leave at the end of a set period. Therefore, to suggest that tawhid somehow makes 
democracy incompatible with Islam is unjustified. 
The Caliphate: Islam’s Political System? 
According to Esposito and Voll (1996), another element in al-Mawdudi’s notion of 
Islamic democracy is the caliphate. Moreover, in arguing that Islam has its own 
political system, al-Tamimi (1993) claims that ‘[m]any contemporary Islamic 
thinkers consider the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate to be the most catastrophic 
event in the entire history of the Muslims’ (p. 11). Al-Tamimi makes no attempt to 
criticise this statement for being a gross exaggeration and loaded with inaccuracies. 
To begin with, there is no mention of some of those thinkers to examine their views 
on the issue of Islamic caliphate. The claim that the collapse of the caliphate was so 
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catastrophic seems at odds with many catastrophic events in the history of Muslims. 
For instance, what about the invasion of Baghdad by the Mughal? What about the 
driving out of Muslims from Andalusia? What about the loss of Palestine, an event 
Palestinians and Arabs refer to as the catastrophe (nakba)? What about the loss of 
Jerusalem, the third holiest shrine for Muslims?  
Gross exaggerations aside, I shall subject the point about the caliphate to the scrutiny 
it deserves. 
The most common meaning of khalifa in Arabic is ‘successor’: one who comes after 
another, either after death, or one who replaces another in a position in an 
organisation. Therefore, Abu Bakr was the successor of Prophet Muhammad. He 
became the leader of Muslims after the death of Muhammad. ‛Umar was the 
successor of Abu Bakr.  
Tamimi overlooks certain facts in Islamic history when he makes his arguments 
about the caliphate. The title of the ruler of Muslims was not caliph (successor) 
throughout Islamic history. Soon after ‛Umar became the caliph, a new title emerged: 
commander of the faithful. The title caught on, because ‛Umar was supposed to have 
had the title of the successor of the successor of the messenger of God. The title 
would have become very long after a few caliphs (Sharqawi 1987, p. 60). The title 
‘commander of the faithful’ is still in use in Morocco. 
The first four caliphs were selected through varying degrees of consultations 
amongst Muslims. They did not become caliphs on hereditary bases. The fourth 
caliph, ‛Ali, was beset by wars with Mu‛awiya. The advocates of ‛Ali’s right to rule 
after Muhammad created their own branch of Islam (Shi‛i). Once Mu‛awiya secured 
his reign, he introduced the hereditary system of government. Is this Islamic? If so, 
why was it not introduced by the Prophet? If it was not Islamic, why did it continue 
for centuries? The point here is that al-Tamimi’s assertion that caliphate is the 
Islamic system of government is problematic already. 
Ibn Khaldun (2011, pp. 284-285) explains that the title ‘sultan’ was common, but 
after the central caliphate disintegrated, different titles were used by the rulers of 
different parts of the Muslim world. Moreover, by the sixteenth century, as Esposito 
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points out (1994, p. 62): ‘Three major Muslim empires emerged in the midst of the 
many sultanates’, namely, the Ottoman; the Safavid in Iran; and the Mughal in India. 
‛Abd al-Raziq (2000)14 discussed the issue of caliphate in Islam. He pointed out that 
caliphate was eliminated in Baghdad by the Mughal in the seventh century, hijra (p. 
137). Moreover, he disagreed with Ibn Khaldun who suggested that unlike other 
religions, the religious and political authorities in Islam were merged (p. 150). He 
concludes that the caliphate is a political matter, not a religious one, and it must be 
decided by ‘reason, experiences of nations and political rules’ (p. 182). 
‛Imara (2000) explains that there are contradictions in Razik’s analysis and that he 
‘neglected the bright side of Islamic thought’ (p. 49). According to ‛Imara, there 
were Muslim thinkers who adhered to the principles of shura and selection even 
when the rulers usurped power (pp. 49-45). Kahlawi (2007) notes that ‛Abd al-Raziq 
emphasised general statements, and added to them a brief and naïve historical 
narrative that would not be acceptable to most contemporary historians, including his 
denial that there was no government during the Prophet’s time’ (p. 13). I disagree 
with Kahlawi’s assessment. Although he is entitled to disagree with ‛Abd al-Raziq, 
the latter’s discussion of the caliphate is not naïve. 
Furthermore, the advocates of the caliphate are silent about certain facts that reflect 
badly on the caliph, such as being allied with the colonisers of Turkey. Nor do they 
refer to the fact that Mustafa Kamal’s move was supported by some Muslims such as 
‛Abd al-Hamīd ibn Badīs who described Kamal as ‘one of the great geniuses of the 
East’ (cited in ‛Imara 1984, p. 163). He considered the caliph of the time to be a 
captive caliph, and the ‛ulama’ around him to be hypocrites. 
Irrespective of the title, two substantives points should be addressed: the first is 
whether the caliphate has been the Islamic system of government from after the death 
of Prophet Muhammad until it was the abolished by Mastafa Kamal in 1924. If this 
has been the case, the second point is to examine whether it is unIslamic to have a 
ruler with a different title? 
                                                 
14
 The book was originally published in 1925. Muhammad ‛Imara republished it in 2000 with relevant 
documents, including the decision by al-Azhar scholars to strip Razik of his ‛ālim title. 
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Al-‛Awwa (2006, p. 25) subscribes to the view that there has been a caliphate system 
which started with the selection of Abu Bkar and ended with the removal of ‛Abd al-
Majid in 1924. Abu al-Majd (2006) is more discerning when looking at the caliphate 
since Abu Bakr until ‛Abd al-Majid. He points out that the caliphate of the four 
rightly-guided caliphs is different from that of their successors, who, despite the title 
of caliph, were effectively kings. They ruled sometimes with coercion and did not 
respect rights and freedoms (pp. 104-105).  
Therefore, the view that there has been a caliphate system that started after Prophet 
Muhammad and ended in 1924 is not uncommon. However, this view glosses over 
the differences that characterised the caliphs and caliphate at various stages in 
history. It also glosses over the fact that there have been three different Muslim 
regions with different rulers. In the absence of recognition of the differences, I agree 
with Abu al-Majd, who considers that the arguments concerning the caliphate are 
sterile (2006, pp. 104-105). Therefore, I will address the more substantive, relevant 
point: can Muslims be ruled by someone whose title is not caliph? 
Both al-‛Awwa and Abu al-Majd argue that Islam, specifically the Qur’an and sunna, 
did not prescribe a system of government; nor did they specify how the ruler of the 
Muslims should be selected. Al-‛Awwa suggests the absence of a prescribed method 
to select the ruler and other details pertaining to the system of government means 
that these issues are left to Muslims to decide according to their interests, time, place, 
and circumstance. The only proviso is that these matters are decided with guidance 
from the general principles and values of Islam (pp. 64-65). 
Similarly, Abu al-Majd (2006) explains that there has been consensus in the past that 
it is not the title that matters; it does not have to be caliph. He rejects the suggestion 
that the caliphate is a Godly system, namely, prescribed by God. He also rejects the 
opposite argument that the Islamic system of government is based on ijtihād, namely, 
solely based on human reason. Abu al-Majd takes a centre position and argues that 
an Islamic system of government must be based on shura, justice, and holding the 
ruler to account (pp. 104-108). Al-‛Awwa argues that the term ‘caliphate’ does not 
imply a specific system of government, and that the caliphate is not part of shari‛a. 
That the Muslims in the past called their ruler ‘caliph’ is a matter that belongs to the 
realm of history, not religion, according to al-‛Awwa (pp. 108-109).  
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Interestingly, the view that a new Islamic system of government can be developed is 
shared by some Sunni and Shi‛i scholars. For instance, Paya (2010) outlines the 
views of some ‘famous contemporary Iranian scholars’ to establish how it is possible 
to have an Islamic version of democracy (p. 102). He outlines the views of such 
scholars from three categories: fundamentalist; traditionist (not the same as 
traditionalist), and modernist. The scholars in the first two categories ‘reject the 
authority of reason’. The modernists do not; they ‘try to provide rational 
interpretations of religious tenets and doctrine’ (p. 104). 
Paya introduces a fourth category, which he calls ‘critical rationalists’. Within the 
framework of this category, Paya develops a model of Islamic democracy. It is based 
on treating democracy as a technology. As he points out (p. 110), ‘the users of 
technology [...] try to alter the products they are using to better fit their specific tastes 
and preferences [...] Car and home owners, almost universally, put their own 
personal touches on these “technological products” no matter how perfect the 
products where when they obtained them’ (p, 110). Paya argues: ‘The more a 
technology is adjusted to the needs and cherished values of its users and the 
environment in which they live, the more it is considered “acceptable” or “popular” 
or “efficient”.’ (pp. 110-111).15 
Treating democracy as a technology, and utilising the notion of ‘social construct’ and 
the critical rationalist approach, Paya concludes that it is possible to have Islamic 
forms of democracy which share with their ‘standard’ counterparts five components: 
‘civil society, political society, the rule of law, state apparatus, and economic 
society’. The other common features are ‘freedom of association and 
communication, free and inclusive electoral contestation, constitutionalism, regional-
legal bureaucratic norms, and institutionalised markets’. He stresses that labelling it 
as Islamic does not attach to it ‘sacredness’; it implies ‘sources of value’ (p. 111). 
Although I disagree with the need for an Islamic form of democracy, I do recognise 
that to move away from the rejection of democracy in Muslim countries towards 
accepting an Islamic version entails some benefits. Democracy as practised now in 
democratic states is not the same that was practised when it was first adopted as a 
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system of government. Women had to fight for the right to vote. African-Americans 
in the US had to fight for their civil rights. Therefore, the Islamic version, whether as 
proposed by Paya or anyone else, will not remain static. People will demand more 
and wider rights, and will achieve some or all demands through campaigns or 
reinterpretations of the Islamic principles and rules which restrict rights. 
In contrast, El-Affendi (2010, p. 25) goes further than Paya in making the case for 
democracy without attaching any labels to it, Islamic or other. He suggests that there 
is an ‘anti-democratic ethos’ in the models purported to be ‘Islamic’. He further 
suggests that the ethos is ‘underpinned by a further set of interconnected 
assumptions’ made in relation to Islam having all the answers. El-Affendi refutes 
these assumptions and comes to the conclusion that ‘Islamic teachings are not only 
compatible with democracy, but demand it’ (p. 26). He urges the Islamists to ‘revise 
their models in order to reflect Islam’s true spirit, which is not only favourable to 
democracy, but […] finds democracy indispensable’ (p. 26). 
To conclude the discussion of the above section, I would say it is clear that the 
incompatibility claim made by some Muslims on religious grounds is contested by 
other Muslims using religious grounds as well. In my considered judgement, the 
evidence is in favour of Muslims who reject the incompatibility claim. 
Incompatibility Claims: Non-Muslim Scholars 
Lewis (1990/2002) has argued that Islam is incompatible with democracy. The 
essence of his argument in brief is that the separation of church and state is not 
possible in Islam. Lewis argues that the key to the success of ‘Christiandom’ is in the 
separation of ‘Church and State’. He traces the inclination to separate them back 
‘almost to the beginning of Christianity’. Lewis says that ‘Christians are enjoined in 
the Scriptures to “render … unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s [ellipsis in 
original] and unto God the things which are God’s”.’16 
Whether there is a relationship between Islam and a lack of democratisation, 
Huntington (1991) is not categorical regarding which side of the argument he is on. 
‘Whatever the compatibility,’ Huntington observes, ‘of Islam and democracy in 
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theory, in practice they have not gone together’ (p. 308). However, in 1997, he could 
not be more candid: 
The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is 
Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority 
of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The 
problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defence. It is the 
West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality 
of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on 
them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world (pp. 217-218). 
As indicated in chapter one, Fukuyama (1992, p. 347) rejects the argument that there 
are cultural prerequisites for democracy. However, he contradicts himself when he 
discusses democracy and Islam. He does not see it as part of culture, which evolves, 
as he has argued. Instead, he claims that Islam is incompatible with liberal 
democracy, and Muslims have no interest in adopting it. He portrays Muslims as a 
mindless group of people, when he says Muslims ‘can, of course, challenge liberal 
democracy through terrorist bombs, a significant but not vital challenge’ (p. 347). 
When writing about Islam and politics, Milton-Edwards (2004, p. 116) makes the 
same claim that Islam and democracy are incompatible: ‘In conclusion, there is 
evidence that the religious fundamentals of Islam are incompatible with secular 
liberal democracy’. The claim is based on her observation that ‘the majority of 
Muslim societies are characterised by authoritarianism and intolerance for pluralism 
and principles of popular sovereignty and equality’ (p116).17 
The suggestion by Lewis that Islam is not amenable to a separation of the state and 
mosque cannot stand even a minimum amount of scrutiny. The separation of church 
and state in the Christian world did not come naturally, nor was it established 
smoothly and effortlessly. In the past, the king of Spain was referred to as His 
Catholic Majesty, and the king of France was called His Most Christian Majesty. 
Lewis’s approach to declaring the amenability of Christianity regarding separation of 
state and church is simplistic. By using a statement attributed to Jesus to explain the 
separation of state and church in the Christian world, Lewis’s approach is no 
different from that of al-Mawdudi and Qutb, who found in one short statement a rule 
that had magical power to explain complex phenomena. The state and church in the 
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Christian world were not separate. There was a conflict between the church and state. 
That is why secularism emerged, with varying degrees of hostility towards religion.  
Moreover, Lewis’s area of expertise is the Ottoman Empire. As discussed before, the 
view that there has been a continuous system of government since Abu Bakr in 632 
until ‛Abd al-Majid in 1924 is not uncommon. However, as Abu al-Majd (2006, pp. 
104-108) has pointed out, it is not possible to talk about that system and the entire 
period of time as one, inseparable unit. With regard to the Ottoman Empire, Abu al-
Majd also points to a difference of opinion amongst Muslims regarding the Ottoman 
era, especially before the collapse of the empire and the removal of the last caliph, 
‛Abd al-Majid. He notes that some Muslims defended the Ottoman caliphate because 
they viewed it as Islamic and acted as a bulwark in the face of European political, 
military, and intellectual invasion. Other Muslims did not view it as Islamic in its 
latter days; they criticised the Ottoman caliph, and did not mind the collapse of the 
empire (pp. 104-108). 
Therefore, when Lewis makes a sweeping generalisation about Islam, it is highly 
likely that he relies on his expertise in the Ottoman Empire, which lasted for more 
than six centuries. It defies logic that one can view this period as a single unit. It 
defies logic even more when this long period is seen as a continuation of the 
caliphate that started with Abu Bakr, and as being representative of Islam and 
fourteen centuries of its history. It is imprudent to use this period, or events from the 
past, to make sweeping generalisations about Islam and Muslims now and in the 
future. 
As Hitti (1948) notes, the idea of inseparability of political and religious roles of the 
leader of the Muslims is a ‘common fallacy’. He rejects the assertion that ‘the 
caliphate is a religious office’ (p. 57). He argues that it is ‘misleading’ to make 
comparisons with ‘the headship of the Holy Roman Empire’, or ‘the Catholic 
Church’ (p. 57). Hitti further notes: ‘Not until the latter part of the eighteenth century 
did the notion prevail in Europe that the Moslem Caliph was a kind of pope with 
spiritual jurisdiction over the followers of Muhammad throughout the world’ (p. 58). 
He attributes the idea to an Ottoman sultan, the ‘shrewd ‛Abd al-Hamid II’ (p. 58). 
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The principle of the separation of branches of government is discussed by Gharaybeh 
(2000, p. 505). He points out that only Prophet Muhammad combined all authorities. 
With his death, the ability to legislate with divine authority came to an end. 
Moreover, none of the successors combined all roles. Caliphs appointed judges to 
adjudicate on matters, and the caliphs were not above the decisions made by these 
judges. 
In response to Lewis and Huntington, Said (2001)18 points out that Huntington ‘relies 
heavily on a 1990 article by the veteran Orientalist Bernard Lewis’. He argues that 
‘neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for the internal dynamics and 
plurality of every civilization’. Said describes Huntington as ‘an ideologist, someone 
who wants to make “civilizations” and “identities” into what they are not: shut-down, 
sealed off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents 
that animate human history, and that over centuries have made it possible for history 
not only to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of 
exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing’. 
Said’s characterisation of Huntington as an ideologist applies equally to Fukuyama. 
These scholars are not only ideologists; they are in some way politicians, or scholars 
who serve political agendas. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed that they were 
members of the ‘neo-conservatives’ trend, or had offered advice to the administration 
of George W. Bush. As Waldman (2004) reported in the Wall Street Journal, days 
after the attacks of 11 September 2001, Lewis ‘argued for a military takeover of Iraq 
to avert still-worse terrorism in the future’. 
The claim of incompatibility made by Milton-Edwards (2004) was based on what 
some Muslims, like Qutb, had argued. Her claim was shaky because she failed to 
identify the ‘religious fundamentals of Islam’ that made it incompatible with 
democracy. The ‘evidence’ she relies on to support the claim of incompatibility is 
that ‘the majority of Muslim societies are characterised by authoritarianism’. Her 
own evidence is not in favour of her argument. If there is a minority of Muslim 
societies which are not ‘characterised by authoritarianism’, why not investigate the 
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matter further to ascertain that it is indeed the fundamentals of Islam are the source 
of authoritarianism. 
In fairness to Milton-Edwards, I should point out that she has updated her views on 
the matter. She indicates that many Muslim ‘thinkers believe that there is a mutual 
compatibility between Islam and democracy’. She further observes that the majority 
of Muslims have ‘accepted some notion of democracy, but […] they have differences 
over its precise meaning’ (2010, p. 137). In spite of the change, which seems 
qualified, the fact remains that the opinion she expressed in 2004 should be 
mentioned because it represents a view subscribed to by some non-Muslim scholars. 
Unlike Lewis, she reconsidered her view when she familiarised herself with what 
Muslim scholars have said about Islam and democracy. 
Democracy and Shari‛a 
There remains another important question to answer. Can democracy and shari‛a co-
exist? Can democracy in a Muslim country be adopted, and at the same time shari‛a 
be applied? This is a valid point and requires consideration.19 I propose two answers 
in response to this point. The first is that, in theory, the answer is yes: shari‛a and 
democracy can co-exist. Shari‛a is an Arabic word for law. The other one is qānūn. 
The law and democracy co-exist in democratic countries, and the rule of law is very 
important in a democratic system of government. The laws in such countries differ 
from one another in relation to rights. The same logic applies to a Muslim country 
wishing to democratise and implement shari‛a at the same time. 
Contrary to a widely held view, shari’a is a body of law, which covers punishments 
for crimes such as theft and murder, as well as other acts and beliefs which do not 
warrant punishment under universal human rights, such as sexual orientation or 
changing one’s religion. In Muslim majority states, whether highly secularised such 
as Turkey, or anti-secular, such as Saudi Arabia, shari‛a does exist in one form or 
another in the laws in relation to marriage, inheritance, and economy, for instance. 
Even in the West, the banking sector found that it can attract customers if the 
business is conducted in a way consistent with the shari‛a. Therefore, some financial 
institutions created Islamic banking and investment divisions. I need to stress here 
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that I am only explaining that shari‛a is law and the term is broader than what it is 
often associated with—the penal code (hudūd). 
Having said that, I have to explain how shari‛a, specifically the penal code that 
comes into conflict with the universal human rights, can be reconciled with 
democracy based on universal human rights. The answer is found through different 
routes. One is that it is wrong to suggest that the implementation of penal code in 
particular is wanted in every Muslim state. There are old and new debates about the 
implementation of shari‛a even amongst those who want it implemented. Some 
people oppose immediate implementation, and call for gradual enforcement. Others 
argue that severe punishments, such as stoning and severing hands, were rarely 
implemented in the past because the conditions that have to be satisfied before the 
punishment is applied are nearly impossible to be satisfied. For example, the 
punishment for zina is that the act must be witnessed by four people. In reality, a 
couple copulate in private, and consequently the condition of four witnesses cannot 
be easily met. Those who follow this line of argument conclude that the punishments 
stipulated in shari‛a (hudūd) cannot be implemented because the standards of proof 
are too high. 
In Saudi Arabia, there is little doubt that shari‛a, regarding the penal code in 
particular, is implemented selectively. Therefore, it is not the model that appeals to 
other Muslim countries. The majority of Muslim states do not implement the hudūd. 
Jordan, my case study, is one of them. Some laws in Jordan are within the rules of 
shari‛a (family and related issues); others are not (banks and economy). 
Laws and the interpretations of laws evolve. In the West, homosexuality was 
punishable by law. Oscar Wilde was tried for homosexuality and imprisoned. At 
present, gay couples can marry legally. Some Muslims say that Allah’s laws do not 
evolve. From a critical, rationalist perspective, this rigid attitude will not serve Islam 
or Muslims, as it rejects refutations (see my previous reference to Popper). 
Some Muslim scholars distinguish between shari‛a and fiqh. Abu al-Majd (2006, pp. 
88-89) explains that those who equate them make a big mistake. The people who 
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engage in fiqh are human beings, and obeying them is not a duty. Similarly, al-
‛Awwa (2006, pp. 232-233) explains that opinions expressed by fuqahā’ in the past 
do not bind Muslims of subsequent eras, because the circumstances have changed. 
In other words, while the point about implementing shari‛a within a democratic 
country seems contradictory at first sight, closer scrutiny reveals three points. The 
first is that there is no single interpretation of shari‛a; the second is that there is no 
agreement on immediate or gradual implementation; and the third is that not all 
Muslims want to implement hudūd. 
PART 2: ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY 
In an attempt to be less sweeping in making the claim that Islam is incompatible with 
democracy, certain scholars felt conscious of the need to make a distinction between 
Islam, the religion, and the actions of some Muslims. This is apparent in an argument 
by Diamond, Liz, and Lipset (1988, p. 174): 
What we are witnessing is the transition from a relatively tolerant and open 
kind of Islam to an Islam that is setting itself as an autonomous political 
force. Whereas the first type was compatible with democracy, the second is 
more of an obstacle, for it implies a totalitarian vision of society. 
Diamond, Liz, and Lipset further argue that ‘Islam has become an ideology of 
mobilization and protests’ (p. 173). 
There has been movement away from using ‘Islamic’ when referring to groups with 
Islamic orientation. The term ‘Islamicist’, used by Robins (1991, p. 192) points to an 
attempt to distinguish the religious aspect of Islam from the one mixed with politics. 
The formula used to make a distinction is adopted by Halliday (1995), agreeing with 
Keddie (1986), that Islamic denotes the religious aspect of religion, while Islamist 
denotes the political (p. 349).  
The desire to differentiate between the religious and political comes as well from 
Muslims who have objected to calling some groups Islamic on two grounds: one is 
that it implies other groups are not Islamic. The other ground is that when called 
‘Islamic’, such groups are ascribed a role they are not entitled to, nor do they 
deserve, namely, appearing to be representing Islam and Muslims. Consequently, the 
term political Islam appeared in Arabic (Islam siyasi), and is in wide circulation. 
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Others have opted to make a non-standard adjective form Islam, so instead of Islāmī 
(Islamic), the term Islamawy was coined. 
Initially, there was no problem with describing various movements as Islamic. El-
Affendi (2002, p. 44) has argued that to call the groups engaged in politics ‘Islamic’ 
does not mean other groups are not. He uses the analogy of calling a party 
democratic, and says the name does not mean that other parties are not. Such an 
argument is ascertained by political realities in democratic countries. No one will 
suggest that because there is a party called the Democratic Party in the US, then the 
Republican Party is not democratic. Moreover, in the UK one party is called Labour, 
and another is the Conservative Party. No one will suggest that the Labour Party 
looks after the interests of only working people, or that the Conservative Party looks 
after people who have conservative attitudes. 
The point being made here is that the arguments about the name and its connotations, 
or an adjective, seem superficial. Therefore, I shall look for more substantive 
arguments against Islamism. 
Objections to Islamism 
If the claim of democracy’s incompatibility with Islam receded, another one 
ascended: with Islamism. Kramer (1997) identifies four flawed assumptions, 
underlying some of the views that advocate involving the Islamists in political 
processes and power (p. 162): 
= First, that the yearning for democracy is today universal, and stands behind the 
mass Islamist movements. 
= Second, that there are ‘extremists’ and ‘moderates’ in Islamist movements, and 
that they can reliably be identified, classified and separated both for analytical 
and policy purposes (inverted commas in original). 
= Third, that power has a moderating effect upon those who share or exercise it, 
and would have such an effect upon Islamists as well. 
= Fourth, that because Islamism represents the populist will, its triumph is 
inevitable. 
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Kramer’s first point illustrates the argument that when it comes to the Muslim world, 
the Muslims will be condemned if they appear not to be interested in democracy. 
When they express aspirations in this regard, then these aspirations are met with 
scepticism, if not dismissed. The ultimate judgement on whether the Islamists are 
genuine in their discourse about democracy is in the establishment of democratic 
systems in Muslim states. To deprive the Muslims of democracy because the 
Islamists are not democrats is a bizarre argument. 
In the second point, Kramer lumps all Islamist movements in one category. 
Realistically, however, Islamist movements are not all the same. To begin with, 
when the term ‘Islamist’ is used in such a loose manner, confusion is a natural 
conclusion. The point about policy is also worth discussing. Whose policy? The 
Israeli foreign policy planners? American planers? Jordanian foreign policy 
planners? It is absurd to suggest that Jordanian policy makers cannot tell the 
difference between the MB and groups led by al-Zarqawi and his likes. 
Kramer’s third point has been put to the test by Schwedler (2006). She studied the 
IAF in Jordan and Islah Party in Yemen. She correctly observes (p. 194): 
both have been allied with the ruling elites since their early days, so labelling 
them moderate because they do not seek to overthrow the existing regime 
fundamentally misses the point: not only were they never radical, they were 
never really excluded. 
Therefore, whether inclusion leads to moderation remains an unresolved point. 
However, inclusion and consequently working with other parties within a system 
with defined areas of authority does not allow Islamist parties to have their way. 
When the MPs of the MB were included in Mudar Badran’s government in 1991, the 
inclusion was the right thing to do on the basis that the MB had a big bloc in the 
HoD. However, the five ministers were not able to dictate the government’s policy. 
Therefore, whether the MB or these ministers became less radical or not is irrelevant. 
This instance, therefore, indicates that inclusion is the option with merits that 
outweigh exclusion. 
The fourth point in Kramer’s list is also instructive. He is wrong to suggest that other 
scholars are naïve to assume that the populist will triumph. To start with, the best 
way to have a free, measurable popular will is to have a democratic system of 
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government. It is under this system that one can say with some confidence that ‘the 
people have spoken’. In a democratic system, the will of the people (the majority) 
prevails, and this is the right thing.  
In the absence of democracy, any claim in relation to popular will is speculative. As 
such, it can be dismissed by Kramer and others as ‘populist’. Moreover, whether it is 
a populist will, or democratic popular will, there is no guarantee that it will triumph. 
In Algeria, the army interfered in 1992 and cancelled the results of the elections. In 
Palestine in 2006, the democratic will of the people counted for nothing, as far as 
Israel, US, and EU were concerned because the people chose Hamas. In Chile in 
1970, electing Salvador Allende was also unwelcome, and the army staged a bloody 
coup in 1973. Kramer will have been right if he suggested that the will of the people 
matters very little. 
Pipes (1997, p. 65) argues that the Muslim fundamentalists are Westernised and in a 
way similar to nationalists in Europe. He predicts that ‘fundamentalist Islam will 
remain a force for some time to come’. However, he further predicts that ‘it will 
wither just as surely as did the other radical utopian ideologies of this century, 
fascism and communism’ (p.65).  
There are several problematic assertions in this short statement by Pipes, who fits 
Popper’s description of a historicist. Popper (1957) outlines how historicists tend to 
make prophecies about the future relying on what they believe to be historical laws 
(pp. 41-45). Many Muslims wear Western clothes in their own countries, including 
Muslim ‘fundamentalists’. This can be seen as sign that they have no problem with 
everything Western. However, Western suits and ties do not make one a Westerner, 
as the identity of a human being is made of more than the clothes he/she wears. 
Unlike nationalists anywhere, the Muslim fundamentalists are known, in theory at 
least, to oppose nationalism. They consider all Muslims to be one nation, as 
described in the Qur’an (21: 92 and 23:52). Other verses (2:13 and 10:19) suggest 
that all people are one community.  
Moreover, it is not hard to agree with Pipes that fundamentalist Islam will continue 
for some time to come. It will probably remain a force for longer than he thinks, 
because fundamentalist trends in all religions never die. His prediction that ‘it will 
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wither’ is unsound. There is a scholarly misconceived comparison between 
‘fundamentalist Islam’ and fascism. Such a similarity is dismissed by another 
American scholar, Sciabarra (2006) who points out that the Arab world is  
a mongrel mixture of theocratic fundamentalism, quasi-socialist command 
economies dominated by state-monopoly control of key resources (such as 
oil), and hereditary monarchy. It’s simply wrong to characterize this mongrel 
mixture in toto as “Islamofascism.” Call it theocratic statism or theocratic 
authoritarianism or, for its more “secular” forms, monarchical-military 
dictatorship, but please don’t call it “fascism.” Not unless you mean 
something historically specific, as in the “guild socialist” arrangements of 
Benito Mussolini.  
Moreover, Hayes (1973) explains that there has been a ‘lack of agreement about the 
true nature of fascism, both of the past and present’ (p. 9). He points out that ‘fascist’ 
is an abused term and the intention of using it is ‘to make a controversial comment 
on political developments and at the same time place those who they oppose beyond 
the pale of human sympathy’ (p. 9).  
As Forte (2001) explains, ‘some commentators […] seek to turn the response to bin 
Laden into a campaign against religion itself’.20 With little scholarly scrutiny, one 
can find that this is the case when one reads the claims made by some scholars such 
as Lewis, Huntington, Fukuyama, Pipes, and Kramer. It is all done in the name of 
scholarship, often at prestigious academic institutions. 
It will be naïve to suggest that there are no people who genuinely distrust the 
Islamists’ commitment to democracy, and oppose mixing politics with religion. 
Religious minorities, secularists, agnostics, and even many practising Muslims will 
be genuinely alarmed. Therefore, these concerns will need to be addressed. Mere 
assurances form Islamists will not be sufficient.  
Al-Sayyid (2003, p. 25) is categorical in his assertion that the ‘Islamists’ 
participation in democratic politics undoubtedly presents a serious threat to the 
maintenance of civil and political rights and democratic procedures in their home 
countries’. However, he does not go as far as suggesting that they should be 
prevented from being included. Instead, he argues in favour of ‘safeguards to reduce 
the risk’. These include constitutional changes which enshrine ‘the full set of civil 
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and political rights formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
without the limitations Muslim countries typically impose to make such rights 
compatible with shari‛a’ (p. 25). 
The second safeguard recommended by al-Sayyid is the use of ‘proportional 
representation’ in the electoral system. This system, he argues, tends to prevent 
winning a majority of seats in parliaments. The third safeguard is a bicameral system, 
in which the upper chamber can act as a check on the lower (p. 25). 
The fourth safeguard is ‘the establishment of a supreme constitutional council’ with 
various powers to protect rights. However, it is also empowered ‘to order the armed 
forces to overthrow, if necessary, any government convicted through judicial 
channels of violating citizens’ fundamental civil and political rights’ (pp. 25-26). 
It is sensible to enshrine the rights and freedoms of citizens in the constitutions. 
Governments will argue that they are enshrined already. The point of departure in al-
Sayyid’s suggestion is that rights and freedoms are enshrined without the usual 
qualification of being in line with shari‛a. It will take some courage to make these 
particular constitutional changes, because removing the reservations will be opposed, 
as has been demonstrated in Jordan when the government removed its reservation on 
article 15 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW). However, the regime that will introduce these changes is 
unlikely to be one headed by someone who wants to stay in power for life. A change 
of this nature amounts to an overhaul which intends to take the entire people of the 
state to a new, higher level of human dignity. Therefore, while this recommendation 
is sensible, it overlooks the fact that this safeguard protects the citizens not from the 
Islamists, but also from the state. 
The recommendation of using proportional representation (PR) is also sensible. 
However, this has its justification not only as a safeguard against Islamist 
participation, but as a general issue of fairness of representation. The debate about 
the need to adopt PR is a recurring one in the UK, whose electoral system produces 
majorities in the House of Commons with less than a majority of the popular vote. 
The system used in the UK is known as ‘first past the post’. The candidate with the 
highest number of votes is declared the winner. As Beetham (2005, p. 173) explains, 
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this system ‘can produce an assembly which is highly unrepresentative of the 
distribution of political opinion in the country’. 
Al-Sayyid’s recommendation of a bicameral system is also recognised as being of 
merit. Despite the fact the House of Lords is often criticised for being an unelected 
body, there is recognition that it does provide a useful role when laws are rushed 
through the House of Commons. However, the two chambers should be elected, as is 
the case in the USA. 
The fourth recommendation of al-Sayyid is very problematic. A constitutional court 
is a good idea. It is a sign of maturity of a democracy when the constitutional court is 
the ultimate arbiter on what is constitutional or not (even though constitutional courts 
are not without debates). Al-Sayyid seems to propose a council similar to the one 
formed in Iran, namely, the Guardian Council, which can restrict the right to run in 
elections. This is contrary to a basic right in a democratic system of government. 
Moreover, to empower a body to order the army to overthrow governments is an ill-
considered idea. Firstly, the military should always stay out of politics. Secondly, a 
party which gains power in a country may enlist the support of the army, and 
continue to violate the fundamental rights of the citizens. The special role enjoyed by 
the army in Turkey has been a barrier to democracy in Turkey. In Algeria, the army’s 
intervention prevented the FIS from coming to power in 1992, but thrust the country 
into years of violence. 
Al-Sayyid’s last recommendation invites another point of discussion: What if an 
Islamist party came to power through the ballot box, and then changed the 
democratic nature of the system? This hypothetical scenario will be better discussed 
in the Jordanian context. What if the IAF/MB came to power in Jordan? 
The first point to recognise in this scenario is that the elections would have been free 
and fair. This second point is that the political system in Jordan would have gone 
through a major, substantive change of attitude, which will allow the government to 
be formed by the party which has the majority, or largest bloc, in the HoD. This 
happened only in 1956, and the government lasted merely several months. Therefore, 
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with the powers of the king, a government formed by the Islamists will be dismissed, 
when the king decides that it is not implementing the policies he favours. In other 
words, winning the majority in elections, then forming the government will not give 
the Islamists a free hand to change the system, because the king has superior powers. 
It is worth pointing out that the MB pledged not to change the nature of the system. 
In April 1990, King Hussein appointed a royal commission. The sixty members 
represented the political currents in the country, including the MB. The task was to 
produce guidelines on the conduct of political activities. In June 1991, a document 
prepared by the commission was presented in a national conference and adopted 
unanimously. The charter stipulated the need to keep ‘the civilian and democratic 
character of the state’. By being represented on the commission and attending the 
national conference, the MB had given a pledge not to change the system of 
government. 
Assuming that Jordan has undergone drastic changes, and the king has become a 
nominal constitutional monarch, will the Islamists change the democratic nature of 
the system? 
In the event that the MB and IAF decide not to honour the pledge contained in the 
national charter, and the king is helpless to stop them, the assessment of Fahd al-
Rimawi is that other forces of society (such as civil society organisations) will not 
allow this to happen.21 Emily Nafa‛ has a similar view and points out that there are 
several hypothetical stages to this scenario that makes it unrealistic.22 
I shall go a step further and imagine that the Islamists in power decide to impose 
measures which alter the democratic nature of the system. If they do, it will be up to 
the Jordanian people to oppose and reverse that. This will not be easy, and will take a 
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 Personal interview. Amman, 14 April 2008. 
22
 Personal interview. Amman, 18 November 2010. 
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long time, but it is not impossible. The peoples of Eastern Europe removed the 
communist regimes after many years of strict rule.23 
Conclusion 
This chapter negotiated the hurdles identified in the introduction, namely what 
democracy means; whether Islam is, or provides, an alternative form of democracy; 
and whether democracy and Islam/ism are incompatible. The conclusion of the 
detailed discussion of these issues is that there is no theoretical incompatibility 
between democracy and Islam/ism. However, judgment is reserved until after the 
democratic audit is presented and discussed. The next chapter will continue the task 
of negotiating the fifth hurdle, specifically whether democracy can be measured and, 
if so, how. 
                                                 
23
 I completed writing this chapter before the peoples in the Arab world rose to demand change. These 
events reinforce the argument that whoever is in power cannot keep it indefinitely in the name of a 
good cause, or in the name of religion. Also, see the epilogue. 
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Chapter 3  
Assessing Democracy: Theory and Practice 
 
 
This chapter consists of three parts. The first cites examples of assessments of the 
state of human rights, freedoms, and democracy in Jordan. The second outlines the 
notion of a democratic audit and the debates about the standards to be used in 
assessing the state of democracy. The third part outlines how I carried out the 
democratic audit of Jordan. It also identifies the limitations of the audit. 
PART 1: CAN DEMOCRACY BE MEASURED? 
Suesser and de Miguel (2008) acknowledge the scepticism regarding the 
measurement of democracy: ‘the feasibility, and relevance of “measuring” human 
rights, democracy, and governance have long been controversial both in the human 
rights community and also in the international statistical community’ (p. 157). They 
suggest, however, that there is a ‘need for indicators for quantifying democracy and 
human rights’, because increasingly they ‘are seen as fundamental for good 
governance’ (p. 169).  
Human rights violations vary in severity and can have tangible consequences. 
Therefore, an attempt to establish differences in the violations is feasible. Humana 
(1987) has compiled a human rights index for 120 countries. In response to the 
scepticism about measuring human rights violations, Humana (1987, p. vii) cites a 
conclusion by Banks (1985) in which he says that statistics can be used in the service 
of human rights, just as they have been used in other areas.1 
The sources of scepticism will be discussed in a separate section below. In the 
remainder of this section, I shall cite several assessments which, as will become 
apparent, are based on different methods and standards to measure human rights, 
freedoms, and democracy in Jordan and elsewhere. 
Humana’s index is compiled by using a questionnaire of forty questions. Its version 
of 1983 ‘included items not covered by international human rights instruments’ (p. 
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 A paper presented at the American Statistical Association. 
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viii). However, he revised the questionnaire so that all the questions were ‘drawn 
totally from’ them (p. viii). After receiving the answered questionnaires, he assesses 
each question and uses a scale of four grades: YES, yes, no, and NO. The respective 
marks for these grades are 3, 2, 1, and 0. He also uses a system of weighing, because 
a violation, for instance, intimidation, can vary in severity. 
In cases of incomplete information, Humana provided a summary report about 
certain countries. This was a category he created to take into consideration countries 
about which information was available ‘but did not cover all of the specific articles 
of the questionnaire’ (p. 4). The rating system in this category entails a description of 
‘FAIR’ for ‘75 percent and above’; ‘POOR’ for ‘41-75 per cent’; and ‘Bad’ for ‘40 
per cent or less’. 
Jordan appears in Humana’s index in summary form and the rating it has been 
awarded is POOR (p. 150). Humana cites four reasons for this assessment: (a) ‘the 
power of the absolute monarch’; (b) ‘the continuing dispute with Israel’; (c) ‘Islamic 
law applies to much of social and personal life’; and (d) ‘a significant minority of 
Palestinians, over a quarter of the population, which continues to create instability’ 
(p. 150).2 Moreover, Humana cites two additional reasons which affect human rights 
in Jordan: (1) ‘the strategic importance of the country and the regime’ to the USA; 
and (2) ‘priority over human rights of maintaining the authority of the present 
monarch’ (p. 150). 
It is not clear why Humana thinks the Palestinians in Jordan ‘create instability’ and 
what kind of ‘instability’ he has in mind. However, irrespective of why he thinks so, 
the democratic audit asks questions about citizenship in order to establish the extent 
of agreement on the principle in Jordan. Moreover, Humana’s reference to the 
strategic importance of the country is dealt with in the democratic audit through 
questions about the external influence on democracy in Jordan.  
Freedom House (FH) produces an annual report in which all countries of the world 
are classified into three categories: Free, Partly Free, and Not Free. In the various 
annual reports, one finds Jordan in the Partly Free category. FH (2010) considers 
                                                 
2
 This is a problematic view of the Palestinians in Jordan whether in relation to their estimated 
number, or being a cause of instability.  
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itself ‘a clear voice for democracy throughout the world’. As its name suggests, it 
equates freedom with democracy. 
Sartori (1962, pp. 281-284) classifies freedoms into two categories: freedom to and 
freedom from. He argues that political freedoms are ‘characteristically freedom 
from’. Described in another way, he considers political freedom to be ‘a defensive or 
protective foredoom’ (p. 283), namely, to protect the individual from the power of 
the state. 
FH (2010) defines freedom as ‘the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of 
fields outside the control of the government and/or other centres of potential 
domination’. FH bases its evaluation on civil and political rights, and uses universal 
standards, for it relies on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
assessment of a country consists of an analytical report and numerical ratings (1-7, 
where 1 is more free than 2). The ratings and corresponding scores are: 1 for a score 
of 36-40; 2 (30-35); 3(24-29); 4 (18-23); 5 (12-17); 6 (6-11); and 7 (0-5). 
In the political rights category, there are three subcategories: electoral process; 
political pluralism and participation; and functioning of government. Each category 
has overarching questions, and each of these has sub-questions. In total, there are 
seventy-two questions, of which eight are discretionary and reserved for ‘traditional 
monarchies that have no parties or electoral system’ and occupying powers. 
Based on the above method, those who observe that freedom and democracy are not 
the same are correct. A monarchy for instance might choose to be liberal and allow 
people the freedom of expression, but the government is not elected. However, the 
method and the checklist used by FH show that they assess how democratic a county 
is, but FH prefers to use freedom and free instead of democracy and democratic. One 
possible reason for using freedom instead of democracy is that freedom has more 
positive connotations, as the status of ‘democratic’ was claimed by states which were 
not, especially during the Cold War, such as East Germany and South Yemen. 
The British magazine, The Economist, has an ‘Intelligence Units’ (EIU), which 
assesses democracy. In 2007 and 2008, it produced ‘The Index of Democracy’. 
Countries of the world are classified into four categories: (1) full democracies; (2) 
flawed democracies; (3) hybrid regimes; and (4) authoritarian regimes. 
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The index is compiled according to the EIU’s criteria which differ from that of FH in 
that the EIU considers it insufficient to measure only political freedoms and civil 
liberties as FH does. Instead, the EIU has developed its own five categories: (a) 
electoral process and pluralism; (b) civil liberties; (c ) the functioning of government; 
(d) political participation; and (e) political culture (The Democracy Index Report 
2008, p. 2). 
Each category has a number of questions which total sixty—an average of twelve 
questions for each category. The answers are marked in such a way that it leads to a 
mark of 10 for each category. If the average in the five categories is 8-10, then the 
country is classified as a full democracy. If the average is 7.9-6, the country is 
considered a flawed democracy. An average of 5.9-4 attracts a hybrid classification. 
An average less than 4 acquires the label of authoritarian regime (The Democracy 
Index Report 2008, p. 18). 
As regards the scoring system, it uses ‘a dichotomous and a three-point scoring 
system for the 60 indicators’. In the former, 1 is given for a yes answer, and 0 for a 
no. A half mark is used in many questions to capture ‘grey areas’. The EIU argues 
that although its scoring system is not without problems, it is preferable to scores 
using 1-5 scale or 1-7 scale. 
In the Index of 2007, Jordan was ranked 113, with a score of 3.92. In 2008, the rank 
fell to 117, but the overall score was slightly higher (3.93). This change would 
suggest an improvement in other countries which overtook Jordan’s almost 
unchanged status. In 2010 the rank was 117, with a score of 3.74, which put Jordan 
in the category of authoritarian regimes.  
Polity IV is a project which has monitored ‘Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2008’. Polity IV (2009) measures: (1) key qualities of 
executive recruitment; (2) constraints on executive authority; (3) political 
competition; and (4) changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. 
According to Polity IV (2009), its ‘conceptual scheme is unique’. This is attributed to 
examining the ‘concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in 
governing institutions’. Polity uses a score based on a 21-point scale, ranging from -
10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The score then leads to 
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one of three categories: autocracies (-10 to -6); anocracies (-5 to +5); and 
democracies (+6 to +10). 
In relation to Jordan, Polity IV data show that at no time since 1946 did Jordan reach 
the threshold of a democracy. There are two peaks that brought Jordan close to being 
an anocracy. The first one was in 1956/1957, when Sulayman al-Nabulsi became the 
PM, because he was the leader of the Socialist Nationalist Party (SNP), which won 
the largest number of seats in the HoD. The second peak starts slowly in 1984 and 
reaches its highest point from 1992 through 2006, before it starts to fall again. 
Kanaan and Massad (2010) outlined the political and economic factors which would 
have prompted Polity IV to increase or decrease its rating of Jordan’s status as 
anocracy or otherwise (pp. 87-112). They conclude that ‘like most Arab countries, 
Jordan has suffered from continued autocratic rule’. They attribute this to ‘the ability 
of the Jordanian monarchy to impede real political reforms through various 
incentives and means, largely financed by rentier (non-tax) public revenue, to co-opt 
the elite and middle class, and by relying on the Western powers’ (p. 111). 
The Centre of Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan publishes an 
annual report about the state of democracy in Jordan. The report is based on a poll. In 
2008, the report was introduced in the following terms: 
The poll aims to identify the views of Jordanians about the democratic 
transformation in Jordan in general. It measures the level of democracy as 
perceived by citizens, identifies what democracy means to Jordanians, what 
type of political system Jordanians prefer, and what political system they 
perceive as the best to address the issues of poverty, unemployment, and 
financial and administrative corruption.3  
Implied in this introduction is a suggestion that Jordan is undergoing a process of 
democratic transformation. It becomes apparent as well that the definition of 
democracy is taken for granted, and every Jordanian knows what democracy is. 
According to CSS (2008): 
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 Reports are available in electronic form on the website of CSS (without page numbers). 
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Most Jordanians conceptualize democracy as closely related to civil and 
political liberties. This understanding, in essence, does not differ from the 
concept of democracy in advanced democratic countries. Since the 1999 poll 
and until the time of this poll, 63% of total responses defined democracy as 
civil liberties and political rights. 
In referring to civil and political rights, the poll seems to be guided by the criteria 
adopted by FH. The democratic audit does not leave the definition of democracy to 
politicians or the people for the reasons cited by Beetham in the second part of this 
chapter. It also did not take for granted, for instance, that Britain under Blair was 
democratic.4 The poll by CSS was based on impressions, rather than on defined 
criteria. Therefore, while the reports of CSS are valuable, they do not provide an 
assessment based on standardised criteria. For example, the poll quotes a majority of 
Jordanians as saying that Palestine is not democratic. In contrast, the EIU’s Index of 
Democracy (2007) lists Palestine in the hybrid category (p. 4). 
One can say that the Jordanian assessment of the level of democracy in Jordan is 
more generous than the others referred to above. Two reasons can explain this. While 
CSS strives to be independent, nonetheless, it operates in an environment where 
‘loyalty to Jordan’ is demanded. Second, CSS does not refer to a standardised 
procedure. A poll is not a reliable method to assess the level of democracy anywhere, 
including Jordan. 
Measuring Democracy: A Critique of Methods 
Klug, Starmer, and Weir (1996) outline various methods used in assessing ‘political 
freedoms and rights’ and have found them ‘unsatisfactory’. They also consider both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to human right studies ‘unsuitable’. With 
regard to the method adopted by FH, Klug, Starmer, and Weir state that: ‘The index 
used to evaluate liberties is very broad and only partially based on international 
human rights standards […] Consequently, much is left to the judgement of the 
independent ‘expert’ charged with answering these questions’ (p. 14). An example to 
justify this reservation is related to measuring the ‘independence of courts’. In this 
criticism, Klug, Starmer, and Weir include Humana’s method and state that he 
‘provides little detail on his coding protocol’. They correctly observe that the ‘final 
assessment’ is made by ‘Humana himself’. 
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 A democratic audit was carried out in 1999 by S. Weir and D. Beetham 
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Moreover, Klug, Starmer, and Weir outline their criticism of the quantitative 
approach. Taking the number of banned demonstrations as an example, they argue 
that the question in this regard ‘can be misleading’ in the absence of a ‘reference to 
the prevailing of political activity in the country’ (p. 15). Moreover, the quantitative 
approach does not reveal the different levels of torture, for example. Similar criticism 
is levelled at the qualitative approach. While praising Amnesty International (AI) for 
producing ‘the most reliable’ reports, they point out that it ‘specifically disavows any 
intention to grade or evaluate governments according to their record on human 
rights’ (p. 15). 
This critique, I suggest, applies equally to the method adopted by Diamond and 
Morlino (2004) who developed criteria to assess the ‘quality of democracy’. They 
acknowledge that their notion is ‘a value-laden and hence controversial subject’ (p. 
1). The definition of democracy they subscribe to involves four elements: universal, 
adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one serious 
political party; and alternative sources of information (p. 3). They point out that in 
‘the industrial and marketing sectors, quality is referred to in three contexts: 
procedure, content, and result’ (p. 4). On this basis, their definition of quality of 
democracy is ‘one that provides its citizens a high degree of freedom, political 
equality, and popular control over public policies and policy makers through the 
legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions’ (p. 4). 
Having dealt with the definitions of democracy and quality, Diamond and Morlino 
proceed to ‘identify eight dimensions on which democracies vary in quality’. These are: 
the rule of law; participation; competition; vertical accountability; horizontal 
accountability; respect for civil and political freedoms; progressive implementation of 
greater political (and underlying it, social and economic) equality; and responsiveness (p. 
5). Diamond and Morlino argue that ‘the analysis of a good democracy should exclude 
hybrid or “electoral authoritarian” regimes’ (p. 3). If one wishes to use their criteria to 
assess the state of democracy in Jordan, a prejudgment has to be made: if Jordan is a 
hybrid regime, then a priori, it is not a good democracy. If Jordan is considered a 
democracy, then one can proceed to use the eight dimensions to assess its quality. This 
situation illustrates why the democratic audit is a better option, as no such prejudgments 
are required. On the contrary, the purpose of using the democratic audit is to arrive at a 
judgment after the audit is completed. 
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 PART 2: THE DEMOCRATIC AUDIT 
What is a democratic audit? As indicated before, in David Beetham’s definition 
(1994, p. 25), it ‘is the simple but ambitious project of assessing the state of 
democracy in a single country’. The task is far from simple, especially when one 
considers the limited resources available to a single researcher. When the idea of a 
democratic audit was first entertained by Beetham, it was essential to define ‘a 
specification of what exactly to be audited’. Secondly, there must be ‘criteria to serve 
as bench marks’, according to which the audit is carried out (p. 25). 
Several possible standards were rejected by Beetham: one is to assess democracy 
‘against the standards of its practitioner claim to be guided by’. Another is ‘the 
values implicit in the political system’. A third standard is ‘what citizens themselves 
understand democracy to mean’ (p. 26). To adopt the first two standards would have 
meant acceptance that they were democratic when in fact an audit should assess how 
democratic they are (Beetham 1994, p. 26). The third standard was also rejected 
because of the ‘misuse of the term “democracy” in popular parlance has come to 
mean whatever political arrangements the speaker personally approves of, and has 
become emptied of any objective referent’ (p. 26). 
Moreover, basing the standard on ‘the existing institutions and procedures of 
Western political systems’ has two flaws: the first is that ‘no reason can be advanced 
as to why we should call these institutions “democratic”, rather than “liberal”, 
“pluralist”, “polyarchic”, or whatever other term we choose’. Another reason is the 
strong possibility that adopting this standard will lead to the charge that the concept 
is ‘Eurocentric’ because it does not offer a way to distinguish between the ‘non-
Western institutions and procedures which offered genuinely alternative ways of 
realizing democracy’ (p. 26). 
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Eurocentrism 
Before continuing to outline Beetham’s response to the objections that can be raised 
in relation to the democratic audit, I propose to discuss the charge which is 
frequently directed at concepts and argument, namely, being Eurocentric. As defined 
by Amin (1989, p. vii): 
Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon in the sense that it assumes the 
existence of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical 
paths of different peoples. Eurocentrism is therefore anti-universalist, since it 
is not interested in seeking possible general laws of human evolution. But it 
does present itself as universalist, for it claims that imitation of the Western 
model by all peoples is the only solution to the challenges of our time. 
In relation to the Arab world, Sadiki (2009) argues that ‘Eurocentric paradigms, 
especially democratization, are not easily applicable to Arab democratic 
experiments’ (p. 10). He also notes that ‘'Eurocentric modalities and concepts defy 
transposition’ (p. 11). Sadiki assesses cases of democratisation in the Arab world 
‘through an anti-foundationalist lens’ (p. vii). He argues that ‘an anti-foundationalist 
ontology that recognizes that Euro-American democratization is a function of time 
and context-specific knowledge is needed for Arab re-reading of democratic 
transition’ (p. 47). 
Foundationalism and Anti-Foundationalism 
Before engaging with Sadiki’s contentious assertions, it is necessary to identify what 
is meant by foundationalism, and anti-foundationalism. As explained by Ruckmore 
and Singer (1992), ‘foundationalism is an epistemological theory intended to be 
independent of ontological claims, a theory in which reason is meant to justify its 
own claim to know’ (p. 6). In contrast, anti-foundationalism is ‘the negation of one 
of the various forms of foundationalism’ (p. 8). More specifically, however, it is ‘any 
effort to validate knowledge claims without appealing to an absolute or ultimate 
basis known with certainty, whether the latter is held to be unattainable or the model 
of knowledge as a unified structure resting on a foundation of certainty is rejected in 
principle’ (p. 8).  
Said (2004) situates himself amongst the ‘crude foundationalists’. He refuses to 
accept that ‘human rights are cultural or grammatical things’, and argues that the 
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violations of human rights ‘are as real as anything we can encounter’ (p. 136). Al-
Sayyid (2010) observes that Sadiki ‘rejects the transitologues’ basic assumptions and 
looks for the building blocks of another analytical structure. However, he does not 
completely construct the structure, leaving this task to the future—but without any 
hints as to how the whole construction would look’ (p. 185). 
Sadiki (2004) acknowledges that ‘anti-foundationalism itself is not above reproach, 
nor is it without challenges’ (p. 57). He refers in this regard to Crowell (1996) who 
accuses the anti-foundationalists of ‘foisting new foundations of thought’ (p. 57). 
Therefore, Sadiki’s ‘anti-foundationalist lens’ does not necessarily lead to a better 
assessment of democratisation in the Arab world.  
There is agreement in the studies of democratisation that the transition from 
dictatorship happens through different paths and for various reasons. Every transition 
is influenced by local circumstances and considerations. As Geddes (2004) notes: 
‘Many fine studies of these transitions have been written, but few of the general 
explanations proposed by scholars have turned out to hold across the full range of 
cases’ (p. 2). However, a judgment that a paradigm, concept, or modality is 
Eurocentric, in the sense suggested by Samir Amin (1989), must be based on criteria. 
Otherwise, there is a risk of comprehensively rejecting everything European or 
Western. 
I suggest that the debate about Eurocentrism is similar to the one I have outlined and 
engaged with in the previous chapter in relation to the definition of democracy. The 
difference is that instead of challenging the definition of Eurocentrism, the term 
becomes a convenient charge to dismiss notions, concepts, and arguments. It also 
seems like adopting Occidentalism in response to Orientalism. 
Universal vs. Culture-Specific Standards 
An extension of the debate on Eurocentrism is the discussion of whether or not rights 
should be universal. As the standards in the democratic audit are universal, I would 
like to cite another reason why some Muslims have no problem with enjoying 
universal rights. Al-Ghazali (1990) states that ‘Western democracies (my emphasis) 
developed good controls for correct political life, and we should borrow a great deal 
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from them to make up for the deficit that resulted from the stagnation which lasted 
for centuries’ (p. 69). This leads me to suggest that Sadiki should be more judicious 
in rejecting the applicability of European or Western concepts to the Arab world or 
elsewhere. I should also add that Arab, Muslim, Indian, Chinese, and other concepts 
should not be rejected as being ethnocentric. Cross-fertilisation is a healthy 
phenomenon. 
  
Although Beetham should be commended for wishing to avoid Eurocentrism, I 
would suggest it cannot be avoided despite one’s best effort. The reason is similar to 
the argument about universalism. While Europe (or the West generally) is more 
developed, an element of Eurocentrism is inevitable. Countries undergoing a process 
of development emulate the West to a great extent, even when they try to keep a 
unique cultural identity. If one were to take China as an example to argue that 
modernisation can be pursued without Westernisation, I would suggest that this 
argument is half-true. If Westernisation is understood in a superficial sense, such as 
wearing Western clothes, listening to Western music, and eating Western ‘fast food’, 
then I will agree that the Chinese people may wish to retain their Chinese styles and 
preferences. However, if the argument is extended to suggest that the Chinese people 
will prefer to have limited freedoms, then this argument is rejected. People all over 
the world, irrespective of their race, religion, and culture, cherish freedom.  
One objection to a democratic audit is that ‘the character and quality of a country’s 
democracy cannot be assessed by “ticking off” a set of specified criteria considered 
independently of one another’ (Beetham 1994, p. 31). The basis of the objection is 
that ‘a political system operates through a complex interrelationship between various 
institutions and practices’ (p. 31). Beetham accepts the validity of the objection but 
argues that ‘it does not follow that we should therefore abandon generalizable criteria 
against which to assess the differing practices of different countries or political 
system’ (p. 31).  
Another objection is concerned with ‘whether it is appropriate for academics to be 
engaged in such explicitly evaluative and judgemental exercise’ (p. 35). Beetham 
(1994, p. 35) explains that not all fields of academia have problems with this 
involvement: ‘those who work in the field of normative political theory have less 
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difficulty with this objection than those whose main work lies in analytical and 
exploratory political science’. Moreover, Beetham argues that all democratic indices 
are ‘necessarily evaluative and judgemental’ (p. 35).  
Assigning measures on a scale is a judgemental exercise, and especially so 
where they become evidence to be used in the foreign policy of one country 
towards others. It is not unreasonable for those at the receiving end of such 
judgement to ask whether countries making them are prepared to be judged 
by similar criteria. 
After making the case for the democratic audit, Beetham lists thirty indicators of 
democracy. These were further developed, after collaboration with International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), whose questionnaire 
stands at ninety questions. 
Although Beetham responded to various objections, the debate about which 
standards to use is worthy of further discussion, especially in relation to whether 
there should be universal rights. One of the criticisms levelled at universal standards 
is that they ‘have a Western liberal bias’ (Humana 1987, p. 5). Humana accepts this 
observation and emphatically states that it is ‘undeniably true’. However, he goes on 
to argue that the states which join the UN do so voluntarily. He points out that even 
after joining the UN, there remains a gap between the theory and practice. He cites, 
as an example, the Muslim countries which have joined the UN, yet ‘[t]heir faith and 
traditions take precedence over their obligation to the United Nations, a reality that is 
not in dispute’ (p. 5). 
Furthermore, Mouffe (2008) opposes the universality approach. She is in favour of a 
‘kind of pluralism advocated by Carl Schmitt’ who ‘insisted that the world is 
pluriverse not a universe (italics in original). She is in favour of a multi-polar world 
order, as it guards against hegemony. This is fine if it were true. It is highly likely 
that in a multi-polar world, hegemony will be divided amongst the major powers, and 
practised in their respective spheres of influence. This was the case before the bipolar 
world of the Cold War. Latin America was reserved for the US. The UK and France 
agreed on the territories to colonise and run in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 
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The general thrust of Mouffe’s arguments is valid. When it comes to specific aspects, 
it becomes problematic, especially when she discusses human rights: ‘there is 
something problematic about the idea of human rights that should be accepted by all 
culture’ (p. 454; italics in original). Schmitt ([1929] 2007) said: ‘The political entity 
cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and 
the entire world’ (p. 53). A universal standard of human rights is not the same as a 
political entity that embraces ‘all of humanity and the entire world’.  
Moreover, Schmitt makes a valid point: ‘The concept of humanity is an essentially 
useful ideological instrument of imperial expansion and in its ethical-humanitarian 
form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism’ (p. 54). I agree with him that 
notions such as liberty, democracy, humanity, and human rights are used as 
ideological tools of imperial expansion and economic imperialism. However, I agree 
only when I examine the messenger. When George W. Bush is the messenger, his 
rhetoric about liberty, democracy, or human rights lacks credibility. When the 
messenger is the millions of people who have opposed the war on Iraq in 2003, I find 
something genuine and to be celebrated about the notion of humanity. 
Mouffe’s multi-polar argument is inherently flawed, in my view. How many poles? 
Three? Seven? Why any specific number? Similarly, with numerous cultures in the 
world, how many cultural standards of human rights should the world have? It is 
worth recalling here what Said (2008) has said in relation to cultures in response to 
Huntington—namely, that cultures are not ‘shut-down, sealed off entities’ and 
throughout history they engaged in ‘exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing’. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that Mouffe (2008) argues that ‘different communities’ 
should not be allowed ‘to organise themselves according to their own laws’ if these 
‘laws contradict the constitutional essentials’ (p. 463). Although I agree with the 
submission, I suggest it undermines the arguments made already in favour of 
pluralism. 
This flaw of the non-universalist argument is that while the intention is good, the 
consequences are not. These scholars overlook the debates by the people of various 
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cultures about how much to retain and change of their cultures. Even scholars who 
attempt to avoid Eurocentrism by showing respect for other cultures fail to see the 
variety of views and debates within these cultures. The well-intentioned argument 
leads scholars like Esposito and Voll (1996) to present an anti-democratic argument 
by al-Mawdudi, as an example of an Islamic conceptualisation of democracy. Why 
should al-Mawdudi or Qutb be seen to have spoken for all the Muslims in relation to 
democracy or other notions? 
I am suspicious of the non-universalist arguments, because their ultimate conclusion 
is that people of non-European race are not worthy of these rights. The anti-
universalist argument is also favoured by the authoritarian rulers to perpetuate their 
grip on power. It is worth reiterating what I have said earlier: that the notions of 
modernity, human rights, and democracy cannot be appropriated by Europe, the 
West or the Judeo-Christian world. I do not doubt that some scholars make their 
arguments out of sympathy with other peoples’ aspirations to be different, and in 
opposition to hegemonic discourse. However, a universal human right will not make 
the Chinese people European or Western; nor will it make a Jordanian less so.  
I suggest there is a better reason for the use of a universal standard. This has the 
implication that all people across the world are considered equal and worthy of the 
same rights. The argument against universal human rights is misguided because it 
can and does open the door to the abuse of rights. One would consider the merits of 
the anti-universal standards if the culture-specific standards are of higher standards. 
For example, when the Muslim world was more tolerant of Christians and Jews, 
some Jews of Spain chose to live in the Muslim world. At that time, it would be 
possible to argue that the Muslim human rights standards were higher than those of 
Spain, and therefore, it was natural to be inclined to go and live where the standards 
are better. 
In other words, I concur with those who choose the universal standards as the norm, 
without losing sight of the fact that the universal standards come qualified, to the 
point that they can seem ‘worthless’. Beetham (2004) cites Article 10 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and points to its first part which upholds the 
freedom of expression. However, its second part qualifies this right with many 
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restrictions.5 Therefore, he notes: ‘Most students when you give them this text to 
read will say, well, this right is worthless’. In other words, where the standards of 
rights are considered universal, enjoying them without restrictions is a struggle that 
has not yet ceased. 
On the basis of the democratic audit, Klug, Starmer, and Weir (1996) have developed 
the Human Rights Index, arguing that ‘political rights and freedoms are singled out 
for special protection in international treaties because they ought to be exempt, in 
principle, from everyday commerce of politics’ (p. 309). Consequently, Klug, 
Starmer, and Weir base their questionnaire on UN instruments, namely, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Before I conclude the discussion on which standards to use, I will attempt to identify 
some Islamic standards, and discuss whether they can or should be used in the 
democratic audit. 
Abou El-Fadl (2004), who reconciles democracy and Islam, identifies ‘a set of social 
and political values that are central to a Muslim polity’ (p. 5). The first is ‘pursuing 
justice through cooperation and mutual assistance’; the second is ‘establishing a 
nonautocratic, consultative method of governance’; the third important value is 
‘institutionalizing mercy and compassion in social interaction’ (p. 5).  
Can the Islamic values identified by Abou El-Fadl be used in the democratic audit? 
One possible response is that they are already incorporated without labelling them as 
Islamic values, because, having reconciled democracy with Islam, Abou El-Fadl 
concludes that democracy ‘offers the greatest potential for promoting justice and 
protecting human dignity without making God responsible for injustice or the 
                                                 
5
 Article 10, part 2 states: The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
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degradation of human beings’ (pp. 5-6). The other possible response is that there is a 
need for criteria in order to measure these values. The third response is that when 
these criteria are available, it will be an interesting exercise to conduct an Islamic 
democratic audit. Moreover, when these criteria are developed, there will be a case to 
make that Beetham and others should revisit their own criteria to take into account 
Islamic and other criteria. My democratic audit of Jordan, however, cannot mix 
criteria, as this will be unsound methodically and procedurally. 
 PART 3: MY DEMOCRATIC AUDIT OF JORDAN 
The democratic audit has advantages over other assessments by asking questions 
about various elements that are considered by scholars to be part of a democratic 
system of government. The scholars who consider civil society to be of prime 
importance in democracy will be satisfied by the part in the audit which asks various 
questions about it. Others who attach more importance to the social and economic 
rights will also be satisfied. In brief, the audit takes into consideration various views 
of democracy. However, there is no room in this approach to argue that democracy is 
a contested concept. In a democratic audit, the concept of democracy is not 
contested. On the contrary, it is considered the best form government, and for a 
system to remain democratic, it has to rest on two pillars: popular control and 
political equality (Klug, Starmer, and Weir 1996, p. 13). The standards are also 
universal for reasons already discussed. 
Questionnaires to Collect Data 
The collection of data for the democratic audit involved using two questionnaires. A 
questionnaire is an instrument to collect information from respondents. It is part of 
the survey method widely used in social sciences, as Czaja and Blair observe (1996, 
p. 1). When using a questionnaire, a researcher will face questions with regard to its 
design, and the sample of respondents. Czaja and Blair (1996, p. 11) identify five 
stages of a survey: (1) design and preliminary planning; (2) pre-testing; (3) final 
survey design and planning; (4) data collection; and (5) data coding, data file 
construction, analysis and final report. 
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For the purpose of my research project, I did not need to concern myself too much 
with the first three stages because the democratic audit uses a standardised 
questionnaire, which is available from the Democratic Audit (University of Essex), 
and IDEA (Stockholm). However, I did assess which question is likely to be 
misunderstood. I also had to consider whether to use the questionnaire in English, 
Arabic, or both.  
Democratic Audit has a ‘do-it-yourself’ questionnaire. The respondent chooses from 
a grid one of five options: VH (very high); H (high); M (middling or ambiguous); L 
(low); and VL (very low). The respondent is also invited to identify the best feature, 
most serious problem, and a suggestion for improvement. I have used this 
questionnaire to gather data. However, I have slightly modified it as outlined below. 
To entice respondents to answer the questionnaire, I envisaged that it should not take 
a long time to answer. By making it look shorter, the respondent will feel it can be 
answered quickly. Therefore, instead of nine pages, the modified questionnaire was 
reduced to three, including the cover page. This was possible by using only the 
overarching questions. The original questionnaire used a grid to reduce the number 
of pages because it had many more questions. More importantly, however, I decided 
against using the grid because the respondent was asked to choose one of five elastic 
replies, such as high and very high. Instead, I asked the respondents to give a mark 
out of 10, which people would find easier, as it did not impose on them a yes or no 
answer, or pass/fail choice. A mark out of 10 is easier to deal with than very high, 
very low, and the three choices in between. I retained the part that invited the 
respondents to supplement the mark with information about best and worst features, 
and to make suggestions for improvement. 
Democratic Audit and IDEA do not give any specific guidance about the sample 
size. It was left to me to make a considered decision. I endeavoured to have as many 
as I could get diligently. When one starts to ask potential respondents to answer a 
questionnaire, it becomes apparent that one cannot get as many as one wishes. 
Reaching a target of twenty returned questionnaires required sustained efforts, and 
the help of several people. 
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The Respondents 
For the short questionnaire, the respondent is someone who is familiar with 
democracy and related issues, such as civil society and freedoms. There are people in 
four categories that I identified as being able to answer the questionnaire: (1) 
academics who specialise in democracy and related issues; (2) journalists who report 
and comment on these issues; (3) activists; and (4) other intellectuals.  
During one field trip, I printed thirty copies of the short questionnaire and gave some 
copies to people who might be able to help me. I made it clear in advance that the 
respondents should fall within those categories. These printed questionnaires served 
as a testing stage because it was apparent that despite simplifying the questionnaire, 
there was some confusion as to how it should be answered. Therefore, I added a 
hypothetical question about the environment. I answered it, by giving a mark out of 
10; identified the hypothetical best and worst features; and made a suggestion for 
improvement. 
Vagueness, real or perceived, is a common issue when questionnaires are used. Czaja 
and Blair (1996, p. 73) observe: ‘Ambiguity is the ghost most difficult to exorcise 
from survey questions’. Before I sent the questionnaire, I spotted two questions that 
had the potential of being misunderstood. One (No. 12) asks: ‘Is there full 
participation in public life?’ To clarify this question, I added between parenthesis 
information to explain that it refers to diversity of voluntary organisations; women’s 
participation; and equality. The other question (No. 9) is related to leadership of the 
army. I expected a reluctance to answer this question because Jordanians are 
accustomed to refrain from talking about the army or the security services. 
Although the questionnaire was not sent by mail (it was given by hand or sent by 
email), the observation about questionnaires by Neuman (2003, p.243) is valid and 
applies to mine. Neuman points out that the ‘researcher cannot control the condition 
under which the mail questionnaire is completed […] Also, no one is present to 
clarify questions or to probe for more information’. 
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Long Questionnaire 
Although the short questionnaire was a reduced version of the full one of ninety 
questions, it was my considered judgement that it would be open to challenge as to 
whether it could be considered a democratic audit. Consequently, I decided to use the 
full questionnaire provided by IDEA. This one has the advantages of providing an in-
depth assessment of Jordan’s state of democracy. Another important advantage is 
that it may or may not concur with the overarching questions of the short 
questionnaire. If it does concur, then one assessment corroborates the other. If it does 
not, this is equally valuable because it prompts one to try to understand why this is 
the case. 
This longer questionnaire had its own set of issues and problems. To begin with, it 
consisted of 140 questions. As such, it would have been seen as very long and time 
consuming, and would have severely discouraged respondents. Moreover, although it 
was translated into Arabic by IDEA, the Arabic version would further discourage the 
potential respondents because, in translation, terms acquire meanings that can change 
the original. For example, when the term ‘inclusive’ was translated into Arabic, it 
produced a word that meant ‘comprehensive’ (shumūli), which implies a totalitarian 
system.  
My inquiries led to information that the standards questionnaire was revised, and the 
number of questions reduced from 140 to 90. Comparing the two versions, I 
established that the questions deleted were of one type that asks: ‘What measures, if 
any, are being taken to remedy publicly identified problems in this field, and what 
degree of political priority and public support do they have?’ I agreed that the deleted 
questions were redundant, and by deleting them the audit would not be less 
comprehensive. 
IDEA’s guidance as to the sample of respondents was not specific: ‘it depends on 
resources and design’. I had to make a considered judgement. Although there is a 
methodology adopted by IDEA, the decisions on implementation are taken by the 
researchers carrying out the audit. Having found that the audit carried out in 
Mongolia used five experts, I chose this figure as my target.  
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To avoid the problems with translation, I decided to use the long questionnaire in 
English, and changed the type of potential respondent. The additional requirement is 
that the respondents must have good command of English and be familiar with the 
concept of democracy and related issues. For the sake of clarity, from this point 
onwards, I shall refer to the people who answered the long questionnaire as the 
assessors. 
The search for such assessors was harder but more focused. As is the case with the 
short questionnaire, some ignored the request for help completely. Two candidates 
gave the impression they would answer but changed their minds subsequently. 
Others responded promptly. Therefore, the response rate was a great deal higher 
because the potential assessors were fewer. 
The long time spent on securing five answered questionnaires in English was mostly 
spent on identifying suitable assessors and finding the means to contact them. 
Eventually, however, I managed to have six assessors with impressive credentials. 
Two of them are women. This demonstrates that the assessment is sensitive to 
gender. Initially, I was in favour of providing brief biographies to show that they 
have highly regarded credentials. However, after some reflection, I thought that I 
should not, to eliminate the slim possibility that they might be reproached in Jordan 
if my thesis happened to be read and its content deemed unfair to Jordan. Overall, 
finding the six assessors took several months, but in the end the goal was achieved. 
Problems with Questionnaires 
The first problem one faces when using a questionnaire is that potential respondents 
will ignore the request for assistance, especially when the researcher is not personally 
known to them. In such a situation, more than three quarter of the potential 
respondents will ignore the questionnaire and will not even reply to decline. The 
other problem is that the respondent will delay answering the questionnaire, and 
when sent a reminder, a few more will ignore the request. The third problem is that a 
respondent does not understand a question and will send back a questionnaire that is 
incorrectly answered. This happened initially in in the shorter questionnaire. The first 
set of answered questionnaires demonstrated that the respondents were not clear 
about how to answer the questions. Once I recognised this, I modified the cover page 
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of the questionnaire to include am example of how to answer it. The quality of 
returned questionnaires improved thereafter. 
Quality of Responses 
By quality of responses I mean whether the answered questionnaires are usable or 
not. All of the six long questionnaires were useable because the vast majority of the 
questions were answered. It is not clear in some instances whether the assessors 
missed a question or chose not to answer it; one assessor chose not to answer 
questions related to elected government and indicated that Jordan had no elected 
government. This points to a shortcoming in this part of IDEA’s questionnaire as the 
questions assume that the governments being assessed are elected. I refrained from 
inferring that the mark should be zero when I analysed the data, as the thesis is not 
about marks, averages, and rankings. The marks have been used as a tool to help 
produce a qualitative assessment of the state of democracy in Jordan. 
Size of Sample 
Without specific advice on what constitute an adequate sample, the only choice is to 
make a considered judgement. There might be an inclination to assume that the 
bigger the sample the better. This is not necessarily true. As Spirer and Seltzer (2008, 
p. 208) explain ‘cost or time needed’ do not allow gathering ‘data for the entire 
population’. They also point out that focusing ‘resources on gathering data from a 
smaller number of subjects or units improves the quality on information gathered’. 
Other Issues 
The generic one-size-fits-all is not suitable for every country. For instance, one 
question (2.5.4.) asks: ‘How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary 
units, private armies, war lordism and criminal mafias?’ If one was conducting a 
democratic audit of Somalia or Afghanistan, the issue of war lordism would be 
relevant, but the question in Jordan would puzzle people. This question in particular 
is more than ‘double-barrelled’—the type that Blair and Czaja (1996, p. 77) 
recommend that researchers must avoid. 
Furthermore, part 2.3 of the questionnaire (Effective and Responsive Government) 
has a question (2.3.1.) which begins with ‘How far is the elected government…’. As 
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indicated above an assessor declined to answer the questions in that part, and pointed 
out the government in Jordan was unelected. IDEA’s questionnaire should not 
assume that the governments being assessed are elected. Many are not. IDEA should 
revise this part of the questionnaire.  
Tools Used in Analysing Data 
I used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), to generate descriptive 
statistics, which provide means, frequency of marks, percentages, and tables. The 
assessment does not require more than these statistics because it is a qualitative 
appraisal. To improve the presentational aspect of the tables, I used a combination of 
MS Excel and Word. 
Conclusion 
This chapter negotiated the fifth set of hurdles identified in the introduction, namely, 
whether democracy can be measured and the standards used in the measurement. The 
conclusion supported by evidence is that measuring democracy and other notions is 
now common practice. For the purpose of this thesis, the democratic audit has been 
chosen as it has advantages over other methods. 
Moreover, in the methods section of the thesis, I have quoted  Strauss and Corbin 
(1998, pp. 10-11) who argue that ‘the nature of the research problem’ influences the 
selection of method. The same applies to choice of theory. I have approached the 
assessment of the state of democracy in Jordan with an open mind, and the 
democratic audit itself is not based on a prejudgment of about the state of democracy 
in Jordan. As can be seen in the concluding chapter, other theories were outlined and 
engaged with, but there were not as plausible at explaining the state of democracy 
revealed by the audit. The modernisation theory is not dead. It can be found in 
different forms in many studies, such as those by Przeworski who argues that there is 
a link between democracy and per capita incomes. Therefore, choosing the 
modernisation theory is objectively justified. 
It should be noted that the overall assessment in this thesis is based on three 
elements: short questionnaire (macro-analysis); long questionnaire (microanalysis); 
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and elite interviews. I make no claim that the six assessors, the respondents who 
answered the short questionnaire, and the interviewees, constitute a representative 
sample of Jordan’s population. This is a qualitative assessment, not a poll. I do stress, 
however, that the people who contributed to this assessment are diverse. 
Consequently, the data produced a balanced assessment. 
Before the data collected through the two questionnaires will be presented and 
discussed, there is a need for background information in relation to Jordan and the 
MB/IAF. This will be the subject of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Jordan: History and Political System 
 
 
This chapter consists of five parts. One will focus briefly on the modern history of 
Jordan. Another focuses on the political system in Jordan, particularly its branches of 
government. The third part is concerned with the role of Islam in the state. The fourth 
is about the economy. The fifth part outlines the Palestinian connection in Jordan’s 
history and politics. The background of these issues is necessary because they will be 
addressed in the democratic audit. 
PART 1: HISTORY OF JORDAN 
The modern history of Jordan is related to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and 
the subsequent colonial era in which France and Britain carved out territories that 
were under the rule of the Ottomans. During the First World War (1914-1919), in 
which Britain and France were on one side and Germany and the Ottoman Empire on 
the other, contacts were established between Britain and Husayn ibn ‛Ali, the Sharīf 
of Mecca. According to Storrs (1939), Amir ‛Abdullah, son of the sharīf, initiated the 
contact in 1914 during a visit to Cairo ‘as the guest of the Khedive’ (p. 129). In 
Cairo, he met Lord Kitchener. Storrs noted that ‛Abdullah ‘appeared to have 
something to say but somehow did not reach the point of saying it’ (p. 129). 
Storrs (1939) outlines the details of his meeting with Amir ‛Abdullah during which 
the latter asked ‘whether Great Britain would present the Grand Sharif with a dozen 
or a half-dozen machine guns’ (pp. 129-130). The Jordanian historian, Sulayman 
Musa (1986) confirms that Amir ‛Abdullah met Lord Kitchener during a visit by the 
latter to the Khedive’s office. Musa says that Kitchener, accompanied by Ronald 
Storrs, followed the Amir, and that they told him ‘the British government was 
satisfied with the security in Hejaz and the measures taken to look after the pilgrims 
since his father assumed the role of Amir of Mecca’ (pp. 66-67). 
At the time of contact, the relationship between Turkey and Britain was not 
adversarial. Therefore, the British account suggests that ‛Abdullah was not promised 
any support. Similarly, the Jordanian account does not mention any request for help 
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during the initial contact. Both sides however were interested in re-establishing 
contact and developing cooperation after Turkey joined Germany in the war. 
The Ottoman Empire lasted for six centuries. With the rise of nationalism in Europe, 
the peoples of the empire were influenced by nationalist ideas. The Turkish elements 
of the empire wanted to give it a Turkish character. In the late 19th and 20th 
centuries, the decaying empire saw the formation of the Society for Union and 
Progress and Young Turks (1906). Likewise, the non-Turkish peoples started to think 
of independence. As Sayigh (1966A) pointed out, Arab and Turkish critics of Sultan 
‛Abd al-Hamīd succeeded in 1908 in ‘restricting his powers and adopting a relatively 
progressive constitution’ (p. 18). They then managed to remove him in 1909 (p.18). 
Sayigh (1966A) suggests that the Arabs developed a higher sense of national identity 
after members of the Young Turks reneged on the promises to be fair to the non-
Turkish elements in the empire (pp. 18-19). Instead, ‘persecution of Arabs in the 
empire intensified’ (p. 19). Furthermore, other non-Arab elements in the empire 
managed to breakaway and establish independent states such as Greece, Romania, 
Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria (p. 19). Therefore, during 1913-1914, the signs of 
an Arab nationalist movement were clear (p. 20). 
Nationalist sentiments in the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire were suppressed, 
especially during the reign of Ahmad Pasha, the butcher, who hanged many 
nationalists in Syria and Lebanon in May 1916. When the Ottoman Empire entered 
the war on Germany’s side, the road was paved for closer cooperation with sharīf 
Husayn. The British officer, Thomas Lawrence, played a leading role in organizing 
and implementing a revolt against the Ottomans.  
There are different accounts as to when and who amongst the Arab leaders initiated 
contact with sharīf Husayn ibn ‛Ali. One account referred to by Sayigh (1966A) 
indicates that the contact occurred in 1911 in the form of a letter from thirty-five 
Arab members in the Ottoman Parliament (pp. 22-23). However, Sayigh casts doubt 
on the authenticity of this account. Assuming it was, Sayigh argues, it did not 
promise the sharīf that he would become a king (p. 22). Sayigh also points out that 
even if this letter was indeed sent to sharīf Husayn, he did not respond. 
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Storrs (1939, p. 160) indicated that sharīf Husayn was telling the British that he had 
‘a general mandate as King of Arabs for a Spiritual Pan-Araby’. However, Storrs 
said that the sharīf ‘knew better than we that he could lay no kind of genuine claim’. 
The reasons outlined by Storrs include the fact the Christians, Shi‛a, Zaydis, and 
even Sunnis of North Africa would not accept him as their leader. 
Sayigh asked a necessary question: why did the leaders of the Arab movement 
choose to contact the Sharīf of Mecca to make him the leader of the movement? 
Sayigh confirmed that the Arab movement in 1915 chose to call upon sharīf Husayn 
to be its leader. They sent him a letter full of praise and offered cooperation against 
the Turks (pp. 25-26). After a long analysis concerning the lack of credentials for 
such a leadership, the answer in Sayigh’s conclusion is in ‘circumstances and the 
English’ (p. 39). The most important circumstance is the fact that the sharīf became 
the Amir of Mecca at a time of tension between the Arabs and Turks (p. 39). 
The significance of the alliance between Britain and Husayn ibn ‛Ali cannot be 
understated since Hejaz is the region which has the two holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina. Muslims make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and are encouraged to visit 
the mosque of Prophet Muhammad in Medina. From a religious point of view, this 
region is of paramount importance for the Ottoman Empire which ruled in the name 
of Islam. 
Husayn ibn ‛Ali was known as the ‘Keeper of the Holy Places of Mecca’ (‛Aruri 
1972, p. 15). He belonged to a family whose members claim to be descendants of 
Prophet Muhammad. A male member of this family is known as sharīf (honourable) 
or sayyid (master). In particular, members of this family claim descent from Hashim 
ibn ‛Abd-Munaf, the paternal great grandfather of Prophet Muhammad. Husayn ibn 
‛Ali had four sons: ‛Ali, ‛Abdullah, Faysal, and Zayd. They played various roles 
during and after the revolt launched by their father. 
A series of communications which laid the foundation for a revolt by the Arabs 
against Turkey were exchanged between Husayn ibn ‛Ali and the British High 
Commissioner in Egypt, Henry McMahon. The incentives for Husayn ibn ‛Ali were 
qualified promises that Britain would be willing ‘to recognise and support the 
independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif 
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of Mecca’; that Britain would provide the Arabs with ‘her advice’; and would ‘assist 
them to establish what may appear to be the more suitable forms of government in 
those various territories’ (1915).1 
In the meantime, Britain and France had reached a secret agreement in 1916 (Sykes-
Picot)2 according to which the two powers designated the areas which would come 
under their respective control after the end of the war. Accordingly, the region that 
incorporates present-day Syria and Lebanon would be under France’s control. The 
region from Iraq to the Mediterranean coast (including historic Palestine) was to be 
under British control. Furthermore, in 1917 the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur 
Balfour, wrote a letter to Walter Rothschild, a leader of the Jewish community in 
Britain, to inform the Zionist movement that Britain was supportive of the idea of 
establishing a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. This is known as the 
Balfour Declaration. 
Husayn ibn ‛Ali launched the revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916. It led to the 
surrender of Ottoman forces in Hjjaz. Forces led by Faysal, who was working with 
General Allenby and Colonel Lawrence, managed to seize Aqaba from the Ottomans. 
In 1918, they entered Damascus, where Faysal set up an administration. Arab 
representatives in Syria declared him King of Syria. 
In 1920, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement, France decided to remove 
Faysal from Syria, and managed to do so after a battle at Maysaloun (July 1920). 
Faysal’s brother, ‛Abdullah, led some forces with the declared intention of restoring 
the throne of his brother. His first stop was at Ma‛an, which belonged then to the 
Hejaz and is now in southern Jordan. 
Although Syria was under French control and Iraq and Palestine were under the 
British, the borders between the areas of control were not clearly delineated. The 
region on the eastern side of the Jordan River, Transjordan, had three separate 
administrative districts: ‛Ajlun, Salt, and Karak. Each had a British adviser. These 
three districts became the basis of an entity ruled by ‛Abdullah. This was formalised 
in a meeting between ‛Abdullah and Churchill in Jerusalem in March 1921. 
                                                 
1
 Letter from Henry McMahon to Hussein ibn ‛Ali, 24 October 1915.  
2
 A secret agreement between Britain and France. Named after the two officials who negotiated it: the 
British Mark Sykes and the French Georges Picot. 
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‛Abdullah was informed that ‘he could keep Transjordan on a temporary basis under 
British mandatory ‘protection’ until some more permanent arrangement was agreed 
upon with the French’ (Salibi 1993, pp. 87-88). 
It was on 15 May 1923 that the ‘Emirate of Transjordan’ was recognised ‘as a 
national state being prepared for independence under the general supervision of the 
British High Commissioner in Jerusalem’ (Salibi 1993, p. 88). 
Since then, Transjordan developed into a nation-state in stages. The transformation, 
however, required ‘money, military assistance and goodwill’ from the British (Salibi 
1993, p. 98). A series of treaties were negotiated between 1928 and 1946. The 
Emirate of Transjordan was declared a kingdom on 25 May 1946, and Amir 
‛Abdullah acquired the title of the ‘King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan’.3 But 
even after the officially declared independence of Jordan, the British had 
considerable control, especially with regard to foreign policy and the army, which 
was led by a British officer, John Glubb, who was the commander of the Jordanian 
army, until his dismissal in 1954. King Hussein’s decision to dismiss him was 
influenced by pressure from nationalists in the army and the country. 
Scholars who have studied Jordan have three broad explanations as to why the State 
of Jordan was established. First, it was formed by Britain to stem the French 
expansion in the region (Wilson 1988, p. 44). Second, that Transjordan was created 
as a prize for Amir ‛Abdullah for the services he, his brothers, and their father, 
Husayn ibn ‛Ali, rendered to Britain in its endeavours to bring down the Ottoman 
Empire (Wiktorowicz 2001, pp. 50-51). Third, ‘the British were eager to have a 
buffer between their direct rule in Palestine and both the expanding Sa‛udi power to 
the south and the French Mandate in Syria to the North. The two wishes were 
fulfilled with the creation of a new entity in Transjordan’ (Lucas 2005, p. 14). 
Kings of Jordan 
The ruling dynasty in Jordan starts with ‛Abdullah, the son of Husayn ibn ‛Ali. The 
latter’s ambition to be the king of an Arab state was not realised. Instead, more than 
one state was created in the region he had hoped to rule, and it was his sons who 
were the beneficiaries. Ironically, Husayn ibn ‛Ali and family lost their position in 
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 The Jordanian Declaration of Independence Document, dated 25 May 1944.  
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Mecca, and failed in their attempts to bring present-day Saudi Arabia under their 
control. While residing in Mecca, the family and its supporters were engaged in 
clashes with other leaders in the area. There was fierce competition between the local 
leaders. ‛Abd al-‛Aziz ibn Sa‛ud was engaged in fighting with rivals from al-Rashid 
tribes in Ha’el and the Sharif of Mecca. Ibn Sa‛ud’s forces defeated Husayn ibn 
‛Ali’s in Tayef. In order to pacify ibn Sa‛ud, he stood down in favour of his eldest 
son, ‛Ali, who ruled until 1925, when he surrendered to ibn Sa‛ud and moved to Iraq. 
Faysal was first declared King of Syria in 1918, before the French forced him out in 
1920. ‛Abdullah’s arrival in Ma‛an was supposed to be a step on the way to 
Damascus to restore the throne of his bother Faysal. However, the journey to 
Damascus was never completed. Instead, he ended up being the Amir of Transjordan. 
Thus far, Jordan has been ruled by four kings: ‛Abdullah I, Talal, Hussein and 
‛Abdullah II. ‛Abdullah I is referred to in official Jordanian discourse as the ‘founder 
king’. He acquired the title of King in 1946, and ruled until he was assassinated in 
Jerusalem in 1951. There is no authoritative account as to who was behind the 
assassination plot and why. Various accounts blame the Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-
Husayni, and King Faruq of Egypt. King ‛Abdullah’s critics blame him for 
sacrificing Palestine; his admirers argue that he managed to prevent the inclusion of 
Transjordan in the homeland promised for the Jews in the Balfour Declaration. 
As Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001, p. 36) point out ‘the real motivations of 
the assassin and his accomplices remain unclear to this day’. She adds, however, that 
‛Abdullah’s ‘collusion with the Israelis to the detriment of the Palestinians was held 
at the time to be the most likely reason’. Sayigh (1966B, pp. 227-228) refers to the 
assassin as ‘a young feda’i’4 which in the context of his book, The Hashimites and 
the Palestine Question, leaves little doubt that the assassination is related to the 
Palestine question. Hani Akhu Irshaideh (2003, p. 156) indicates that the unity 
between Transjordan and the West Bank was achieved through the approval of a 
Palestinian minority, and that ‘the assassination of King ‛Abdullah was a protest at 
this unity’. 
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 Feda’i is someone who is willing to sacrifice his life for a cause: national or religious. The term 
feda’i was widely used to refer to the fighters of the Palestinian resistance movement after 1967 war. 
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Abu Nuwar (1990, pp. 124-137) dismisses the suggestion that those behind the 
assassination were the Palestinian Mufti, Amin al-Husayni, and ‛Abdullah al-Tall, 
the leader of the Jordanian forces in Jerusalem during the 1948 war, supported by the 
Egyptian government (p. 124). An account based on this suggestion is detailed by 
Satloff (1994) who refers to ‛Abudllah al-Tall as ‘one of the plot’s ring-leaders’ (p. 
31). That ‛Abudllah al-Tall was involved with others and backed by Cairo is the 
account adopted by Jordanian historians, al-Madi and Musa (1988, pp. 550-561). In 
his memoirs, the British Resident in Transjordan, Alec Kirkbride (1976, pp. 127-
139), also blames ‛Abdullah al-Tall.  
Abu Nuwar (1990, p. 129) noted that in 1957 he met al-Tall in Cairo and asked him 
about his role in the assassination. Al-Tall swore that he was innocent (p. 129). Abu 
Nuwar suggested that Britain was responsible for the assassination. According to 
Abu Nuwar, Britain had three motives for eliminating King ‛Abdullah: (a) because 
he was about to end the British presence in the region; (b) because Britain wanted to 
abort his attempt to ‘unite Jordan with Iraq’; and (c) because he revived the idea of 
‘uniting the Arab East to confront the Zionist invasion’ (p. 129). 
Abu Nuwar said that the man found guilty of plotting the assassination, Musa al-
Husayni, had a German wife, and both were on good terms with the British Generals 
Glubb and Peake (p. 124). Abu Nuwar suggested that the British chose Musa al-
Husayni as it would be possible to make a link between the assassination and Amin 
al-Husayni and ‛Abdullah al-Tall (p. 131). The more likely reason is that the 
assassination was indeed related to the Palestine question. ‛Abdullah’s role was not 
synchronous with the Palestinians themselves or the other Arab governments. That 
he accepted the plan to partition Palestine is cited in the official Jordanian narrative 
as a farsighted decision which could have spared the Palestinians and Arabs the loss 
of all of Palestine. 
‛Abdullah’s eldest son, Talal, succeeded his assassinated father. The succession was 
not a straightforward matter because Talal at the time was receiving treatment in 
Geneva, and there were doubts about his mental stability. 
Abu Nuwar (1990) outlines the discussions and manoeuvres which took place at the 
time to decide who should succeed ‛Abdullah: the constitutional heir, Talal, who was 
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ill and receiving treatment in Geneva, or Talal’s brother, Nayef. Satloff (1994) also 
outlines the manoeuvres which were taking place to exclude Talal from becoming 
the crown prince in view of his turbulent relationship with his father. In the words of 
British officials, including Kirkrbirde, quoted by Satloff, Talal was temperamental 
and ‘deeply anti-British’ (p. 16). According to Satloff, ‛Abdullah secretly signed a 
document in which he appointed his son Nayef as the crown prince (p. 16). However, 
‛Abdullah changed his mind and restored Talal in 1947. 
According to Abu Nuwar’s account, he and other nationalist colleagues wanted Talal 
to succeed, in line with the stipulation of the constitution. The British army officers 
had a different view. The then Prime Minister, Tawfiq Abul-Huda, decided to seek 
medical reports on Talal’s mental health. Satloff (1994, p. 38) quoted a report by 
three Swiss specialists treating Talal as saying that ‘the crown prince had been under 
treatment for “an extraordinary case of mental depression”’ (p. 38). He was declared 
fit and returned to Jordan to succeed his father. 
King Talal ruled from 1951 to 1952. During his short reign, the constitution was 
amended to give more power to the other branches of government. It is noteworthy 
that Kirkbride narrates anecdotes that raise doubts about Talal’s mental stability even 
before he became king (pp. 120-126). He suggests that Talal ‘realised the burdens of 
office were too much for him and abdicated willingly’ (p. 150). This account 
however is inaccurate. King Talal’s mental instability was an issue before after he 
became king. When it became apparent that his mental condition deteriorated, Abul-
Huda initiated the procedure which led to declaring King Talal ill. Consequently, it 
was possible to remove him according to article 28 of the constitution (Satloff 1994, 
p. 56). Parliament also named Hussein, Talal’s eldest son, as the new king.  
When Hussein succeeded his father, Talal, he was two years under the age required. 
Therefore, there was a ‘council of regency’ which ruled until he reached the age of 
eighteen lunar years. He acceded to the throne on 2 May 1953 and ruled until his 
death in 1999. He is referred to in the Jordanian official discourse as the ‘father of 
modern Jordan’. During Hussein’s reign, political freedoms were suppressed and 
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political parties banned in 1957. The process of reversing that decision started in 
1989. This section about him is brief because he will be referred to in many parts of 
the thesis. 
Shortly before his death, King Hussein removed his brother Hassan from the position 
of crown prince and replaced him with ‛Abdullah, Hussein’s eldest son, who was 
named after his grandfather. ‛Abdullah’s mother is the British Antoinette Gardner, 
Hussein’s second wife, who acquired the title of Princess Mona. ‛Abdullah was 
pursuing a career in the special forces of the Jordanian army. According to some 
accounts, he was not expecting to be appointed crown prince when he was called for 
an audience with his father. After ‛Abdullah II became king, he too removed his 
brother Hamza from the position of crown prince. Hamza is the son of Lisa Najib 
Halaby, an American of Syrian origin. She was the fourth wife of King Hussein, and 
acquired the title of Queen Noor. After celebrating the tenth anniversary as king, 
‛Abdullah II named his eldest son, Hussein II, in July 2009 as the crown prince at the 
age of fifteen years. 
PART 2: JORDAN’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. However, the king is not a figurehead, as is the 
case in some European countries, such as Britain, Holland, and Norway. According 
to article 28 of the constitution, the monarchy is ‘hereditary’ and reserved for ‘the 
dynasty of King ‛Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein’—but only for ‘male heirs’. Various 
articles in the constitution give the king the power to dissolve the HoD and the HoN; 
he appoints and dismisses the prime minister; and he is the supreme commander of 
land, naval, and air forces.5 The king is the executive branch, but according to the 
constitution, his power is exercised through ministers. However, he also has 
legislative power. According to article 25, the power to legislate is shared by the 
parliament and the king, who is ‘immune from any liability and responsibility’, 
according to article 30. 
The king selects the prime minister in Jordan. Instructions on the tasks of the 
government are given to the PM in a letter from the king. Only once in the history of 
Jordan has the chosen prime minister been a member of the party which gained the 
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 A translated version is available from the website of Yale Law School.  
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largest number of seats in the HoD. This was in October 1956. Sulayman al-
Nabulsi’s government won the confidence of parliament. However, it was a short-
lived government, serving less than six months. King Hussein dismissed him. 
According to Lucas (2005, p. 23), the pillars of the regime are: East Bank tribes; 
religious and ethnic minorities (Christians, Circassians, and Chechens); state 
bureaucracy; the military; and Palestinians in business. I suggest that these five 
pillars are not amenable to generalisation. The East Bank’s tribes cannot be taken for 
granted. There are divisions amongst and within the tribes that contradict the often-
repeated generalisation about the loyalty of the tribes to the regime. It is also 
doubtful to suggest that religious and ethnic minorities would prefer oppression of 
the whole society, which applies to them as well, in return for some special treatment 
by the regime—a treatment which by international standards is not very special. 
The regime relies on the army, police, intelligence services, and a system of 
patronage. The loyalty of people serving in defence and security forces becomes part 
of the job. The members have no choice in this matter. However, loyalties can shift 
according to circumstances and interests. It is also doubtful that the regime considers 
‘Palestinians in business’ one of its pillars. Most likely, Lucas has some wealthy 
Palestinians in mind, such as the Shomans who own the Arab Bank. Irrespective of 
how many they are, the vague phrase, ‘Palestinians in business’, does not capture the 
divisions discussed later in the democratic audit in relation to citizenship.  
Finer (1970) suggested that if King Hussein were to make peace with Israel, the 
Jordanian army would act to remove him. His predictions proved wrong, because in 
1994 Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Jordanian army did not act to 
remove him. Opposition to the treaty was, and still is, expressed by individuals and 
political parties, especially IAF. 
The Jordanian Parliament is bicameral. The lower house is the House of Deputies 
(HoD), and the upper is the House of Notables (HoN).6 The two chambers are known 
together as the National Assembly (Majlis al-Umma). The number of members of the 
lower house is double that of the upper. The HoN’s members are appointed by the 
king, while members of the lower house gain membership through elections. 
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 Similar to the British House of Lords 
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According to the constitution, the power to legislate is not the exclusive domain of 
the National Assembly. As mentioned earlier, the constitution specifically states that 
the king shares the legislative power. 
After the merger of Transjordan with the West Bank in 1950, the shorthand reference 
to each part of the kingdom was East Bank and West Bank. Membership of both 
chambers was equally divided between the two parts. After the independence of 
Transjordan in 1946, the HoD consisted of forty members, and the HoN of twenty. 
The number of seats was increased in 1960 to become sixty for the lower house and 
thirty for the upper, with membership equally divided between the two parts of the 
kingdom. 
The official history of Jordan’s parliament shows that the HoD was dissolved several 
times, because it did not work well with the government. Contrary to the normal 
practice in democracies, the parliament is dismissed instead of government. In other 
words, the legislative branch of government is the weakest. 
Since the inception of Transjordan, there have been political parties. The elections of 
1956 were contested by various political parties, including the Nationalist Socialist 
Party, headed by Sulayman al-Nabulsi, and the Ba‛th Party, whose member 
‛Abdullah al-Rimawi, was made foreign minister in al-Nabulsi’s government. 
However, after the dispute between the palace and the government, King Hussein 
dismissed the government, dissolved parliament, and banned parties. In this dispute, 
the MB sided with the palace. 
Although political parties remained illegal until the political parties law came into 
effect in 1992, there was a de facto presence of political parties in Jordan, after the 
Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Armed Palestinian groups established bases in Jordan after 
the war, and political organisations were able to operate without being licensed by 
the government. The de facto public presence continued until the PLO’s presence 
was eliminated in Jordan in 1970-1971. After that, those who continued to operate 
did so secretly.  
After parties were made legal in 1992, twenty parties applied for a licence, and by 
the end of 1996, there were twenty-three parties in Jordan (Hourani 1997, p. 19). 
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However, not all managed to win seats in the HoD. Because of high number of 
parties, and weak membership, King ‛Abdullah II suggested the idea of having three 
to four large parties as a way of invigorating the political scene. In 2007, a law 
required parties to re-register, and new requirements were imposed regarding the 
minimum number of members, including a requirement of such membership to be 
spread across the country. IAF passed through this stage.  
Multi-party elections which produced significant opposition within parliament 
occurred on two occasions: 1956 and 1989. In the former, the MB had two members 
and nineteen in the latter. The change of fortunes is due to the fact that secular parties 
(nationalist and socialist)  were more popular in the 1950s. In 1956, King Hussein 
reluctantly selected Sulayman al-Nabulsi, the leader of the largest party in the HoD, 
to form the government. In contrast, although the MB gained the largest number of 
seats (but not a majority), they were not asked to form the government.7 
There are three types of courts in Jordan, according to the constitution: civil courts, 
religious courts, and special courts. The constitution makes references to the 
independence of judges who are not subjected to ‘any interference in their affairs’. In 
reality, however, there are episodes which undermine the independence of the justice 
system in Jordan, as shall be outlined in the chapter analysing the data of the 
democratic audit. As Lucas (2005, p. 23) observes, the courts are ‘staffed with 
staunch supporters of the regime’. However, they usually belong to the ‘liberal wing’ 
of the ‘coalition’ on which the regime relies. He further notes that the ‘judges have 
taken their role seriously and may on occasions reject the government dictates. If the 
king’s will is clear, however, the courts generally will not try to challenge it’ (p. 23). 
PART 3: THE ROLE OF ISLAM 
Islam is the official religion of the state, and the courts follow the Hanafi school of 
interpretation in adjudicating matters such as divorce, inheritance, and other personal 
matters. More than 90 percent of the population are Muslims. This percentage 
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 Al-Nabulsi did not win a seat in parliament. It is thought that this is due to rigging the elections. The 
choice of PM was not going to al-Nabulsi, but then King Hussein changed his mind and decided to 
take the results of the elections into account. 
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includes the Palestinians as well as the Circassian minority. The CIA (2010) provides 
the following information about Jordan’s population:  
Sunni Muslim 92%, Christian 6% (majority Greek Orthodox, but some Greek 
and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian 
Orthodox, and Protestant denominations), other 2% (several small Shia 
Muslim and Druze populations) (2001 est.) 
It is customary to broadcast live the Friday noon prayer from a major mosque. This 
used to be al-Aqsa in Jerusalem before 1967. Also, regular programming is 
interrupted to broadcast the call for prayer (azan). As the Audiovisual Commission 
(AVC) notes, a radio station wholly dedicated to broadcasting Qur’an recitations and 
religious programmes was established in 2006. However, the fact that Islam is the 
official religion does not translate into implementation of shari‛a. For instance, banks 
(nonIslamic) which deal with interest operate freely. Alcoholic beverages can be 
purchased and consumed in Jordan. 
As Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001) note: ‘Jordan’s rulers enhance their 
legitimacy through reference to their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad, but the 
political philosophy of the state is western constitutional in origin’ (p. 102). It is true 
that the rulers of Jordan refer to their linage to the Prophet. However, does this 
enhance their legitimacy, or that of other rulers in the Muslim world? There are two 
points which are worthy of discussion: the legitimacy to rule Jordan by the Hashimite 
and the popularity of the kings of Jordan.  
Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001) are not alone in referring to the lineage as a 
credential. Al-‛Ukur (2003, p. 88), an Islamic member of the Jordanian HoN, 
addresses a point which the Islamists in Jordan and elsewhere discuss: whether they 
should participate in legislative councils and take up leading roles in countries not 
considered to be following the teachings of Islam. He argues in favour of doing so, 
especially in countries ‘whose constitutions stipulate the Islam is the official religion 
and the origins of the rulers go back to the honourable household [of Prophet 
Muhammad]’ (p. 88). Similarly, the leftist writer, ‛Urayb Rintawi (2003) suggested 
that what reinforced the relationship between the Islamic movement and the state 
was ‘the most important [source of] legitimacy of the regime in Jordan: belonging to 
the Prophet garden [sic]’ (p. 92).  
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Both the Sunni and Shi‛i branches of Islam revere Prophet Muhammad and his 
family. The latter is referred to as the people of the house (āl al-bayt). It is a well-
known story to Muslims that Prophet Muhammad was fond of his grandchildren, 
Hassan and Hussein, the sons of his cousin, ‛Ali, and his daughter, Fatima. After the 
dispute over who should succeed Muhammad, those who argued that it should have 
been ‛Ali, eventually became known as the Shi‛a. In this branch of Islam, ‛Ali, his 
family, and his descendants, enjoy a very special status. There is a belief that one of 
the grandchildren will turn up one day and save the world (the Hidden Imam). 
In contrast, the Sunni branch does not give the same status to the household of the 
Prophet, even though they are highly revered and praised. Three successors of 
Prophet Muhammad, Abu Bakr, ‛Umar, and ‛Uthman, were not members of the 
Prophet’s household. The caliphs who ruled the Muslims of the Sunni branch did not 
necessarily have a connection with the Prophet’s household. 
Various people in the Muslim world proudly refer to their connection with the 
Prophet and his family. For instance, a Saudi family, al-Sharif, makes such a claim. 
The Syrian-German scholar, Bassam Tibi, invoked such a connection during an 
address he gave at the Moshe Dayan Centre in Israel in January 2000.8 If one is to 
follow the injunctions of the Qur’an, there is no special status for anyone. God 
favours people according to their piety, not their lineage (Qur’an 49: 13). 
‛Uthman (2002) challenges in unequivocal terms the claim that the lineage is a basis 
of legitimacy. He argues that this ‘absolutely contradicts Islam’, and that Islam has 
nothing to do with lineage. The legitimacy is based on belonging to Islam both 
intellectually and in practice. Therefore, the ruler gets it from belonging to Islam, not 
the lineage. ‛Uthman further clarifies that the legitimacy of the king in Jordan is 
constitutional (p. 113). 
Moreover, the claim of lineage as a source of legitimacy did matter in the dispute 
between the Sharīf of Mecca, Hussein ibn ‛Ali and his rival ibn Saud. The latter 
removed the former, and established in Saudi Arabia a stricter Islamic state than is 
the case in Jordan. 
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 The Sixteenth Annual George A. Kaller Lecture, 12 January 2000. 
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The Hashimite rule in Jordan was not readily accepted in Jordan. Al-Madi and Musa 
([1959] 1988) pointed out that there were two major rebellions: one in al-Kura in 
northern Jordan in 1921, after Amir ‛Abdullah formed his first government in 
Transjordan (pp. 156-164). The rebellion was quelled in 1922, after sending a large 
force which managed to subjugate the area (p. 164). The second rebellion occurred in 
1923 by the ‛Udwan tribe of the Salt area (pp. 201-220). Fighters from the tribe and 
its supporters headed to Amman. They were intercepted, and some of the fighters 
were killed. 
The new ruler resorted to pitting one tribe against another, and favouring one over 
the other. The control was in the end solidified by a combination of coercion, money, 
and land. The fact that Transjordanian tribes rebelled undermines the often repeated 
suggestion that the Hashimites are more popular with Transjordanian tribes than they 
are with Palestinians. In his memoirs, General Glubb (1948) records his efforts to 
bring order to the desert. For instance, he had troubles with the Huwaitat tribe in the 
1930s (p. 91): 
I had reached the conclusion that the only way to do anything with the 
Huwaitat was to withdraw all troops from the desert. The resentment between 
the troops and the tribes was such that the latter were embittered against 
Great Britain and the Trans-Jordan government as a whole.  
Moreover, after some success in getting the Huwaitat to cooperate with him in 
defending the area from the raids of the Ikhwan of Saudi Arabia, he could not 
persuade them to join the Jordanian army: ‘But enlist as soldiers they would not. The 
idea that the Government was their bitterest enemy was too deeply engrained in their 
minds to admit such a novel idea’ (pp. 92-93). Al-Budairi (1996) notes that ‘the 
historical record shows that the most vocal and effective opposition to ‛Abdullah 
[…] came from the tribes’. He further notes that the tribes ‘were eventually won over 
by a dual policy of coercion and co-optation’ (p. 243). 
In recent times, members of Transjordanian tribes expressed their opposition in 
varying degrees of severity. Abu Mus‛ab al-Zarqawi resorted to violence and killed 
innocent people in the process. A former MP, and high-ranking officer in Jordanian 
police, Ahmad ‛Uwaidi al-‛Abbadi, was imprisoned after criticising corruption in 
Jordan. In February 2010, two prominent activists, Sufyan al-Tall and Muwafaq 
Mahadin, were imprisoned for taking part in interviews which discussed the 
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Jordanian involvement in Afghanistan, and were critical of Jordan’s cooperation with 
the CIA.  
Another part of the official Jordanian narrative, sometimes repeated by scholars and 
journalists, is that the kings of Jordan, especially King Hussein, are popular and liked 
by people. Public personalities who are frequently in the news attract a following, 
and will be well-liked by a certain number of people. When the personality is a king, 
the number of admirers is likely to increase manifold because of the system of 
patronage known in Jordan as makrumah (an act of generosity). The makrumah can 
be applied to an individual or a segment of the population, such as the bedouin. 
It is highly likely to be suggested that whenever the king, Hussein or another, visits 
universities, villages, or patrons an event, there is always evidence that the king is 
popular, because people will rush to shake his hand or hug him. These images will be 
shown repeatedly in the Jordanian media. However, it is commonly known in 
political life that there is a great deal of stage management when politicians, in the 
West as well as in the East, visit places and attend events. The staff of politicians will 
always ensure that their man or woman is met by a friendly crowd, and according to 
a script. This will apply to the king of Jordan as it does to the president of the USA. 
Moreover, it is a fact known to school children in Jordan that on certain occasions 
they get the day off to welcome the king along the route to his palace. When King 
‛Abdullah II celebrated the tenth anniversary of ascending to the throne, the Ministry 
of Education required teachers and students to take part in the public celebrations. 
The streets of Amman were supplied with tents, chairs, water, soft drinks, and sweets 
to entice and reward participation. In other words, the images of friendly crowds do 
not tell how popular the person is across the country. In a state where it is a crime to 
criticise its king, it is not possible to conduct polls to ask people whether they like 
him or not.  
PART 4: THE ECONOMY AND RENTIERISM 
As indicated in official statistics (2007), the area of Jordan is nearly 90,000 km2, of 
which 70,000 km2 (78%) is classified as semi-desert. Jordan is a country without 
natural resources that can counterbalance this disadvantage, as in the case of Saudi 
Arabia and other states in the Gulf. According to 2006 official statistics, the 
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population of Jordan is 5.6 million, with a growth rate of 2.3 percent. At this rate, it 
will take thirty years for the population to double. More than 80 percent of the 
population live in urban areas. More than one-third of the population (37.3%) are 
under the age of 15. The median age of the entire population is 20.3 years. 
The illiteracy rate is 9.3 percent, but it is much higher amongst women (13.7%). 
Only 10.7 percent of the population hold a bachelor degree or higher. The majority’s 
level of education (53.7%) is below secondary education. The GDP is JD10,108 
million, while the GDP per capita is JD1805 (equivalent to $2500). The inflation rate 
during 2006 was 6.3 percent.  
Water resources are scarce in Jordan. Consequently, water distribution to homes is 
rationed. According to Raddad (2005, p. 1), the water supply per capita is considered 
‘among the lowest in the world’. It is nearly 135 cubic meters ‘for all uses’ per year. 
Only 3.1 percent of the population work in agriculture. In contrast, more than a third 
of the labour force (35%) worked as farmers in 1964, and agriculture then amounted 
to ‘20% of the total production’ of Jordan’s economy’ (‛Aruri 1972, p. 50). 
As ‛Aruri (1972, p. 60) noted, Jordan’s economy was weak since its creation. It 
suffered from ‘chronic deficit in the budget and the balance of trade’. He further 
noted that ‘domestic revenue has consistently lagged behind expenditure. Grants 
from abroad were always needed to cover expenditure, which the country was never 
able to meet with its own resources’.  
Such a state of affairs lends Jordan to being classified as a rentier economy. The 
characteristic of a rentier economy, as identified by Beblawi and Luciani (1987), is 
‘one where rent situations predominate’ and one which ‘relies on substantial external 
rents’ (p. 51; italics in original). Another characteristic is that the government is the 
‘principal recipient of the external rent’ (p. 52). 
As Brynen (1992) explains, Jordan’s economy and politics have the characteristics of 
rentierism since the state’s inception, because of the reliance initially on a British 
‘monthly subsidy of £5,000’, in 1921. It then increased to ‘around £100,000 per year 
by the mid-1920s and to £2 million by the mid-1940s’ (p. 78). Moreover, although 
after independence in 1946 and the merger with the West Bank, which led to the 
reduction of foreign assistance, ‘British (and later, United States) budget support 
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continued, with foreign grants accounting for an average of 30 per cent of all 
government revenue and between one fifth and one third of GDP between 1952 and 
1966’ (p. 78). After the 1967 war, and having lost the West Bank, Jordan was one of 
the recipients of Arab aid. ‘Between 1967 and 1972,’ according to Brynen, ‘foreign 
grants accounted for no less than 58 per cent of all government revenues’ (p. 78). 
Moreover, Robinson (1998, p. 390) noted that ‘Jordan’s economic fortunes were in 
decline well before the beginning of the Gulf War in 1990. Its per capita GNP, 
hovering around $2,000 since 1985, plummeted to less than $1,500 in 1989’. When 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Jordan received hundreds of thousands of 
refugees. Moreover, ‘government transfers, primarily from Gulf Arab countries, 
declined markedly […] down to $164 million’ in 1991. In this regard, it is worth 
recalling that the decline is related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and King 
Hussein’s attempt to find a diplomatic solution through Arab efforts. This position 
was ill-received by Kuwait, other Gulf states, and the USA. 
 As was the case in other developing countries, Jordan resorted to foreign loans and 
defaulted on payment. The slowdown in the economy during the 1980s was severe 
due to the collapse of oil prices, which affected oil producing countries. 
Consequently, there was a knock-on effect on the aid Jordan received from these 
countries, and on remittances form Jordanian expatriates in the Gulf. As Harrigan, 
El-Said, and Wang (2006) explain, ‘between 1983 and 1988, the government 
followed expansionary policies based on external borrowing and running down 
reserves’. Moreover, the ‘budget deficits widened significantly’. Jordan external 
debts were $9.5 billion. The government ceased to be ‘able to service her foreign 
debt obligations’ (p. 267). 
As seen elsewhere in the developing world, the IMF and World Bank were involved 
in the endeavours to resolve Jordan’s problems through programmes agreed with 
both institutions. One of the government’s measures was a freeze on ‘public wages, 
salaries and employment and an immediate increase in the prices of petroleum 
119 
products, all of which were required to meet IMF loan conditionality to curb the 
fiscal deficit’ (Harrigan,  El-Said, and Wang 2006, p. 269).  
The measures caused public discontent, manifested in disturbances in the southern 
cities of Ma‛an, Karak, and Tafila. Of significance is the fact that the disturbances 
were by the Transjordanian section of the population, whose loyalty to the regime is 
often presented as not being in question. King Hussein discussed with his advisers 
how best to deal with the situation. According to Lucas (2005, p. 27) the ‘advisers 
had split on recommending a response to the riots’. 
The protests in the southern cities are often cited as the reason for the liberalisation. 
However, I would suggest that it was one of several reasons. Other factors were at 
play at the time, one of which was the breaking away of Eastern European countries 
from the Soviet orbit. Internally, moreover, there have always been demands for 
political reform in Jordan, and King Hussein engaged in informal dialogue with some 
personalities, such as Jamal al-Sha‛er. However, after the disturbances broke out, 
using oppressive measures at a time when freedom was sweeping Eastern Europe 
would have been ill-received internationally. 
PART 5: THE PALESTINIAN CONNECTION 
Jordan’s modern history is entangled with that of Palestine. The Arab Revolt 
encouraged by Britain took place in 1916. The British promise to create a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine was made in 1917. Britain used its links with the family of 
Hussein ibn ‛Ali (and Ibn Sa‛ud as well) to achieve this goal. For instance, in 1919, 
Faysal reached an agreement with Chaim Weizmann in this regard. Article III is of 
particular significance: 
In the establishment of the Constitution and administration of Palestine all 
such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for 
carrying into effect the British Government’s declaration of the 2nd of 
November, 1917.9 
When the UN partition plan was proposed in 1947, the Palestinians and the leaders of 
Arab states of the time rejected it. King ‛Abdullah was in favour of acceptance. The 
Arab-Israeli war in 1948 forced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to seek refuge 
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 Faisal-Weizmann Agreement, 3 January 1919.  
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in neighbouring Arab countries. Two parts of Palestine remained in Arab hands; the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. There were attempts to have a Palestinian entity to 
carry on the fight for Palestine. The embodiment of these attempts was the Pan-
Palestine Government, which came into being in September 1948. As Muhammad 
Khalid al-Az‛ar (1998) explains, this government was met with hostility by King 
‛Abdullah I, and became an emasculated body, based in Cairo, until it ceased to exist 
in 1963. The PLO was created soon afterwards. 
Al-Az‛ar (1998) documents King ‛Abdullah’s opposition to this Palestinian 
government, and his countermeasures to merge the West Bank with Transjordan. His 
attempts were fruitful, and the merger was agreed in a conference held in Jericho in 
December 1948. The merger with the West Bank resulted in changes in various laws 
to accommodate the representation of the new part of the kingdom in the government 
and parliaments. 
In 1954, a law was enacted which gave Palestinians, including the refugees, the right 
to acquire Jordanian citizenship. Both moves (the merger and citizenship) were 
controversial, and created identity crises for the State of Jordan, the people of 
Transjordan, and the Palestinians—as shall be seen in the democratic audit.  
When the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 broke out, three Arab states lost territories to 
Israel: Egypt lost the Sinai and the Gaza Strip; Syria lost the Golan Heights; and 
Jordan lost the West Bank. After the war, a Palestinian resistance movement 
emerged and established a presence in Jordan. Friction between the various factions 
of the Palestinian movement and the government eventually led to the expulsion of 
the movement in two stages: the first in September 1970, after which Palestinian 
fighters were forced to relocate to bases in the northern part of the country, and then 
in 1971, when the presence was eliminated. Following the clashes of 1970-1971, 
Jordan embarked on a process of ‘Jordanisation’ of the army and other government 
institutions. In 1972, Palestinian gunmen assassinated the then Prime Minister of 
Jordan, Wasfi al-Tall, in Cairo.  
The Palestinian national movement, embodied by the PLO, sought to represent all 
Palestinians. In 1974, the PLO secured a resolution from the Arab summit in Rabat 
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that declared the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
The representation of the Palestinians remained an issue fraught with tension 
between Jordan and the PLO. Jordan was not willing to consider the PLO the 
representative of the Palestinians who had acquired Jordanian citizenship. 
The relationship between the PLO and Jordan went through stages of tension and 
cooperation, influenced in both cases by the prospects of a settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Some peace plans had what was called the Jordanian option, which, 
amongst its varieties, would involve a confederation of Jordanian-Palestinian states.10  
In February 1985, an agreement between Jordan and the PLO leader, Yasir Arafat, 
was signed in Amman, calling for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
However, the agreement failed to win the support of the rest of the PLO. King 
Hussein cancelled the agreement in February 1986. The tension in the relationship 
between both sides escalated. The end of 1987 saw the eruption of the Palestinian 
uprising, intifada, whose coverage in Jordanian official media was limited. 
Exasperated by the frustration of attempting to work with the PLO, and the criticism 
levelled at Jordan’s role in the peace process, King Hussein announced in July 1988 
a disengagement plan which declared that Jordan was no longer responsible legally 
or administratively for the West Bank. As shall be seen in the democratic audit, the 
constitutionality of this decision is debated by two opposite camps: one wants it 
constitutionalised so that it has a permanent effect; the other considers it 
unconstitutional. 
In October 1991, the Madrid Peace Conference took place. Initially the Palestinians 
were part of the Jordanian delegation. However, a separate track was established 
after the negotiations moved to Washington in 1992. While the peace talks were still 
going on, the PLO reached with the Israelis in Oslo in 1993 a secret agreement, 
which led to the recognition of the PLO, and a form of autonomy for five years, after 
which the final status of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 would be 
determined. After the Israeli-Palestinian agreement was reached, Jordan wasted no 
time and concluded its own peace treaty in 1994. 
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 The ‘Jordanian option’ was viewed with suspicion by the Palestinian organisations. 
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Palestinians in Jordan 
The issue of Palestinians in Jordan is never discussed openly. For instance, the 
number of Palestinians in Jordan is shrouded in secrecy. Even when a census is 
carried out, the figure is not revealed. Some Palestinians who served the regime 
loyally wrote about the exclusion and discrimination practised in Jordan against the 
Palestinians. ‛Adnan Abu ‛Odeh, an intelligence officer who served as minister of 
information in the military cabinet formed during the clashes of 1970, published a 
book in 1999 in which he referred to the exclusion. After an interview on al-Jazeera 
TV in 2006, in which the same view was aired, legal proceedings were initiated 
against him, ostensibly after complaints were filed against him. However, the 
charges were dropped without an explanation. Similarly, Jawad al-‛Anani, who 
served as chief of the royal court, expressed similar sentiments in an article he wrote 
in al-Bayan, a UAE daily, in 2001. Both had to give up their seats in the HoN. 
It should be noted that the Jordanian-Palestinian entanglement is not purely political 
in nature. Religious Muslims do not entertain the idea that Palestine is not their 
concern, whether in Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, or other Muslim countries, because 
Jerusalem is considered the third holiest place in the world, after Mecca and Medina. 
Prophet Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and then ascending to the 
Heavens (the Night Journey) is part of the faith and is celebrated every year. 
Looked at from the perspective of some of the Transjordanians, because Palestinians 
in Jordan acquired citizenship, as of 1954, resentment is often expressed at the fact 
that Palestinians identify themselves as such. This is seen as an expression of 
disloyalty. However, this view is too narrow, as the issue of identity is too complex 
to be settled by acquiring citizenship in Jordan or elsewhere. 
Moreover, one should not believe claims that Transjordanians have no sympathy for 
the Palestinians and their resistance, especially the movement which emerged after 
the 1967. Before the relationship between the Palestinian factions and the 
government descended into hostility, the Palestinian resistance was welcomed and 
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supported by Transjordanians. This was acknowledged in ‛Abdullah ‛Azzam’s 
memoirs (1990, pp. 69-72). He gives credit to the ‛Ubaydat clan whose member, 
Ahmad ‛Ubaydat, became the chief of the GID and then prime minister. 
Relationship with Hamas 
The rise of Hamas is connected with the Palestinian uprising of 1987, which broke 
out in Gaza and then engulfed the Gaza Strip and West Bank. After the Arab defeat 
in the 1967 war with Israel, leftist and nationalist organisations, old and new, 
launched armed resistance against the occupation. Religious groups, such as the MB, 
did not do so. They thought that resisting the occupation should be under the 
umbrella of jihad, and that the Arab/Muslim societies were not Islamic enough. They 
saw the defeat as a revenge of God, and thought Nasser and fellow Arab leaders 
deserved the defeat. This explains why the leftist and nationalist organisations won 
the support of the people after the 1967 war. 
The reluctance of the MB to resort to armed resistance led some members to break 
away and create the Islamic Jihad organisation. Moreover, Hamas refused to join the 
ranks of the PLO. At times, the unwillingness to join was based on the size of 
representation in the PLO bodies, such as the executive committee, central council, 
and the Palestine National Council.  
As Hroub (1996) and al-Tamimi (2007) explain, many of Hamas leaders were 
residents in Kuwait. They moved to Jordan after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, and used Jordan as a base for their political and media activities. They were 
helped by the MB in Jordan. 
Israeli agents attempted to assassinate Khalid Mash‛al in Jordan in 1997 by injecting 
him with poison. King Hussein took advantage of the episode and achieved two 
goals before the Israel agents were released: (a) he demanded information concerning 
the antidote to save Mash‛al’s life, and (b) he also demanded the release of Shaykh 
Ahmad Yasin, the spiritual leader of Hamas. After the death of King Hussein, 
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Jordan’s relation with Hamas deteriorated. Four Hamas leaders, who were based in 
Jordan, were forced to leave in 1999.11  
After Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006, Jordan refused to receive the 
then Palestinian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud al-Zahhar. Shortly before that, 
Jordanian news reports claimed Hamas was stockpiling arms in Jordan. The weekly 
paper, al-Majd, reported that the announcement was made months after the alleged 
discovery and the timing was chosen to coincide with the unwanted visit. In June 
2008, the three individuals accused of involvement in the stockpiling of arms were 
sentenced to five to fifteen years imprisonment. 
As shall be seen in the next chapter, the Hamas factor has also been a source of 
disagreements within the MB and IAF. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided the necessary background about Jordan and its system of 
government. In addition to the history of the creation of the State of Jordan, it 
referred to the kings who ruled thus far, and the three branches of government. The 
chapter also discussed the role of Islam in Jordan, as stipulated and practised by the 
state. The economy and its characterisation as a ‘rentier economy’ was also 
discussed, for this is highly relevant in relation to issues included in the democratic 
audit, such as social and economic rights. Moreover, the chapter discussed the 
connection between Jordan and Palestine. This matter is also highly relevant to issues 
that will arise in the democratic audit, such as agreement on citizenship. 
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 Khalid Mash‛al, Musa Abu Marzūq, Muhammad Nazzal, and Ibrahim Ghosheh. 
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Chapter 5 
Jordanian MB and IAF 
 
 
This chapter has three parts. The first provides an overview of the MB and its 
founder Hassan al-Banna. The second part focuses on Jordan’s MB since its creation 
in 1945. The third part is concerned with IAF, the party formed by the MB in 1992.  
PART 1: THE MB IN EGYPT 
The founder of the MB is Hassan al-Banna, who was born in 1906 in the Egyptian 
town of al-Mahmūdiyya, where he received his elementary and secondary education. 
He was a bright student, and managed to be fifth amongst the top ten students across 
Egypt in the secondary education examinations (Gharaybeh 1997A, p. 11). 
Al-Banna was born at a time Egypt was becoming a region under increasing British 
influence. It became a British protectorate in 1906. Although it was given 
independence in 1922, it was of a nominal nature. The foreign presence that came to 
Egypt brought with it behaviours that were alien to the local culture, such as the 
consumption of alcohol and Western women dress styles.  
Al-Banna’s adherence to Islam and its teachings is evident in the fact that he studied 
and memorised Qur’an at the hands of his father and two Sufi shaykhs: Muhammad 
Zahran and ‛Abd al-Wahhab al-Hasafi. Al-Banna continued his higher education at 
the College of Sciences (Dār al-‛Ulūm) in Cairo, where he met a number of 
prominent shaykhs, including Muhammad Rashid Rida, who was studying at al-
Azhar with Muhammad ‛Abdo, the disciple of Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani, the Islamic 
reformer (Gharaybeh 1997A, p. 11). 
Before the MB was formed, al-Banna was involved with the other shaykhs in 
organising the Young Muslims Society, and al-Fath magazine (Gharaybeh 1997A, p. 
11). In 1927, he started to work as a teacher in Isma‛iliyyah. He was only 21 years 
old (Mitchell 1993, p. 6). 
In March 1928, he and six other people met at his house and pledged to live and 
struggle for Islam (al-Banna 2001, p. 69). This is the date when the MB group was 
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founded. The name of the society seems to have been taken from a verse in Qur’an 
(49:10: ‘The believers are indeed brothers, so make peace among your brothers, and 
fear God – perhaps you will be shown mercy.’).  
Scholars have attempted to study the reasons for the MB’s popularity and appeal. 
According to Munson (2001, p. 488), al-Banna realised that if the MB is to expand, 
he has to be in Cairo. The move produced the desired results. The MB expanded 
during 1932-1954 and had about fifty branches throughout Egypt.  
Hanafi (2003, p. 63) attributes the appeal to al-Banna’s ability ‘to formulate a clear 
and simple theoretical and practical Islam that had an activist concept of the Brothers 
as fighters during the day and monks during the night’. The other factors which 
increased the appeal of the MB, according to Hanafi, were their involvement in the 
1940s in ‘the Egyptian national movement’, fighting in Palestine, and opposing ‘the 
tyrannical feudal system of the British, the palace, and minority parties’ (p. 63). 
Munson (2001, p. 487) studied ‘how the organization was able to attract an 
unprecedented number of new members and public support in 1932–1954’. He 
argues that ‘the concept of political opportunity structure in social movement theory 
offers a possible alternative explanation’. As he explains, the concept ‘focuses on the 
relationship between a social movement and its environment, especially its political 
environment,’ and ‘on the relationship between social movements and political 
institutions to understand movement mobilization’ (p. 494). 
Munson identifies three elements in Egypt’s history at the relevant time to justify the 
use of the concept, namely: ‘(1) the role of the British in Egyptian political life, (2) 
the delegitimation of the once-popular Wafd Party, and (3) the ideological conflict 
over the creation of Israel’. Munson asks: ‘But why did a religious reform society 
rather than a communist party develop?’ (pp. 494-495). The answer he provides is 
that in addition to the favourable environment, the MB had a ‘federated structure of 
authority’ (p. 497). The movement had ‘a network of branches throughout the cities 
and villages of Egypt’ (p. 489). Moreover, the branches were ‘unified by a central 
headquarters in Cairo’ (p. 497). 
Another reason for the success of mobilisation by the MB is that its membership 
system consisted of three tiers. The first does not require the member to do anything 
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more than sign a membership form and pay dues. The second would expect the 
members to be aware of the principles of the movement. The third requires the 
members to be deeply involved in the organisation, and follow Islamic teachings (p. 
497, citing Mitchell 1969).1 
Munson’s explanation, while different from others, nonetheless confirms the fact that 
the MB appealed to a large number of people. The role of politics is always 
important in mobilising the masses. I suggest that when many organisations compete 
to mobilise the masses, the one with the simpler message is more likely to succeed. 
The simpler message can be in the language used to deliver the message. 
Alternatively, the message itself can be simpler than the one being delivered by other 
parties. Judging from the example of the Palestinian resistance movement which 
emerged after 1967, Fatah was the most successful at attracting support. Unlike the 
leftist, Marxist organisations, the language used in Fatah’s statements and by its 
leaders was simpler. Moreover the vision that Fatah communicated was also simple: 
the liberation of Palestine through armed resistance. Other organisations shared the 
vision, but referred to ideologies and concepts that did not equally appeal to people, 
such as dialectical materialism, bourgeois, class conflict, to name but a few. Instead 
of quoting Marx or Lenin, Fatah would quote the Qur’an or examples from Muslim 
history. 
Can religion and politics mix? In his letters to supporters of the movement, al-Banna 
(1992, p. 37) explains the mission of the movement: 
Our people: We call you with the Qur’an in our right hand and the sunna in 
the left, and the actions of the good ancestors of this nation as our example. 
We call you to Islam and its teachings, rules, and guidance. If this is politics, 
then this is our politics. If the one who calls you to this is a politician, then we 
are politicians. 
Although al-Banna explicitly eschews politics, I suggest that the act of creating a 
movement of this nature at a time when Egypt was colonised is also a political act 
even though the stated goal is a religious one. This is a movement which does not 
want to engage in politics as promoted and controlled by the coloniser. A return to 
                                                 
1
 Mitchell mentions four categories of membership as of 1935: musa‛id (assistant); muntastib 
(related); ‛amil (active); and mujahid (fighter or struggler). In 1945, there were only two types: taht 
al-ikhtiyar (under examination; tentative); and active (p. 183). 
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Islam is the equivalent to practising different politics which is not controlled by the 
coloniser.  
Involvement in politics had two opposite effects on the MB in Egypt. As pointed out 
above, Hanafi suggested that when the involvement was in the Egyptian national 
movement, fighting in Palestine, and resisting the feudal system in Egypt, the MB 
benefited in terms of appeal and popularity. Involvement in the domestic politics of 
Egypt put it on a collision course with the authorities when Egypt was a monarchy, 
and when it became a republic. 
Collision with the Authorities  
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Palestine question and how best to support the 
Palestinian people were major issues. The MB supported the Palestinian people who 
were under the British Mandate. Palestine was being prepared to become, in part if 
not in whole, a homeland for the Jews, as promised in the Balfour Declaration of 
1917. 
The MB was officially dissolved on 8 December 1948. A statement by the Ministry 
of Interior listed thirteen reasons in the decision, which accused the MB of 
committing acts of violence (Mitchell 1993, pp. 65-66). Three weeks later, on 28 
December 1948, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi, was 
assassinated by ‛Abd al-Majid Ahmad Hassan, a young man who was a member of 
the MB (Mitchell 1993, p. 67). The MB was held responsible for his death. In 
February 1949, al-Banna was assassinated. No one was held responsible for his 
death. Hanafi (2003, p. 63) suggested that three parties were responsible for his 
assassination: ‘The Palace, the British, and some minority parties’. Mitchell (1993, p. 
71) was more specific and indicated that it was believed that the assassination was 
carried out by ‘members of the political police’.  
In 1951, the MB won a legal battle which prevented the sale of its headquarters. This 
decision amounted to legalising its status. Meanwhile, it moved to choose a 
successor to Hassan al-Banna. Hassan al-Hudaybi was chosen as the new General 
Guide. An announcement of his appointment was made in October 1951 (Mitchell 
1993, pp. 84-86). 
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When the Free Officers took over power in Egypt in 1952, they did not ban the MB. 
Hanafi (2003) points out that ‘half of the Revolutionary Council,’ were members of 
the MB (p. 68). Nasser had contacts with al-Banna, but was not a member. The 
relationship between both sides deteriorated, however. The Free Officers had their 
own differences and power struggles in 1954. The nominal head of the new republic, 
Muhammad Najib, entered into a power struggle with the other officers, led by 
Gamal Abdel Nasser.  
While the dispute was still unsettled, the MB sided with Najib. The reason, according 
to Hanafi (2003) was that Najib ‘seemed to unite the two halves of the Nile Valley, 
since his father was Egyptian and his mother was Sudanese’ (p. 66). This reason to 
side with Najib is not a convincing one. Abu Zaid (2007) offers a more plausible one, 
which focuses on the ideological orientations of the MB and Nasser. The MB was 
hoping for an Islamic form of government. Nasser had different ideas, which 
included socialism and land ownership reforms (Telmisani 1985, pp. 64-68).  
The conflict between Nasser and the MB peaked in 1954. A member of the MB, 
Mahmoud ‛Abd al-Latif, attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954. The failed attempt 
resulted in arrests of members of the movement, and executing six of them (Mitchell 
1993, p. 96). Some people expressed doubt about this assassination attempt, and 
considered it stage-managed to prop up Nasser. Al-Mahdawi (1986, pp. 110-116) 
said that the attempt was suggested by an American propaganda specialist, who 
recommended a failed assassination attempt. Plans were made, and the 
implementation took place on 26 October 1954, while Nasser was delivering a 
speech in Alexandria. 
When Sayyid Qutb published his book, Signposts, in the 1960s, one of the people 
who read it was Nasser. According to Hanafi (2003, p. 66), Nasser discerned in the 
book a reference to a secret organisation. Therefore, he asked the Interior Minister, 
Sha‛rawi Jum‛a, to investigate. Subsequently, Qutb was returned to prison, and 
eventually executed in 1966. 
The conflict with the MB in Egypt made Nasser a vehemently hated personality. 
Hanafi (2003) points out that the MB does not give Nasser credit for anything 
‘except the nationalization of the Suez Canal, [and] the stopping of the tripartite 
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aggression against Egypt in 1956’ (p. 68). They consider everything else he did to be 
a disaster, notably the unity with Syria (1958-1961), the involvement in Yemen, and 
the socialist laws (p. 68). Hatred for Nasser led them to welcome the defeat of Arab 
states in the 1967 war with Israel. The stories of offering prayers of thanks to Allah 
for defeating Nasser are not propaganda stories to distort the image of the MB. 
Shaykh Sha‛rawi revealed this information in a TV programme broadcast in 1989. 
This is referred to by Abu Zaid (2007, p. 20) in his critique of the Islamic discourse. 
Shaykh Sha‛rawi was happy that the ‘communists were defeated and they were 
abandoned by Allah’.  
Radi Sadduq (2009) confirms this information. He used to come in contact with 
shaykh Sha‛rawi while both were working in Saudi Arabia. Sha‛rawi was a lecturer 
at a university and Sadduq worked at Saudi Radio. He asked Sha‛rawi about the 
rumour that he had offered prayers of thanks after the defeat of 1967. Sha‛rawi ’s 
answer was in the affirmative because he considered Nasser a communist, and when 
there was a choice between communists and people of the book [Christian and Jews], 
the latter were preferable. 
Although the persecution by Nasser earned the MB the sympathy of their brothers in 
other Muslim countries, the hostility towards Nasser and the attitude towards the 
defeat of 1967 earned the MB the contempt of many people, especially left and 
secular leaning intellectuals. Nor did it endear them to ordinary people. Instead, the 
resistance organisations, such as Fatah and PFLP, were the beneficiaries of the 
support of the people after the 1967 war. 
After Nasser died in September 1970, his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, enlisted the 
help of the MB to fight against leftist and other currents in Egypt (Esposito 1994, p. 
168). Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1978 and Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel in 1979 
did not endear him to many people in Egypt and in the rest of the Arab world. He 
was assassinated in October 1981 at the hands of Islamists while he was viewing a 
parade of Egyptian forces on the 18th anniversary of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. 
Under Sadat’s successor, Husni Mubarak, the MB failed to secure legal status. Its 
members were arrested and imprisoned. Whenever the government decided to hold 
elections, it took measures to control who would be allowed to run.  
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PART 2: MB IN JORDAN 
Unlike the case in Egypt, the Jordanian MB had a better relationship with the regime 
as will be outlined below. 
The founder of the MB in Jordan is ‛Abd al-Latif Abu Qūra. He was born in the city 
of Salt, and belonged to a family which came to Salt from Damascus at the turn of 
the 19th century. The Abu Qūras had relatives in Egypt. A century later, most of the 
Abu Qūras moved to Amman. ‛Abd al-Latif Abu Qūra had his education in kuttab, a 
school which teaches students Qur’an, the basics of Arabic, and arithmetic. He 
ventured into business, and became a successful businessman (‛Ubaidi 1992, p. 8). 
In the early 1940s, the MB was branching out of Egypt. Its preachers would travel to 
other Arab countries, where they would meet prominent people and shaykhs, give 
lectures, and establish the nucleus for an MB society. As regards Jordan, ‛Abd al-
Hakim ‛Abdin visited Jordan and met Amir ‛Abdullah. Another preacher who visited 
Jordan was Sa‛id Ramadan, who was a good orator and attracted audiences to the 
Husayni Mosque in downtown Amman (Gharaybeh 1997A, pp. 11-12). 
According to ‛Abd al-Kathem (1997, pp. 16-17), ‛Abd al-Latif Abu Qūra, contacted 
Hassan al-Banna in 1945 to offer bay‛a (pledge allegiance) and to work with him in 
propagating the call to adhere to Islam across the Arab and Muslim worlds. He did so 
after reading some of the issues of the MB’s newspaper. He admired the call for 
jihad and the rejection of the Jewish presence in Palestine. 
Moreover, Abu Qūra went to Cairo in 1945 and was selected as a member of the 
guidance committee of the movement in Egypt. After his return to Amman, Abu 
Qūra proceeded to make formal arrangements to create an MB organisation in 
Jordan. The government permitted the creation of a society, and its headquarters 
were opened under the patronage of Amir ‛Abdullah on 19 November 1945 (‛Abd al-
Kathem 1997, pp. 16-17). The Amir’s representative, ‛Abd al-Mon‛em al-Refa‛i, 
delivered a speech at the inauguration event (‛Ubaidi, 1992). The first elections 
within the society for the administrative committee (the general bureau) were held in 
1947.  
A few years later, and as a result of the merger of the West and East Banks in 1950, 
the members residing in both regions belonged to one MB organisation in the new 
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Jordan. Hroub (1996, pp. 18-19) contrasted the MB members in Gaza with those in 
the West Bank. The former adopted a revolutionary, military attitude. Those in the 
West Bank focused on education and political activism. Hroub also noted that the 
Jordanian government was tolerant of their activities, in the hope that they would act 
as a counter-current in the face of Nasserism and Ba‛ath.  
Abu Qūra continued to lead the society until he resigned in 1953. There are two 
accounts as to why he did. According to one account, the issue which prompted him 
to resign was related to taking part in elections. He held the view that the MB should 
not participate if it had no prospect of winning the majority of seats. His colleagues 
thought differently, and saw benefits in participation, irrespective of the number of 
seats won (‛Ubaidi 1992, p. 108). The other account for his resignation (al-Thbaytat 
2009, p. 27) was that he objected to the formation of a special apparatus, as 
recommended by Najib Jwaifel, an Egyptian who was accused of being an agent of 
Nasser (‛Ubaidi 1991, pp. 102-108).  
Abu Qūra was succeeded by ‛Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, who was also born in Salt and 
belonged to one of its tribes: the Nsours. At the time of becoming the leader, he was 
working as a judge in Madaba (near Amman). He was the first leader of the MB in 
Jordan to acquire the title of General Guide. Under his leadership, the MB changed 
status from a charitable society to a general Islamic organisation. In other words, it 
was not a charitable society, nor was it a political party. This gave the MB the 
freedom to preach in mosques and other places without the restrictions placed on 
charitable organisations. 
Khalifa was imprisoned on two occasions when the MB criticised the government. 
The first was in 1958, after the MB issued a statement criticising the decision to 
invite British forces to Jordan after the coup in Iraq (al-Hassan 1990, pp. 58-59). The 
second was in 1960, when an ice-skating event was organised in Amman. The MB 
criticised the government for ‘importing naked girls’ while Israel ‘imports tanks and 
planes’ (pp. 68-69). 
Khalifa was the leader of the MB when the elections of 1989 took place. He also 
swayed the decision of the movement towards participation after the government 
changed the elections law in a move believed to have been designed to limit the 
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MB’s ability to win many seats in 1993. He continued to lead the MB in Jordan until 
1994. Since his replacement, the MB had three leaders, an indication of the change of 
attitude that was characterised by having a leader for life. The three leaders are ‛Abd 
al-Majid Dhnaibat (1994-2006), Salem al-Falāhāt (2006-2008), and Hammam Sa‛id 
(2008-present). 
Relationship with the Government 
Although the MB had good relations with the government, there were issues which 
caused friction between both sides. The tensions led the government to arrest and 
imprison Khalifa on two occasions, as mentioned previously. Disputes occurred at all 
stages. After the political liberalisation in 1989, the conflict became more frequent. 
Foreign relation issues have often caused estrangement: the presence of British 
officers in the Jordanian army; the Baghdad Pact; the Eisenhower doctrine for the 
Middle East; and the invitation for British forces to Jordan in 1958 after Iraq 
threatened to annex Kuwait (Abu Fares 2000, pp. 22-47). The MB’s opposition to 
these issues is similar to the attitude of leftists and Pan-Arab nationalists. 
The other common theme that causes friction is related to instances in which the MB 
sees a considerable disregard for Islamic practices. Such an instance happened in 
1960, when an ice-skating event was organised in Amman. The MB objected to 
women skaters who would be wearing revealing costumes (Abu Fares 2000, p. 34). 
Despite the frequent episodes of tension, the MB in Jordan sided with the regime on 
two important occasions: one in 1957, when King Hussein banned all political parties 
in the country. Abu Fares (2000, p. 39) justified the decision to side with the king as 
an act of self-defence; the MB members were to be liquidated had the opposition 
been successful. He also suggested that a civil war had been averted.  
The second occasion was in 1970, when King Hussein decided to eliminate the threat 
of the Palestinian armed resistance in Jordan. The MB presents its position as having 
taken a neutral stand in the conflict. ‛Azzam (2005), a prominent figure in the MB 
movement in Jordan, who in the 1980s became associated with Mujahidin 
organisations in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda during the years of the Soviet invasion, 
says (p. 72): 
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We decided that if the army clashed with the guerrillas, we would not 
participate in this conflict which we were concerned that it would spill 
innocent blood […] and the battle would be waged under no clear banner, and 
especially the resistance movement was overwhelmed by riffraff [...] Fighting 
the Jordanian army was unacceptable from the view point of shari‛a, reason, 
and interest. Therefore, we preferred to take a neutral stand. 
If it was indeed a neutral position in that situation, it suited King Hussein. 
It was in the by-elections of 1984 that the measurable popularity of Islamic 
candidates was revealed. The Islamist candidate in the Irbid constituency, Ahmad al-
Kofahi, was more than 10,000 votes ahead of his nearest rival. Another Islamist 
candidate, Laith Shbailat, defeated thirty-five candidates (al-Sharah 1997, p. 122). 
The Shbailat instance is highlighted in Boulby’s (1999) study of the MB in Jordan. 
She pointed out that Shbailat ‘won the support of upper class leftists and other 
secularists, as well as that of Christian men and women’ (p. 105).2 
In the general elections of 1989, five Islamist candidates achieved the highest 
number of votes, the lowest being nearly 20,000 votes. Al-Sharah attributed the good 
performance of the MB to being ‘one of the first groups to establish a coherent, 
organized platform’ (p. 172). He further noted that ‘the Islamic trend won a number 
of seats equal to that of overt supporters of the regime’, namely, ‘the tribal leaders 
and ex-governmental officials’ (p. 172). 
PART 3: THE ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT 
The IAF was created in 1992, soon after a law was enacted to allow the formation of 
political parties in Jordan. The IAF was supposed to be an organisation which 
embraced non-MB Islamists. However, when the founding conference was held, the 
independent Islamists walked out, and accused the MB of attempting to dominate the 
party (Hourani et al. 1997, p. 20). 
As stated in the bylaws, the first goal of the party is ‘the resumption of Islamic life in 
society, and seeking to implement Islamic law in various aspects of life’ (IAF bylaws 
                                                 
2
 Although Shbailat is an Islamist, he is the son of Farhan Shbailat, who served as the chief of the 
royal court in 1950s, and a professional engineer who was elected as the chief of the Association of 
Engineers. 
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2002, article 1). The goals include the ‘reinforcement of national unity, shura and 
democracy; defending the dignity and rights of the human being; and defending 
freedoms generally’ (IAF bylaws 2002, article 1/1/4). 
The founding members totalled 353. The first secretary general was Ishaq al-Farhan, 
a former minister of education. The ruling bodies of the IAF comprise the general 
assembly, general congress, consultative council, and the executive bureau (Hourani 
et al. 1993). 
The members of the general assembly include the founding members and other 
members admitted in accordance with the internal regulations. It holds a meeting 
once a year, unless it is asked to meet by a decision of the executive council or the 
absolute majority of the consultative council. 
The consultative council (shura council) has 120 members who represent 
proportionately the branches of the party. The term of office for the council is four 
years. It meets once every six months, unless it is asked by one third of its members 
or the executive council. This council is the body which decides the policies of IAF 
and monitors their implementation. It also elects, by a secret ballot, the chairman of 
the council, his deputies and assistants, the secretary general of the party, and other 
members of the executive council. 
There are thirteen members in the executive council, including the secretary general 
of the party, who is elected to this position separately. Then another twelve members 
are elected. Members of the executive council elect his deputy and assistants. It 
forms various committees to run the affairs of the party. The secretary general can be 
elected for two terms only, each lasting for a period of two years. 
IAF: Women’s Bureau 
The IAF’s bylaws list seventeen goals, one of which, stated in article 1/2/9, is ‘to 
respect the woman’s being and her legitimate rights; her role in developing society 
within Islamic virtues; to enable her to participate in public life; and to enable the 
emergence of women leaders in political action’. In December 2001, the party held 
its first general conference. The leader of the women section of the party, Arwa al-
Kilani, spoke at the conference and reminded the attendees of article 1/2/9. She 
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called for wider involvement in the decision making by increasing the representation 
of women in the consultative council. (pp. 88-92). 
In 1993, a woman, Nawal al-Fa‛uri, was elected to the consultative council. 
However, she resigned and left the party in 1997. She explained that attitudes 
towards women in general in the party, and towards the role of woman in society led 
to her resignation.3 However, another woman, Hayat al-Msaimi, was elected to the 
council in 1997, and kept her seat on five consecutive occasions. She acknowledges 
that there are people in the party, such as Muhammad Abu Fares, who oppose 
women’s involvement in politics. However, as she stresses, he abides by the 
decisions of the party, and does not let his views undermine the decisions, for 
example, during election campaigns.4 This explanation, however, does not resolve 
the conflict created by holding these views and not acting on them. In a situation like 
this, the credibility of such a person will be questioned by Islamists and others. Also, 
holding these views will discourage women, even if Abu Fares and his likes abide by 
the decisions. These views will have opportunities to be expressed and debated 
within IAF/MB. They will also attract criticism from others—parties and people. 
Al-Thbaytat (2009) has studied the MB, covering a period of more than 50 years 
(1945-1997). He applies Samuel Huntington’s (1965) criteria for political 
institutionalisation: adaptability-rigidity; autonomy-subordination; complexity-
simplicity; autonomy-subordination; and coherence-disunity. 
Al-Thbaytat points out that although the MB considers the Qur’an and sunna to be its 
guidance, it has adapted. Manifestations of this adaptation can be seen in accepting 
ijtihād to deal with new issues. This led to their acceptance of the issue of political 
pluralism and parties; participation in local and general elections; and serving in the 
government at ministerial level (pp. 47-53). 
Regarding autonomy-subordination, al-Thbaytat assesses two categories: financial 
autonomy, and relationship with the regime (p. 89). He identifies the sources of 
funds which include: membership fees; donations by members; donations by non-
members; revenues from properties owned by the MB; and revenues from book sales 
or other fundraising activities (p. 92). He also points out that organisations run by the 
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 Personal interview. Amman, 9 March 2010. 
4
 Personal interview. Amman, 25 March 2010. 
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MB managed revenues that reached JD200 million, surpassing other social 
organisations such as the General Union of Charitable Organisations, and the Noor 
al-Hussein Foundation (p. 93). Al-Thbaytat concludes that the MB has achieved 
financial autonomy, and does not receive external financial support (p. 92).  
In terms of the relationship with the regime, al-Thbaytat goes into the reasons why 
the relationship on the whole was friendly (pp. 99-127). In the 1950s, the MB sided 
with the regime in its attempts to stem the nationalist and leftist currents. Moreover, 
he notes that the MB literature does not call for a revolution. He also suggests that 
they respect the ruling dynasty’s credential of being descendants of Prophet 
Muhammad (p. 105). Al-Thbaytat’s conclusion in this category is questionable. He 
basically suggests that both sides benefited from one another. What should be noted 
here is that there have been changes in the relationship, when Jordan signed its peace 
treaty with Israel in 1994. It underwent further changes when ‛Abdullah II succeeded 
his father in 1999. (This point will be discussed further in a section below regarding 
divisions within MB/IAF). 
Moreover, al-Thbaytat assesses whether MB and IAF meet the criterion of 
complexity-simplicity and identifies the fields in which they are active, such as the 
universities and professional associations. He notes that they have a sizeable 
presence in these arenas. The decisions are not made by the central leadership, but 
taken at the local level and take into account the special circumstances. However, he 
notes that the Jordanian government has enacted some laws to limit their influence. 
Al-Thbaytat mentioned the creation of the Liberation Party as a split within the 
movement in 1960s. However, that the Liberation Party was a group that split from 
the MB was challenged by al-‛Ubaidi (1991). He asserted that the founder of the 
Liberation Party, Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani, was never a member of the MB (p. 121). 
Some people who left the MB might have joined the Liberation Party. Al-‛Ubaidi 
noted that there was no organisational relationship between the MB and Nabhani, 
who did meet Hassan al-Banna and had respect for him, but that was the extent of it 
(pp. 121-122). Al-‛Ubaidi also denied the suggestions that there were attempts to 
unite the MB and the Liberation Party in the 1950s (p. 123-124).  
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Al-‛Ubaidi’s information was identical to that of ‛Abd al-‛Aziz al-Khayyat. The 
latter was a leader in the Liberation Party in Jordan. However, he was co-opted by 
the regime and served several times as minister of religious affairs in 1970s. He 
wrote an introduction to a book on the Liberation Party by al-‛Ubaidi (1992, pp. 3-
28). He corrected or clarified many points that were mentioned in the book.  
If, however, one is to consider that a split did take place in the 1950s, the split is 
more than fifty years old. As such, it will be too crude a measurement to coherence-
disunity. Other examples of disunity mentioned by al-Thbaytat include 
disagreements over participation in elections and joining the government. Overall, 
the disunity in the ranks of the MB/IAF is minimal, according to al-Thbaytat. This 
conclusion, however, is far from categorical, considering the developments within 
the IAF since the elections of 2007. (See section below on divisions within MB/IAF). 
Moreover, Brown (2006, p. 5) concurs with al-Thbaytat in certain areas, such as the 
criteria of complexity-simplicity. He notes that the MB ‘attracted some figures in the 
religious establishment; ran candidates in professional association elections (such as 
the bar and the medical syndicate); and began to publish its own periodicals’. In 
general, Brown is unequivocal about the democratic nature of IAF (p. 6): 
The IAF has built an impressive set of democratic structures internally. Party 
leaders are elected by the membership, and there is a regular turnover in top 
positions. At key points it has polled its members for guidance on important 
decisions (on two occasions to decide whether or not the IAF would boycott 
elections). It also selects its candidates in a process that begins with branches 
holding primaries before forwarding names to the party leadership. 
Although Brown’s observations are correct, IAF’s internal disputes have come into 
the open. Persistent press reports in 2010 indicated that the divisions were deep; and 
could lead to resignations and to the creation of other groups. Various MB/IAF 
leaders tend to downplay such press reports. While they acknowledge differences do 
exist, they argue that in the end, they come together. I suggest that the parties with 
competing factions are usually more interesting to follow, and their structure tend to 
be more democratic. If the disputes lead to a split in the IAF or MB, it will not be an 
unprecedented matter in the Arab world, or elsewhere. 
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IAF: The First Campaign Manifesto 
The manifesto for the elections of 1993 is a comprehensive document in that it refers 
to the goals of the party, an assessment of the performance of the MB members in the 
HoD (before IAF was created), and the electoral programme. The latter is divided 
into four parts. One deals with domestic issues, listing eighteen of them; another 
covers the question of Palestine; the third covers the issues of Arabic and Islamic 
unity; and the fourth addresses foreign policy and international relations (IAF 
manifesto 1993). 
The elections manifesto lists a number of achievements, categorised under two 
headings: (a) legislative achievements; and (b) monitoring the executive branch of 
government. In the first category, it lists seven achievements, the first of which is 
amending the law of the supreme court, which repealed the clause that made some of 
the administrative decisions unchallengeable (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 4-6). Another 
achievement in the legislative arena was to amend the law of the Court of State 
Security, whose decisions were unappealable. The amendment introduced a right of 
appeal, which would be heard by five judges. The amendment of this law had 
tangible consequences, and spared the lives of some people who were tried and 
convicted of organizing a coup. When the appeal was introduced, these people were 
found innocent (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 4-6). 
A third achievement was repealing the ‘law of defence’5 adopted in 1935, and 
enacting a new one which can be used in emergencies only. A fourth achievement 
pertains to legislation that did not go through all the stages, such as a bill to fight 
corruption, creating a trade union for teachers, and a bill which bans alcoholic 
beverages (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 4-6). In the category of monitoring the executive 
branch, the list of achievements included returning hundreds of people to their jobs 
after being removed for political reasons. Similarly, thousands of confiscated 
passports were returned to their holders6 (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 4-6). 
With regard to domestic issues, it is unnecessary to quote IAF’s stand on the eighteen 
issues listed in the manifesto. I have chosen two issues pertaining to freedoms and 
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 The full name of the law is ‘The Law of Defending Transjordan, 1935.’ It gives the Amir sweeping 
powers in situations of emergency. The Britons in Jordan at the time were exempt.  
6
 Confiscation of passports was widespread. It prevents a citizen from travelling, and hinders 
employment in the public sector in particular. 
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gender equality, as these are often cited as a cause of concern if the Islamists come to 
power. 
The manifesto pledges to work towards making sure that the state provides the 
citizens with all public freedoms, including those concerned with belief, religion, 
politics, press, and science. However, this pledge is based on the religious notion that 
preserves for the human being his life, mind, freedom, money, and honour. Included 
in this section on freedoms is the right to preach and to promote virtue and prevent 
vice. The right is fine if the preacher belongs to any religion or belief. However, the 
wording in Arabic indicates that it is to be exclusively a right for the Muslim 
preacher, which makes it problematic (IAF manifesto 1993, p. 10). 
The issue of gender equality is listed within the policy regarding ‘special social care’. 
With regard to women, the manifesto talks about ‘enhancing the status of women as 
decided by Islam, away from imported customs, or stagnant traditions’. The 
manifesto promises ‘to activate the laws that are fair to women, and to complete the 
enactment of laws that reinforce women’s rights’ (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 22-23). 
As regards the latter promise, neither the government nor the IAF demonstrated 
enough courage to enact a new law, or to amend the existing one, to eliminate the 
lenient sentences given to the killers of their female relatives under the pretext of 
protecting the honour of the family. 
One cannot ignore the use of the terms ‘Jew’ and ‘Jewish’ in the manifesto, such as 
in referring to abstention from giving a vote of confidence to the ‘governments which 
negotiated with the Jewish enemy’ (IAF manifesto 1993, p. 5). In any state, not all 
segments of the population approve of the agreements negotiated by the government, 
and may take to the street in protest. In the US, for instance, NAFTA was opposed by 
some Americans. In the case of the Jordanian-Israeli treaty, preferring to use the term 
‘Jewish’ instead of Israeli or Zionist firmly bases the matter on old religious grounds, 
instead of keeping it a political matter. 
I suggest that basing the objection to the peace treaty on political grounds is more 
legitimate, because the religious one is founded on the erroneous belief that the 
enmity between Muslims and Jews is as old as Islam itself, and overlooks the historic 
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facts that show that Muslims and Jews lived and worked together throughout the 
centuries. Moreover, if one were to use Islamic terminology, Christians and Jews, are 
‘people of the book’ and also people of dhimma. The Islamic rule in treating them is 
‘they have our rights and duties’ (lahom ma lana, wa ‛alayhem ma ‛alayna). 
Moreover, even though Israel refers to itself as the ‘Jewish State,’ and even though 
Israel commits acts of aggression, no one should fall into the trap of using the term 
‘Jewish’ to condemn Israeli actions, as not every Jew approves of this. This is the 
same principle that makes it wrong to condemn Islam and Muslims because of the 
acts of some Muslims who engage in terror in the name of Islam. 
When one looks at the reform program published by the MB and IAF in 2005, the 
issue of equality is outlined in more detail (pp. 48-52). There is more emphasis on 
the equality of men and women in many aspects. In this document, verses from the 
Qur’an are cited to support the argument of equality, such as 49:13, 1:4, and 16:97. 
After the emphasis on equality in rights and duties under Islam, the document lists 
six specific rights which treat a woman as a complete independent person. For 
instance, a woman has the right to work, own property, and choose her husband 
without pressure or coercion. She also has political rights which include expressing 
her opinion in all aspects of life (p. 51). 
A fair comparison of the two documents will discern a substantial improvement in 
the use of language. Significantly, the use of the term ‘Jewish’ has disappeared from 
the section on education which in the manifesto of 1993 (p. 12) talked about keeping 
a psychological barrier towards the Jews: ‘the enemies of God and his messenger’. 
This is absent from the document of 2005, which uses Zionist instead of Jewish in 
the section on Arab-Israeli conflict (pp. 75-77). 
IAF/MB Internal Divisions 
Like all parties, the IAF would like to present a united front. However, generally 
speaking, there are two wings in the IAF and MB, referred to in the Jordanian press 
as the ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’. Abu Rumman (2011) identifies four currents. The hawks 
are those who follow Qutb’s line, such as Hammam Sa‛id and Muhammad Abu 
Fares. The doves are those who follow Rachid Ghanouchi’s line, such as ‛Abd al-
Latif ‛Arabiyyat and Ishaq al-Farhan. The centrists are a new generation of leaders 
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such as Salem al-Falāhāt and Rohile Gharaybeh. The members of the fourth current, 
such as Zaki Bani Irshaid, split from the centrists and are considered close to Hamas. 
I shall outline below the issues that have caused internal disputes. 
One issue that causes internal conflicts is the relationship with government and how 
to handle the disputes with it. Occasionally, the relationship between the MB/IAF 
and the government deteriorates. Sometimes, the IAF/MB may make a statement that 
antagonises the government. The old formula to resolve a dispute with the 
government was to leave the matter to the ‘wise people of the movement’,7 who 
usually meet the king or prime minister, and give assurances that they care about 
Jordan and its supreme interests. 
Increasingly, however, the government seems to be escalating the disputes with the 
MB/IAF. One case of heightened tension with the government and within the IAF 
and MB was the issue of the ‘constitutional monarchy’. The Deputy Secretary 
General of IAF, Rohile Gharaybeh, attended a conference in the US in 2009 and 
called for turning Jordan into a constitutional monarchy. Numerous articles in Jordan 
condemned the call itself, and criticised making it in the US instead of Jordan.  
Some commentators suggested that the Jordanian opposition was emulating the Iraqi 
opposition, which encouraged the US government to invade Iraq. One commentator, 
Maher Abu Tayr, argued in the Jordanian daily, Ad-Dustour (14 March 2009) that 
the proposed notion of constitutional monarchy is ‘dangerous and unacceptable’. 
However, if one leaves politics aside for a moment, there is nothing revolutionary in 
Gharaybeh’s call for a ‘constitutional monarchy’. The constitution of Jordan states 
that Jordan’s ‘system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy’ 
(article 1 of Jordan’s constitution).  
The link with Hamas resurfaces often within the MB/IAF and causes tension. At one 
stage, the MB of Jordan and Palestine were united, but in 2006, the Palestinian MB 
(which also means Hamas) sought independence. However, Palestinian and 
Jordanian members in the Gulf were not separated into different chapters, and 
continued to belong to the MB in Jordan. Because of their impact on elections and 
                                                 
7
 Moderate, prominent figures in the MB, from the older generation. In 2007, Prime Minister, Ma‛ruf 
al-Bakhit, called upon the wise people of the movement to save IAF from the radicals after a decision 
by IAF to withdraw from the municipal elections, six hours after they started.  
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policy making in MB/IAF, the issue became a source of internal division. An attempt 
to resolve it occurred in 2010 through a decision made by the ‘Guidance Council’ of 
the international MB organisation. 
Moreover, Zaki Bani Irshaid, who was elected as IAF’s general secretary in 2006, is 
seen by some MB/IAF members as well as the government as too closely linked with 
Hamas. His leadership was challenged internally, and eventually the entire executive 
council of IAF resigned in 2009 to avoid the risk of a split. 
After Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006, the leader of IAF’s bloc in the 
HoD, ‛Azzam al-Hunaidy, said that the MB/IAF were ready to govern as well. He 
was roundly condemned by pro-government writers in the Jordanian press for 
making such a remark, although whether Hamas won or not, it is legitimate for a 
political party anywhere to aspire to govern, and seek to do so through democratic 
means. 
Four members of MB/IAF incurred the wrath of the government when they went to 
offer condolences to the family of Abu Mus‛ab al-Zarqawi, after his death in Iraq in 
June 2006 was confirmed. Such an action would probably have passed unnoticed had 
Zarqawi restricted his ‘jihad’ to Iraq, which became Zarqawi’s new base after the US 
and its allies toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Zarqawi chose to bring 
carnage to Amman on 9 November 2005, when suicide bombers attacked three hotels 
in the capital, one blowing himself up at a wedding party. 
Amongst the many victims was the Syrian-American director, Mustafa al-‛Aqqad, 
who directed in the 1970s a film about Islam called the ‘Message’ and another film 
about ‛Umar al-Mukhtar of Libya. If one compares two examples of Muslims, and 
the services rendered to Islam, one reaches the well-founded conclusion that al-
‛Aqqad, served Islam and its image and that al-Zarqawi damaged them considerably.  
Two of the four people who went to offer condolences made speeches in the tent of 
condolences. The government immediately acted and put the four on trial. Two were 
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acquitted because they made no speeches, and the other two, ‛Ali Abu Sukkar and 
Muhammad Abu Fares, were given prison sentences. They were transported to al-
Jafer prison, a notorious jail, where political prisoners were detained in the 1950s and 
1960s. It is located in the southern Jordanian desert. After rapprochement between 
the government and the MB, the two were released in 2006. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the background that will be necessary for the assessment 
of the state of democracy in Jordan, specifically in relation to Islamism and 
democracy, and whether the Islamists helped or hindered democracy in Jordan since 
1989. In the next chapter, the democratic audit will be presented, starting with the 
major category of citizenship, law, and rights. 
145 
Chapter 6 
Democratic Audit: Citizenship, Law, and Rights 
 
 
In this chapter, I present, analyse, and discuss the data gathered through two 
questionnaires referred to previously. I follow the order and headings of categories 
and subcategories used in the long questionnaire. I begin with the short questionnaire 
(the macro-analysis). I then refer to the same issues in the corresponding overarching 
questions in the long questionnaire because they are identical. 
The democratic audit’s category about citizenship, law, and rights consists of four 
subcategories: (1) nationhood and citizenship; (2) rule of law and access to justice; 
(3) civil and political rights; and (4) economic and social rights. Each overarching 
question is stated before the marks are given.  
Subcategory 1: Nationhood and Citizenship 
The overarching question (Q1S, Q7L) asks: ‘Is there public agreement on a common 
citizenship without discrimination?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the 
question. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 10. The mean is 5, which is the 
same as the most frequent answer. 
Table 6.1: Agreement on Citizenship 
Mark Frequency Percent 
1 1 4.2 
2 3 12.5 
3 4 16.7 
4 3 12.5 
5 5 20.8 
6 3 12.5 
8 2 8.3 
9 1 4.2 
10 2 8.3 
Total 24 100 
Mean 5  
This average does not reflect that such an agreement exists. The issue that explains 
this absence of agreement pertains to the status of Palestinians in Jordan. The 
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manifestations of disagreement resurface frequently. For instance, in May 2010 the 
matter emerged vigorously, ostensibly out of concern that a solution for the Palestine 
question would be at the expense of Jordan. 
The issue of Palestinians in Jordan is often discussed passionately, prompted by 
external and internal considerations. The external factor pertains to Israel, whose 
leaders often argue that Jordan is the alternative homeland for the Palestinians. The 
aim is to absolve Israel of the human, moral, and legal responsibilities regarding the 
Palestinians and their right to live in, and return to, their homeland—Palestine. 
The other reason is internal. In this regard, one will find complaints on both sides: 
some Jordanians are resentful of any suggestion that the Palestinians who sought 
refuge in Jordan were more culturally developed than Jordanians, and that it was the 
Palestinians who made Jordan prosper. Similarly, there is resentment by some 
Palestinians due to the feeling that they are less favourably treated when it comes to 
employment in government departments, for instance. 
Interestingly, the number of Palestinians in Jordan is not officially acknowledged, 
even though a national census takes place every ten years. As Abu ‛Odeh (1999, p. 
255) points out: ‘the government has refrained from publishing the breakdown of 
Palestinian-Jordanians and Trans-Jordanians’. An old estimate, referred to by Sayigh 
(1987, p. 14) puts the number of Palestinians in the East Bank in 1967 at 47.1 
percent. When the West and East Banks are used to calculate the percentage, it rises 
to 70.35 percent. In Abu ‛Odeh’s discussion of this issue, he refers to information 
based on statistics collected by the Civil Affairs Department.1 These statistics 
indicated that the Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the East Bank in 1988 amounted 
to 40 percent of the population (1999, p. 255).  
The statement of May 2010 by retired military officers cited specific numbers of 
Palestinians in Jordan. According to the statement, the Palestinians in Jordan fall into 
three categories. In the first, there are 2.5 million Palestinians, of whom there are two 
million refugees whose citizenship is not challenged. In the second category, there are 
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 This department issues passports and identity cards. 
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850,000 who are Jordanian citizens but have a ‘yellow card’, namely, they possess a 
permit which enables them to reside in the West Bank. In the third category, there are 
2.2 million Palestinians who do not have Jordanian citizenship. These are refugees of 
the 1967 war who sought refuge in Jordan from Gaza and the West Bank. In total, 
there are nearly 5.5 million Palestinians in Jordan. 
The latest official statistics available are those of 2004 which put the population of 
Jordan at 5.3 million on 1 October 2004. The growth rate is put at 2.5 percent. The 
figures do not provide a breakdown of national origin. The statistics show that the 
most populated governorates are Amman (38% of population); Irbid (18%); and al-
Zarqa (15%). The urbanisation rate is 82 percent.2 
Using the figures mentioned in the statement issued by the retired officers, the 2.5 
million Palestinians who have Jordanian citizenship are equivalent to 47 percent, 
nearly half of the population. If the 850,000 Palestinians who hold a ‘yellow card’ are 
excluded, the percentage drops to 37 percent which is still high. There is a possibility 
of a margin of error because of the need to adjust figures in line with the fertility rate, 
but the percentages will remain nearly the same.  
Although the retired officers’ statement is not of an official nature, and is open to be 
challenged regarding its figures, the numbers and percentages nearly mirror the other 
estimates mentioned above. Therefore, it is likely that the specific figures in the 
statement are accurate because the retired officers had access to official data, or had 
been supplied by people who have such access. 
The statement by the retired officers encapsulates the recurring debate about the 
status of Palestinians in Jordan. It claims that Jordan is being pressurised (by 
unnamed parties) to give citizenship to the third category, and to give the Palestinians 
a quota in the political system. This, according to the statement, makes Jordan the 
alternative Palestinian state that Israeli officials often promote. 
It is worth recalling that King Hussein’s decision to sever administrative and legal 
links with the West Bank in 1988 is considered unconstitutional by the MB in Jordan. 
There was no court in Jordan with the power to adjudicate on constitutional matters. 
If there had been one, it was highly unlikely that it would have been allowed to 
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 The Jordanian Department of Statistics. 
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consider the constitutionality of King Hussein’s decision. The issue of 
constitutionality is met with two kinds of responses. One is expressed by the former 
PM, ‛Abd al-Ra’uf al-Rawabdeh, who argues that decisions of secession do not take 
place through constitutional means, citing the example of the failure of Syrian-
Egyptian unity in 1961.3 
The other response to the argument of un/constitutionality comes from some people 
who call for the constitutionalisation of the decision to sever the links with the West 
Bank. In other words, the constitution must be amended to eliminate any doubt that 
the West Bank is not part of Jordan, and that the Palestinians of the West Bank are 
not Jordanians. Such a move eliminates the slim and unlikely possibility to declare 
the severance decision unconstitutional if circumstances change in the future.  
One of the leading voices for the call to constitutionalise the severance decision is 
Nahed Hattar, who presents himself as a leftist and Marxist. His own brand of leftism 
and Marxism is unique in that it is difficult to tell the difference between it and ultra-
right wing, chauvinistic nationalism. In one of his articles (2009), Hattar describes 
‘national unity,’ as a ‘deceptive slogan’ because ‘the Jordanians are united’. His 
definition of Jordanian does not included the Palestinians. It includes ‘Arab and non-
Arab minorities who came to the region before the State of Jordan was established’.4 
The statement by the retired officers has additional significance for three reasons. 
First, the army and its personnel, including retired servicemen, are traditionally 
thought of as the bedrock of the regime. Second, the position adopted in the statement 
was not synchronous with the official line at the time it was published. Third, the 
involvement of former army officers in this debate seems to be a calculated move by 
non-military people who espouse the views expressed in the statement. In Jordan, the 
army is one of those ‘red lines’ which means either it is an untouchable subject, or 
anything less than lavish praise is unacceptable. 
The statement calls for making a constitutional arrangement to end the overlap 
between citizenship and membership in professional associations. It also proposes to 
treat the Palestinians in Jordan in two ways. The first is to continue to treat the 
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 Lecture I attended in Jordan on 23/6/2009 at the Royal Cultural Centre, Amman. 
4
 Article’s date is 27 April 2009 as published in ‘allofjo.net’. The site publishes his articles, which 
sometimes were published in the Lebanese daily, al-Akhbar, or the Jordanian daily, al-Arab al-Yawm. 
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refugees of 1948 as Jordanian citizens until the fate of UN resolution 194 (right of 
return) is decided. The statement further proposes that the implementation of this 
resolution should become a major pillar in Jordan’s foreign policy. The second way is 
to give the refugees of 1967 either Palestinian citizenship (by the Palestinian 
Authority), or travel documents by Jordan. 
Not surprisingly, this recurring theme is a cause of concern for the Palestinians in 
Jordan. Qamhawi (2010) considers the measures which lead to the withdrawal of 
Jordanian citizenship as ‘ethnic cleansing’. His choice of words lacks accuracy, as 
ethnic cleansing involves violence and expulsion. However, the anger shown in the 
article is not baseless, as the withdrawal of citizenship can have destructive 
consequences on the livelihood, ability to travel, and prospects of employment. 
Although racism or ultra-nationalism can be a motivating factor in these campaigns to 
keep Jordan Jordanian and only for Jordanians, the recent campaign is influenced by 
the economic conditions which have led to an increase in poverty. As elsewhere in 
the world, when economic conditions deteriorate, a segment of the population will 
feel that immigrants or asylum seekers are to blame. There is usually no shortage of 
people, politicians, activists, or people in the media, who will exploit such an 
argument, especially during times of elections. 
The statement by the retired officers also betrays the inconsistent logic of their 
argument. One of the characteristics of the distorted debates which take place in 
Jordan is that every statement, written or spoken, must praise the king and declare 
unwavering loyalty, and then make the demands. All criticism is then directed at the 
government. The critics pretend that those in government are implementing their own 
policies, and conveniently overlook the fact that the PM is appointed by the king to 
implement policies under his specific instructions or general guidance. 
This position, which lacks political courage, succeeds sometimes in removing an 
individual or an entire government. However, nothing then changes because the 
policies being implemented are not those of the individuals removed. Moreover, it 
often appears that this tug of war is a form of political contestation dictated by the 
lack of other more organised and rational means. However, it is apparent that this 
form of political contestation is incapable of producing change because it does not 
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address the substantive issues of freedom and social justice, and fails to demand 
reforms from the king no less, and not from the individuals he handpicks. 
In the past, this lack of agreement on citizenship was often calmed down by appeals 
to national unity, and references to Jordanians of all origins. King Hussein famously 
said in a speech in 1996 that those who wanted to destabilise national unity would be 
his enemy until the Day of Judgement. When the same debate resurfaced again in 
2010, a similar appeal by King ‛Abdullah II did not have the same effect. 
The discourse about identity in Jordan resembles the debates on multiculturalism and 
assimilation in Western countries. The ultra-nationalist rhetoric equates identity with 
nationality, and the legal consequences of acquiring citizenship. Therefore, some will 
consider it an act of betrayal if a Palestinian in Jordan identifies him/herself as 
Palestinian. Equating identity with citizenship is an aberrant preposition in a country 
from which many people migrate, or work abroad for extended periods. Yet they 
retain their Jordanian identity. Jordan has appreciated the desire of Jordanians not to 
lose their sense of identity and attachment to Jordan when they acquire citizenship in 
other countries. Therefore, the law has been amended in September 1987 to state that 
‘a Jordanian who acquires foreign nationality remains Jordanian’ (article 9 of 
nationality law, 1987). 
Judging from the debates about multiculturalism in Western countries, such as the 
UK, France, USA, and Canada, one can say that the ultra-nationalist Transjordanians 
are in favour of arguments which require immigrants to assimilate in the new society. 
However, the term immigrant will not be an accurate description of a Palestinian in 
Jordan, considering the fact that nation-states in the Middle East are relatively new, 
and their borders are arbitrary. There was such mobility before the creation of nation-
states in the region that makes the imposition of a narrow definition of nationalism on 
a group of people living in a small territory a nonsensical proposition. An ultra-
nationalist demand for assimilation is absurd because the difference is imaginary. 
Jordanians and Palestinians share language, culture, and religions. Migrants and 
refugees assimilate in different cultures, through learning a different language for 
instance. However, people do not assimilate in their own culture. 
151 
At the ruling dynasty level, King Hussein has established strong relations with some 
Palestinian families, such as the Touqan of Nablus. King ‛Abdullah II continued to 
follow the same path. Members of the Touqan family served in senior posts such as 
governor of the central bank of Jordan and minister of higher education. 
Moreover, the arguments of the ultra-nationalist Transjordanians are inconsistent with 
the fact that Jordan has always had a mix of national origins, before and since its 
creation. One of the prime ministers most admired by Transjordanians is Wasfi al-
Tall, who was assassinated by Palestinian gunmen in Cairo in 1971. What seems to 
be overlooked is that al-Tall’s mother was a Kurd, and as such he cannot be the 
embodiment of a ‘pure’ Transjordanian. The masculine mentality chooses to overlook 
the role of the mother. The maternal half is rarely talked about, and treated as 
negligible, even though many Transjordanian men are married to women from 
diverse national origins, including the male members of the ruling family, who chose 
American, British, Pakistani, Algerian, Lebanese, and Palestinian wives.5 Moreover, 
many Jordanian women marry men from other Arab nationalities, especially those 
who come to work in Jordan. However, the children are not given Jordanian 
citizenship. Therefore, mothers are left helpless should husbands abandon them. 
Even though such feelings do exist, it is naïve to suggest that the Jordanian-
Palestinian divide is vertical, and all Palestinians are on one side and all 
Transjordanians on the other. For every ultra-nationalist Transjordanian, there are 
many who reject their narrow definition of nationalism. A prominent critic of the 
ultra-nationalists is the writer Khalid Mahadin (2010), who has criticised the 
statement by the retired officers for using language which undermines national unity. 
In an article, he refers to Nahed Hattar without mentioning his name, and ridicules 
Hattar’s suggestion that the only true Jordanians are the Christians and the bedouin. 
Furthermore, there is plenty of evidence which undermines the argument that the 
Jordanian population is indifferent to the Palestine question. One has to look at the 
demonstrations and other expressions of support of Palestine on various occasions, 
especially when the Palestinians are under Israeli attack, as in 2008/09 when Gaza 
was besieged and bombarded for three weeks. These expressions show that the 
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 King Hussein married an Egyptian, a British, Palestinian, and an American. Prince Hassan married a 
Pakistani. King ‛Abdullah II is married to a Palestinian. Prince ‛Ali married an Algerian. 
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support for the Palestinians and their cause is deeply rooted in all segments of the 
Jordanian society. 
In the long questionnaire, five of the six assessors answered the question. The marks 
given are: 2, 2, 5, 6, and 7. The mean is 4.4. These marks do not depart significantly 
from those given by the respondents to the short questionnaire. In other words, such 
an assessment reinforces the validity of the results outlined and discussed above. To 
deal with this issue more effectively, Jordan should enact an anti-discrimination law.6 
Although this law will not prevent discrimination, because less favourable treatment 
can be justified on other grounds, the fact remains that there will be a legal option 
which can have a deterring effect. Moreover, when the discrimination is so blatant, 
the courts can adjudicate and remedy the situation. 
Subcategory 2: Rule of Law and Access to Justice 
The overarching question (Q2S, Q14L) asks: ‘Are state and society consistently 
subject to the law?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest 
mark is 1; the highest is 10. The mean is 5.8. 
Table 6.2: State, Society, and Law 
Mark Frequency Percent 
1 1 4.2 
2 3 12.5 
3 1 4.2 
4 2 8.3 
5 4 16.7 
6 3 12.5 
7 4 16.7 
8 2 8.3 
9 2 8.3 
10 2 8.3 
Total 24 100 
Mean 5.8 
 
The mean indicates that there are misgivings. Some of the respondents identified 
areas of concern which include: tribal law, selective application of the law, political 
                                                 
6
 By discrimination I mean less favourable treatment, as in the British Race Relations Act (1976). 
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influence over judges, formal rights in constitution not practised; absence of a 
constitutional court; state security courts; and favouritism, nepotism, and wāsta.7 
The state’s recognition of tribal laws dates back to 1936 when the government 
approved a law which gave ten nomadic tribes the right to have tribal courts to make 
decisions on the basis of tribal traditions. Article 5 permits the punishment of the 
perpetrator of a crime and many of his relatives (up to fifth degree of kinship). The 
government officially cancelled the tribal law in 1976. However, the tribal practices 
are still prevalent, and tolerated by the government as will be outlined below.  
As Massad (2001) explains in detail, there was a ‘new push for detribalization’ which 
began in 1976 (p. 67). A debate about the issue did not remain within government 
institutions. It appeared in the press, which published articles for and against 
tribalism, especially in 1984, when parliamentary by-elections took place. Massad 
summarises this debate (pp. 70-71) and quotes a public letter sent by King Hussein to 
Ahmad ‛Ubaydat, the then PM. King Hussein indicates in the letter that criticism of 
tribal traditions ‘reflects on the king and his family as well’ (p. 70). A letter of this 
kind, with a clearly defined position from the king on such an issue, amounts to an 
order to stop the debate. 
The Minister of Information, Layla Sharaf, resigned in protest. She distributed her 
letter of resignation to the international news agencies. Queen Noor (2003, pp. 259-
260) said she did so after the Jordanian press refused to publish her letter. It will be a 
strange editorial decision not to publish the resignation letter of a minister. However, 
the fact that the resignation is in protest at a position adopted by King Hussein 
explains why the press refused to publish her letter. Moreover, Queen Noor added 
that King Hussein was ‘furious’ (pp. 259-260). 
Tribalism was given a new lease of life, especially after the enactment of an elections 
law known as the single vote law which, contrary to the elections of 1989, allowed a 
voter to cast one vote in a multi-seat constituency. Moreover, the legacy of tribal laws 
is still active. The ugly side of tribalism emerges whenever there is a dispute between 
two tribes, especially in cases of murder. 
                                                 
7
 Using the influence or recommendation of an influential person; literally means an intermediary. 
154 
When one member of a tribe kills another, the tribal practices have dire 
consequences. One incident took place in ‛Ajlun in August 2009. A man from al-
Momani tribe was killed while visiting his son at the home of his former in-laws, who 
belong to al-Smadi tribe. Both sides fought and torched properties. The riot police, 
darak, had to intervene and impose a curfew. In line with tribal traditions, high profile 
people formed a delegation and visited the aggrieved party to seek a truce. In this 
instance, the truce was agreed on the conditions that the alleged killer would not 
receive legal representation, and the court should sentence him to death. In other 
words, the conditions contradict the principles of a fair trial. Another consequence of 
incidents of the kind is jalweh, namely, the family of the killer and many of the 
relatives have to move from their homes to another area. 
Furthermore, tribalism is responsible for the many fights that erupt in Jordanian 
universities in different parts of the country, including the University of Jordan—the 
oldest and largest university in Jordan. On 23 and 30 December 2010, fighting 
erupted on campus and resulted in damage to property and injuries. Initially, the 
fighting was downplayed, but when videos became available on the video sharing 
website, youtube, the seriousness of the situation was recognised. ‛Adel al-Twaisi, the 
president of the university, formed committees to investigate, and disciplinary action 
was taken against thirty students. 
The frequency of fights at universities in Jordan was the subject of an article by Sate‛ 
al-Zghūl (2011) who collected from different sources statistics which showed that 
from 1999 to 2010 there had been 624 fights. The average per year is sixty-four 
fights, which equates to more than one a week. He also indicates that 1999 saw the 
highest number of fights which reached 102. The latest year he includes in the 
statistic is 2010 which saw eighty-eight fights. 
Jordanian commentators, such as Ahmad Abu Khalil, express concern that the 
universities have become an arena for tribal fights instead of being the place for 
intellectual stimulation and competition. Whether the matter relates to murders, 
nominating candidates in elections, or fighting at universities, it is clear that tribal 
traditions do not fit in a modern society, even if tribalism is thought to have its good 
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aspects—known as social capital. Moreover, such tribalism is proof that the ultra-
nationalist Jordanians are basing their claims of Jordanian nationalism on quick sand, 
as this kind of tribalism does not recognise common bonds of nationalism or religion. 
With regard to the laws enacted by the state, when one follows the final outcome of 
court cases, one finds identifiable factors in the use of law as an extension of politics, 
but with added advantages that judicial proceedings are controlled in terms of how 
fast and how slowly they should proceed. The decisions of the courts are influenced 
by a few factors outlined below. 
The first discernible factor is in cases of alleged plotting against the king. People in 
security services have a duty to protect king and country. Two contradictory 
messages are often sent when talking about the king: that he is very popular, and that 
there have been many attempts on his life. Samīh al-Battikhi, the head of GID, 
fabricated a plot to kill King Hussein in 1993. Eventually, the defendants were all 
released. Al-Battikhi turned out to be a crook, and was tried for corruption and 
convicted in 2003. 
Another factor is noticeable in cases with an impact on, or a link to, a member of the 
royal family. The case against Ahmad ‛Uwaidi al-‛Abbadi can illustrate this point. He 
belongs to the ‛Udwan tribe. He was an officer in the Jordanian police, and was 
elected to the HoD in 1989. He used to publish articles in the Jordanian weekly, 
Shihan, in which he expressed anti-Palestinian sentiments. After his stint in the HoD 
he continued to write critical articles. The Minister of Interior, ‛Eid al-Fayez, sued 
him in 2007. Al-‛Abbadi was charged with publishing libellous material on the 
Internet, and was imprisoned for two years. He denied publishing the material, which 
involved Queen Rania, and considered the case against him vexatious. In April 2010, 
a court in Jordan ordered that the case should be dealt with afresh. His lawyer, Feras 
al-Rusan (2010), pleaded with Queen Rania to prevent ‛Eid al-Fayez, from using her 
name in the court papers.  
A third factor that influences the decisions of courts is whether a case is initiated at 
the behest of a prime minister and is decided while he is still in office. In this 
situation, the decision is in favour of the prime minister. An example to illustrate this 
point is the case against Toujan Faysal during the premiership of ‛Ali Abu al-Ragheb. 
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In May 2002, she was tried and sentenced to eighteen months in prison (more on this 
case in a section below). 
If a case is decided after the prime minister is gone, the probability of the decision 
being in favour of the defendant increases. For instance, a case was initiated in 2007 
at the behest of Ma‛ruf al-Bakhit against Fahd al-Rimawi, editor of al-Majd, for 
having written a critical editorial. However, the case came to trial after al-Bakhit left 
office. The judge ruled in favour of al-Majd in June 2008. 
The fourth element amounts to using the law as an arm-twisting tactic against 
individuals and associations. When it comes to individuals, the legal proceedings are 
not initiated by a government prosecutor on his own volition. Instead, they are 
initiated in response to a complaint by one individual or more. A case in point is the 
legal proceedings brought against ‛Adnan Abu ‛Odeh. They were initiated in 
response to a complaint by the mufti of the city of Jarash. Another case is that of Eva 
Abu Halaweh, who attended a meeting with the US Vice President, Joe Biden, 
alongside a few other individuals in March 2010. In both cases, the proceedings were 
abandoned, likely due to American interventions. Abu ‛Odeh researched and wrote 
his book on the Palestinians in Jordan in the US, and Eva Abu Halaweh is an 
American citizen.  
A third court case was initiated against Muwafaq Mahadin and Sufyan al-Tall: two 
activists who participated in a TV programme broadcast by al-Jazeera in 2010. The 
programme discussed the situation in Afghanistan after a Jordanian officer related to 
the ruling family, ‛Ali bin Zaid, was killed in a suicide attack in Khost. The complaint 
was filed by retired military officers who accused Mahadin and al-Tall of insulting 
the army. They were arrested in February 2010. However, there was a robust 
campaign in their support. They were released on bail, and when they were tried, they 
were acquitted in May 2011. 
Using the law in a selective way against organisations can be illustrated through two 
examples. In 2007, the General Union of Charitable Organisations was the subject of 
legal action which was preceded by suspending its executive council and replacing it 
with a government-appointed one. The suspended members were accused of 
exploiting office. When the case went to trial, the members of the council were 
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acquitted. The government also lost the appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
acquittal in July 2010. 
A similar attitude was taken towards a charitable society known as the Islamic Centre 
which was run by the MB. The society owns two hospitals in addition to other 
charitable bodies. The government suspended the management of the charity, and 
appointed a committee to run it in 2007. After investigations over three years, legal 
proceedings were initiated in 2009. This case took place during Ma‛ruf al-Bakhit’s 
premiership, who adopted a hostile attitude towards the MB/IAF. Hammam Sa‛id, the 
MB leader, suggested that the case was political rather than legal. 
Another feature is related to bail, which is either denied or delayed to increase the 
pressure on the accused. This happened in the case of Muwafaq Mahadin and Sufyan 
al-Tall. In a corruption case in 2010, that of a project to expand the country’s oil 
refinery, it took some time before the four defendants were granted bail. Saleh al-
‛Armūti, the former chairman of the Jordanian bar association, and the leader of the 
defence team, suggested that the case was one of score-settling amongst politicians. 
In July 2010, the defendants were found guilty and were sentenced to three years 
imprisonment. The Court of Appeal also upheld the decision in October 2010. 
The above cases were referred to the state security court, which in 2006 was 
described by Human Rights Watch (HRW) as ‘a tribunal which does not meet 
international standards of independence and impartiality’ (p. 2). Until the early 1990s, 
the decisions made by this court were not subject to appeal. 
In the long questionnaire, five of the six assessors answered this question. The marks 
given are 3, 6, 6, 6, and 6. The mean is 5.4. When the means of the two sets of marks 
are compared, it becomes apparent that the assessment of the six assessors 
corroborates that of the twenty-four respondents. 
The constitutionality of various decisions in Jordan is often questioned. One such 
decision, referred to earlier, is that of severing links with the West Bank. Similarly, 
doubts are raised about the constitutionality of enacting interim laws in normal times, 
158 
and not only during emergencies as the constitution states. Moreover, a constitutional 
issue that has been decided by the government, rather than a supreme court, is that of 
royal pardon which is of two types: general and special. The government interpreted 
this to mean that a general pardon absolves the pardonee of all offences. He or she 
will enjoy all rights, including the right to become a candidate in elections. However, 
according to the government’s interpretation, the special pardon releases the pardonee 
from prison, but does not restore all his or her rights. This is the interpretation that 
blocked the candidacy of Toujan Faysal in 2007. The constitutional lawyer, and 
former Minister of Justice, Muhammad al-Hammouri, argues that both types of 
pardon are of equal force (2005, pp. 80-81). However, since there is no constitutional 
court to consider the issue, the government’s interpretation is imposed. 
There is a high court that reviews decisions affecting employees of the government. It 
can order reinstatement in cases of dismissal. However, the jurisdiction of this high 
court does not include deciding constitutional issues. 
Before concluding this section, the principle of the rule of law requires some 
discussion. The notion of rule of law is an important one, as is the principle that 
everyone is equal before the law. The application, however, is not always consistent 
with the principle. It can be circumvented and undermined by people in power. 
Challenging the government in a court of law is not an easy task. Governments resort 
to excuses such as state security or national interest to block proceedings or refrain 
from presenting evidence. While decisions can be challenged at the European Court 
of Human Rights if the decision taken is in a European country, this mechanism is not 
available in many countries, including Jordan. Oppression in undemocratic countries 
is done in the name of the law. For the rule of law to be an effective principle, the 
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laws should be consistent with the freedoms, and there should be a mechanism to 
challenge their constitutionality. 
Subcategory 3: Civil and Political Rights 
The overarching question (Q3S, Q19L) asks: ‘Are civil and political rights equally 
guaranteed for all?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest 
mark is 1; the highest 10. The mean is 5. 
Table 6.3: Civil and Political Rights 
Mark Frequency Percent 
1 2 8.3 
2 3 12.5 
3 1 4.2 
4 4 16.7 
5 5 20.8 
6 2 8.3 
7 3 12.5 
8 3 12.5 
10 1 4.2 
Total 24 100 
Mean 5  
 
In analysing the data in response to this question, I will adopt two approaches. The 
narrow approach examines specific rights, such as the freedom of expression, 
whereas the broad approach examines how equal rights in general are not guaranteed 
in relation to women and where citizens reside in the country. 
Civil and political rights are usually mentioned together. Both are the subject of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The covenant enumerates the 
rights which include the right to life; the prevention of torture; the right to liberty and 
security; freedom of movement; equality before the courts; freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; freedom of expression; freedom of assembly; and freedom of 
association. These rights are also referred to as civil liberties. 
When one examines specific rights such as those mentioned above, one finds 
variations in the degree to which they are respected. For example, freedom of 
movement is better respected than freedoms of expression, assembly, and association. 
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The right to demonstrate is heavily restricted. When people manage to demonstrate 
with or without permission, one finds heavy-handed measures, as was the case during 
a strike by workers at the Port of Aqaba in July 2009. Similar heavy-handed treatment 
befell the demonstrators against Israeli aggression against the Gaza strip in 2008/9. 
In the long questionnaire, four of the six assessors answered this question. The marks 
give are 3, 5, 5, and 7. The mean is 5, which mirrors that of the short questionnaire. I 
chose to be brief in the discussion of the specific rights because they would be 
addressed in other questions. Therefore, I will now examine the lack of equal rights in 
the broad sense—the representation of residents of governorates and of women. 
Geographically and administratively, Jordan is divided into twelve governorates. 
Electorally, it has fifteen, with different numbers of seats. Three of the fifteen 
constituencies are reserved for the bedouin of the northern, southern, and central 
regions of Jordan—three seats each. The largest governorate is Amman, where almost 
half of Jordan’s population reside. However, the number of seats allocated for 
Amman is not proportionate.  


















Source: Adapted from official statistics, 2007. 
 
As the table shows, a vote in Karak is worth more than seven in Amman. The 
government justifies this by pleading concern for representation of all parts of the 
District Population Seats Ratio 
   (1/1000) 
Amman 2,027,685 23 1/88 
Irbid 950,695 16 1/59.5 
Zarqa 838,250 10 1/84 
Balqa’ 135,890 10 1/83.4 
Karak 214,225 10 1/13.6 
Mafraq 245,665 4 1/21.4 
Jarash 156,675 4 1/61.4 
Madaba 135,890 4 1/39.2 
‛Ajlun 118,305 4 1/34 
Tafila 81,000 4 1/20.3 
Ma‛an 103,915 4 1/26 
‛Aqaba 107,115 2 1/35.7 
Bedouin  9  
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kingdom. Addressing issues of representation should be welcome, but there is a 
contradiction in the application. All citizens should be represented equally, not least 
because the constitution states explicitly that all Jordanians are equal before the law. 
The government has various quotas for the Christians, Circassians, and bedouin. 
These quotas are from the early days of the kingdom. In 2003, the elections law was 
amended to allocate women a quota of six seats in the HoD. In 2010, the number was 
doubled. Given that the number of women is 2,773,000, and men 2,950,000, the ratio 
of representation is equal to one seat per 462.2 thousand women, when the quota was 
six seats. The ratio became one seat per 231.1 thousand women when the quota was 
increased to twelve seats. Moreover, given that 104 seats of the HoD can all be for 
men, the ratio of representation amounts to one seat per 28,000 men. 
With regard to quotas in general, there are arguments that all quotas in Jordan are 
unconstitutional. The argument is based on article (6)(i) which states: ‘Jordanians 
shall be equal before the law. There shall be no discrimination between them as 
regards to their rights and duties on grounds of race, language or religion’. Another 
argument about the quota in relation to the bedouin is that they have been urbanised, 
and some Jordanian of bedouin roots have held high offices in the states, such as 
‘Akef al-Fayez, and his son Faysal. 
In relation to the quota for Christians, Nahed Hattar arrives at a higher percentage of 
Christians in Jordan than the quota gives them. He calculates the percentage by 
excluding the Palestinians in Jordan. A more important aspect in relation to the 
Christians in Jordan goes beyond the number of seats allocated for them. Jordan is 
praised as being tolerant, and indeed Christians in Jordan enjoy considerable freedom 
of religion. Moreover, some Christians hold senior positions in government, such as 
the Ministry of Finance and central bank of Jordan. 
However, this tolerant image does not hide the fact that the Christians in Jordan are 
not found in the most senior positions of the army,8 nor has a Christian ever become a 
prime minister of Jordan. A Christian, Marwan al- Mu‛asher, was made deputy prime 
                                                 
8
 Medical practitioners serving in military hospitals get high ranks, but that is not the kind of rank 
referred to above. 
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minister. However, this post is more symbolic in its value, as a prime minister in 
Jordan would have more than one deputy at the same time. I suggest that Mu‛asher’s 
promotion was a reward for his roles in the peace process which led to a peace treaty 
with Israel in 1994. He was Jordan’s first ambassador in Israel.9 
Women’s political and civil rights are not equal nor are they guaranteed. Women in 
Jordan were given the right to vote in 1974. Ironically they were given the right when 
no one in Jordan, men or women, could cast a vote to elect the government. The right 
to vote was shortly before the inauguration of the Women Year (1975). In‛am al-
Mufti became the first Jordanian woman to hold a ministerial position in 1979. She 
served as the minister of social justice. While she was a minister, a new woman 
organisation was established—the General Federation for Jordanian Women.  
The second female minister was Layla Sharaf, the wife of ‛Abd al-Hamīd Sharaf, 
who is related to the royal family, and served as a prime minister. She resigned in 
1985 after King Hussein stopped the debate about whether tribal laws should be 
abolished or not. Massad (2001, pp. 70-71) criticises the reference made in Sharaf’s 
letter of resignation to ‘enlightening the citizen’. Massad says: ‘Sharaf, it would 
seem, had internalized the modernization project uncritically’ (p. 71). This 
interpretation is based on over-theorisation. It fails to recognise that it took a great 
deal of courage to resign, make the resignation letter public, and incur the wrath of 
King Hussein. I suggest that Sharaf’s use of ‘enlightening the citizen’ is unrelated to 
‘the modernization project’, as Massad assumes. ‘Enlighten’ is a commonly used 
word, and it means ‘inform’. 
The third woman to hold a ministerial post was Rima Khalaf who served as minister 
of trade and industry, then as minister of planning. At her time, Jordan’s association 
agreement with the European Union was reached. She was one of three deputies of 
the PM in the government of ‛Abd al-Ra’uf al-Rawabdeh which was formed in 
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 In The Arab Center, Mu‛asher tells that members of his family were not keen on the fact that the first 
Jordanian ambassador to Jordan would be a Christian from a family which has priests. Also, when Paul 
Wolfowitz, the neoconservative got into trouble at the World Bank for behaving unethically, only 
Mu‛asher came out in support, in an attempt to save him. 
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1999—the first after ‛Abdullah II succeeded his father. As already mentioned, the 
deputy post is of symbolic value in the main.  
Through the unelected route, women occupied high-ranking positions in the 
government. However, going through the electoral route demonstrated that women 
have a problem winning seats in the HoD. When Jordan decided to hold elections in 
1989, women looked forward to the opportunity. Hayfa’ al-Bashir said she considered 
it a duty to run in the elections.10 The number of women candidates in the general 
elections of 1989 was twelve. However, none of them managed to win a seat.  
In 1993, a woman candidate, Toujan Faysal, contested the seat reserved for 
Circassians and won. Faysal’s earlier bid had failed, having alienated the Islamic 
current. She pointed out in an article (1989) that the Islamists do not respect women, 
and yet women elect them. Faysal was an active MP. She was, and still is, outspoken 
and attacks corruption. She failed to keep her seat in the elections of 1997, and 
accused the government of rigging the elections in favour of her opponent. In 2002, 
Faysal accused the Prime Minister, ‛Ali Abu al-Ragheb, of changing the law which 
regulated insurance companies for the benefit of members of his family who own 
companies in this sector. 
Faysal’s allegations were made public on a website based in the US. Abu al-Ragheb’s 
government decided she went too far. She was charged with publishing false news 
which harmed the prestige of the state, inter alia. Abu al-Ragheb did not have to give 
evidence in court. She was sentenced to eighteen months in prison. While in jail, she 
went on hunger strike. Faysal was pardoned by King ‛Abdullah II in June 2002. She 
was not allowed to run for elections in 2003 because she was treated as having a 
criminal record.  
Although Faysal was pardoned, the government interpreted the constitution in a way 
that a special pardon does not invalidate the record. Only a general pardon would 
have that effect. Faysal believes that the effect of the sentence on here ability to run 
for elections expires at the end five years after her release, and after that she can run. 
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 Personal interview. Amman, 24 June 2009. 
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If the government prevented her from running, she said, she would sue the 
government.11 However, in the elections of 2010, she did not run. 
In the elections of 1997, which the MB/IAF boycotted, there were seventeen women 
candidates, considerably higher than the candidates in 1989. However, they were 
equally unsuccessful in that round, even though it was boycotted by the MB/IAF. 
This suggests that the attitude towards women is not restricted to those who support 
the Islamists. In 2001, another woman became an MP for a few months: Nuha al-
Ma‛ayta. A vacancy arose in the HoD after the death of Rashed al-Barayseh. It was 
decided that there no was need to hold by-elections. It was left to the serving MPs to 
elect a replacement. The occasion was used to elect a woman. Seventeen candidates 
were considered, and al-Ma‛ayta was selected. When women repeatedly failed to win 
seats, the government introduced a quota, according to which six seats were added to 
the HoD and reserved for women. This was in response to recommendations made by 
the so-called ‘Jordan first commission’. The elections law was amended in 2003 to 
introduce the women quota, and it spelled out the formula according to which women 
would be considered elected. 
The formula to win through the women quota converts the results achieved by women 
candidates into percentages based on the total number of votes cast in their respective 
constituencies. The women candidates who get the highest parentages across Jordan 
become MPs, provided that the percentage is not less than 5 percent. In the elections 
of 2003, this formula meant that one woman, Hayat al-Msaimi, running in Zarqa 
District, became an MP—having secured more than 7,000 votes. In contrast, another 
woman, Insāf al-Khawaldeh, running in the Madaba District, became an MP with 
only 365 votes. There were women candidates who gained votes in the thousands, but 
the formula did not allow them to be selected. For example, a woman candidate in 
Irbid, Aminah al-Khasawneh, gained more than 2,000 votes, the second highest 
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amongst women candidates in Jordan. However, she did not become a quota MP 
because she did not meet the 5 percent requirement. The table below will better 
explain how the winners through the quota are selected. 
Table 6.5: Women Candidates and the Quota Formula 







Zarqa 67,292 H. Msaimi 7,133 10.6  
  F. Khateeb 1,924 2.9 X 
Irbid-1 94,578 A. Khasawneh 2,224 2.4 X 
  F. Zu‛bi 1,942 2.1 X 
Amman-2 83,334 W. Talhūni 1,211 1.5 X 
Madaba 13,023 F. Jam‛ani 1,048 8.1  
Tafila-1 21,743 A. Su‛ud 1,132 5.2  
Tafila-2 6,512 E. Khawaldeh 365 5.6  
 
Source: Adapted from Official Gazette and other sources. 
Based on the figures in the table, a woman candidate in Amman-2 would have needed 
a minimum of 4,167 votes. The table also reveals the unequal representation of 
governorates, where the number of seats is not dependent on the number of people. 
Hayat al-Msaimi ran as an MB/IAF candidate. She nearly won outright, but fell short 
of a few votes. The failure to win outright is attributed (a) to being a woman, and (b) 
to being a Palestinian. This episode is mentioned by Samīh al-Ma‛ayta as an example 
of the penetration of nationalism into the MB ranks, something that was not the case 
before.12 Al-Msaimi said she won outright; however the government declared the 
other candidate the winner because she would win through the quota.13 
Although the quota system was introduced to improve women’s representation in the 
HoD, the women I interviewed in Jordan complained about the system. They 
explained that it had the effect of excluding women candidates in the Amman 
governorate from winning. The consequence of this is that all women who sit in 
parliament according to the quota are from outside Amman. 
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 Personal interview. Amman, 23 June 2009. 
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 Personal interview. Amman, 25 March 2010. 
166 
The elections of 2010 produced a surprise in Amman. The Palestinian leftist, ‛Abla 
Abu ‛Elbeh, won in Amman on the basis of the quota. The 5 percent requirement was 
calculated per single constituency within a multi-seat constituency, rather than per 
governorate as before. This made the more than 1000 votes she received exceed the 5 
percent threshold. Had the old formula been used, she would not have won, and the 
argument that women cannot win Amman would have been validated. Another 
woman, Reem Badran, won outright in Amman. Therefore, she rejects the view that 
women do vote for female candidates. However, women activists believe Badran’s 
case is exceptional. As Emily Nafa‛ explains, ‘that Badran won outright did not come 
as a surprise’.14 She is the daughter of Mudar Badran, a former PM. 
As mentioned earlier, there are arguments about the constitutionality of the quota 
allocated for women. However, women argue that according to the single vote law, 
they have no chance of winning. 
To conclude the analysis of data of this question, one can say that Jordan does not 
meet the international standards of civilian and political rights. The international 
declaration of human rights stipulates that restrictions on rights must be ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’. In such a society, criticism of the head of state is not a criminal 
offence. Comedians mock politicians, including the head of state. However, in 
Jordan, there is a law which makes it an offence to criticise the king. This is 
euphemistically referred to as ‘extending the tongue’. In September 2010, King 
‛Abdullah II pardoned eighteen individuals charged with this offence. 
Subcategory 4: Economic and Social Rights 
The overarching question (Q4S, Q26L) asks: ‘Are economic and social rights equally 
guaranteed for all?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest 
mark given is 1; the highest 9. The mean is 5.3. 
                                                 
14
 Personal interview. Amman, 18 November 2010. 
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Table 6.6: Economic and Social Rights 
 
Mark Frequency Percent 
1 2 8.3 
3 4 16.7 
4 4 16.7 
5 3 12.5 
6 2 8.3 
7 3 12.5 
8 4 16.7 
9 2 8.3 
Total 24 100 
Mean 5.3  
 
Social, economic and cultural rights have their own international covenant. These 
rights include equality of men and women; rights related to work; trade associations; 
social security; family, mothers and children; physical and mental health; and 
education. The proponents of these rights argue that they are closely linked to the 
civil and political rights. 
Jordan offers free education for twelve years, from the elementary level to the 
secondary education after which the students are eligible to enter universities to 
specialise in the subjects for which their marks qualify them. According to the official 
Jordanian statistics (2007), there are 1.207 million students in basic education (first 
nine years of education, 6-15 years old). This is equivalent to one-fifth of the total 
population (5.7 million). In the same year, there have been 184,000 students in 
secondary education—a level for 16-18 year olds. 
Although education is free, a private education sector prospers. Some private schools 
are well reputed, and charge a great deal of money. The government makes an effort 
to distinguish some of its schools for both girls and boys, such as the Hussein 
College, Raghadan College, Zain al-Sharaf, Sukayna, and Samir al-Refa‛i 
Comprehensive School. Moreover, during times of economic downturns, some 
families cut expenditure by taking their children out of private schools and send them 
back to government-funded schools. 
In the long questionnaire, five of the six assessors answered the question. The marks 
give are 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The mean is 6, which is higher than the mean of the marks 
given by the twenty-four respondents. The difference in the means suggests that that 
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the six assessors have a more favourable view of the economic and social rights in the 
country. However, the difference is not significantly high to suggest a discrepancy 
worthy of further investigation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented and discussed some of the data collected through the 
questionnaires. It was focused on the first part of the democratic audit: the broad 
category of citizenship, law and rights. Four overarching questions were included in 
this category which covered nationhood and citizenship; rule of law and access to 
justice; civil and political rights; and economic and social rights. The averages of 
marks in these subcategories were between five and six out of ten. 
The next chapter will present and discuss the data concerned with the second part of 
the democratic audit: representative and accountable government. 
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Chapter 7 
Democratic Audit: Representative and Accountable Government 
 
 
In this chapter, I present, analyse, and discuss the data pertaining to the second 
category in the democratic audit: representative and accountable government. It has 
six subcategories: free and fair elections; democratic role of political parties; 
government effectiveness and accountability; democratic effectiveness of parliament, 
civilian control of the military and police; and integrity in public life. The latter 
refers to corruption. As in the previous chapter, the overarching question is stated, 
marks are given, and then the analysis and discussion follow. 
Subcategory 1: Free and Fair Elections 
The overarching question (Q5S, Q33L) asks: ‘Do elections give the people control 
over the governments and their policies?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the 
question, with 0 being the lowest mark, and 7 the highest. The mean is 3.1.  
Table 7.1: Elections and Control over Government 
 
Mark Frequency Percent 
0 3 12.5 
1 3 12.5 
2 6 25 
3 3 12.5 
5 6 25 
6 1 4.2 
7 2 8.3 
Total 24 100 
Mean 3.1  
 
The low marks by the respondents are not surprising. Since Jordan decided in 1989 
to hold parliamentary elections, no government was formed as a result of the 
elections, or in line with the results. The largest party or a coalition of parties would 
not be offered the chance to form a government. The king retained the prerogative of 
appointing and dismissing the government. This remained so even after ‛Abdullah II 
succeeded his father in 1999. 
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During the twenty years under assessment, six rounds of general elections were held: 
in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007, and 2010. I shall outline below the outcome of each 
round, and to what extent, if any, it led to any degree of control over the government. 
The elections of 1989 took place on 8 November. They were the first of their kind 
since 1967. There was a consensus amongst the people I interviewed in Jordan that 
the elections of 1989 were free and fair. This judgement, nonetheless, was not based 
on international standards of free and fair elections. However, the purpose here is not 
to challenge the characterisation of the elections, but to establish the extent to which 
they led to control by the people over the government.  
The MB gained twenty-two seats (out of eighty), constituting the biggest bloc in the 
HoD. The MB was not invited to form the government whether alone or in coalition 
with other parties. King Hussein named Mudar Badran as PM. When its formation 
was announced in December 1989, there were no MB ministers in it. 
After the win, the MB issued a list of fourteen demands to join the government and 
give a vote of confidence. According to Gharaybeh (1997B, pp. 121-122), the list 
included demands such as working towards implementing Islamic law; amending the 
laws which contradict article 2 in the constitution (Islam is the religion of the State 
and Arabic is its official language); repealing the martial law within six months; and 
preventing the security forces from interfering in various sectors, including 
employment and scholarships to study abroad. 
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and King Hussein’s attempt to 
find an Arab solution, Jordan strained its relations with Kuwait, the Gulf states, and 
Western countries. This situation required Jordan to present a united front. Hence, 
the MB was invited to join the government. There was a reshuffle on 1 January 1991 
which led to the inclusion of several ministers from the MB. Badran agreed to some 
of the demands referred to above, including the opening of a college for Islamic law 
at Yarmouk University, reinstating those who were sacked, and enacting some laws 
that partially met the demands of the MB (Gharaybeh 1997B, pp. 71-72). 
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Although this round of elections was considered free and fair, it did not lead to 
control by the people over the government. Three governments were formed between 
the elections of 1989 and 1993. None of them was under the control of the people 
through parties or MPs.  
The elections of 1993 took place in November, more than a year after it became legal 
to form political parties. The elections were held under a new law known as the 
single vote law. During the elections of 1989, a constituent was able to vote for a 
number of candidates equal to the number of seats allocated for his or her 
constituency. If a constituency was allocated four seats, a voter would be able to vote 
for four candidates. This formula allowed people to widen their choices by not only 
voting for the candidate of the tribe. However, under the new law, a voter could only 
cast one vote in a multi-seat constituency. Faced with a single choice, a voter was 
pressurised into giving priority to the tribe’s candidate. 
The consequence of this law was a reduction in the number of seats won by MB/IAF. 
However, despite the reduction, the number of seats was still considerable, given the 
fact that, as Robinson (1998) observed, the system was ‘clearly designed to work 
against their interests’ (p. 399). It is noteworthy that this round of elections took 
place while Jordan was still trying to repair its relations with the USA and the Gulf 
states. In 1993, the PLO reached an agreement with Israel which paved the way for 
Jordan to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. The speed with which Jordan 
moved to sign the peace treaty and normalise relations with Israel was too fast even 
for those who were involved in the peace process such as Taher al-Masri. He and 
others opposed the Israeli participation in a trade fair held in Amman in 1996. Al-
Masri suggested that in moving too fast, King Hussein was trying to compensate for 
the deterioration in the relationship with the USA over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.1 
The MB/IAF and other smaller parties decided to boycott the elections of 1997 as a 
protest against the single vote law of 1993. The government considered the reason 
for the boycott unconvincing because in 1993 these parties took part in the elections, 
which were organised and carried out under the same law. Despite the dissatisfaction 
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with the elections law in 1993, the MB/IAF participated in them. The leader of MB, 
‛Abdul-Rahman Khalifa, accepted the appeal of King Hussein for national unity. 
The MB/IAF’s statement announcing the boycott was long, and it ended with seven 
demands: constitutional reforms; cancellation of the single vote law; cancellation of 
the provisional press law; stopping measures aiming at liquidating political parties 
and civil society organisations; economic reforms and fighting corruption; lifting 
restrictions on freedoms; and stopping the normalisation of relations with Israel. 
A round of elections was due in 2001. However, it was postponed for two years, and 
held on 17 June 2003. The number of deputies was increased from 80 to 110, six of 
which were reserved for women. The IAF participated in these elections and won 
seventeen seats. 
The elections of 2007 were held on 23 November 2007—during the premiership of 
Ma‛ruf al-Bakhit, a former army general and a former ambassador to Israel. The 
IAF/MB nearly boycotted the elections. However, some assurances from al-Bakhit 
that the elections would be fair and free made them reconsider their position. The 
decision to participate did not meet the approval of all the leaders of IAF/MB. The 
Secretary General of IAF, Zaki Bani Irshaid, chose not to join the campaign. This 
was used against him in subsequent internal disputes which led to the resignation of 
Bani Irshaid and the entire executive council in May 2009. 
An interesting phenomenon that followed the elections was the analyses of the 
results. The columnist, ‛Urayb al-Rintawi, (2007) saw the results as a sign that the 
Islamists have exhausted their appeal in Jordan and other Arab countries, such as 
Morocco. His analysis was unsound because it ignored the claims of rigging. 
Analysts should not base their analyses on dubious results. The fortunes of political 
parties change all the time. Parties in power where free and fair elections take place 
come and go all the time. This applies to IAF as well. However, it is not possible to 
judge whether IAF is popular, and how popular, until fair and free elections are held. 
The elections of 2010 were held under a new voting system, which was supposed to 
have alleviated the concerns of MB/IAF and others. However, the final version of the 
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elections law retained the single vote in a multi-seat constituency. The MB/IAF and 
other parties boycotted these elections which were held during the premiership of 
Samir al-Refa‛i. 
In the long questionnaire, all six assessors answered the question. The marks given 
are 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, and 3. The mean is 2. The assessment in the long questionnaire 
confirms its counterpart in the short one. Although the mean is lower, there is no 
discrepancy that warrants an investigation into the difference. 
Subcategory 2: Democratic Role of Political Parties 
The overarching question (Q6S, Q39L) asks: ‘Does the political party system assist 
the working of democracy?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The 
lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 10. The mean is 5, which is the same as the 
most frequent answer. 
Table 7.2: Party System 
  
Mark Frequency Percent 
1 1 4.2 
2 4 16.7 
3 2 8.3 
4 2 8.3 
5 6 25 
6 4 16.7 
7 2 8.3 
9 2 8.3 
10 1 4.2 
Total 24 100 
Mean 5  
 
The elections of 1989 were held without the official presence of political parties. 
Nonetheless, candidates belonging to various parties, such as al-Ba‛th, ran in the 
elections. However, only one candidate won a seat. Fahd al-Rimawi, editor of al-
Majd and a candidate at the time, attributed this to the fragmentation of votes. This 
might have been the case in a few seats, but overall, the failure was due more to the 
fact that the tides of these parties had receded long before the elections.  
After the law of political parties came into force in 1992, there was a rush to form 
parties. Twenty parties applied for a licence. The government opposed the formation 
of some parties, refusing to license any party which it did not consider Jordanian. 
174 
Parties belonging to, or affiliated with, Pan-Arab parties or Palestinian organisations 
had to change bylaws to meet the requirement of Jordanianness. This applied to the 
parties connected with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Ba‛th of Syria and 
Iraq. By the end of 1996, Jordan had twenty-three parties (Hourani 1997, p. 19).  
Because of the high number of parties, and weak membership, King ‛Abdullah II 
suggested the idea of having three to four major parties as a way of invigorating the 
political scene. However, al-Nsour (2005, pp. 120-121) considered the idea 
undemocratic without mentioning the king. He explained that although the US has 
two major parties, and the UK has three, there are many small parties in both 
courtiers. ‘To limit the number of parties’, he argues, ‘is an incorrect idea’. He calls 
for licensing all parties. The government, on the other hand, created a ministry for 
political development. Its tasks include developing strategies and programmes to 
‘increase participation at all levels and in all fields’ such as local communities, 
parties, and trade unions. 
In the long questionnaire, only two of the six assessors answered the question. The 
marks given are 0 and 2. The mean is 1. In view of the fact that four of the six 
assessors did not give a mark, and two gave low marks, it is highly likely that the 
decision to refrain from giving a mark reflects a high degree of scepticism in relation 
to the role of parties in assisting democracy in Jordan. The higher marks in the short 
questionnaire are likely to be due to the fact that some of the respondents are activists 
who belong to parties, and therefore took a more favourable view of their role (the 
parties), taking into consideration that they operate within restrictions imposed by the 
government.  
Subcategory 3: Effective and Responsive Government  
The overarching question (Q7S, Q46L) asks: ‘Is government effective in serving the 
public and responsive to its concerns?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the 
question. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 9. The mean is 5.3. 
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Table 7.3: Effective and Responsive Government 
  
Mark Frequency Percent 
1 1 4.2 
2 2 8.3 
3 1 4.2 
4 3 12.5 
5 5 20.8 
6 5 20.8 
7 5 20.8 
8 1 4.2 
9 1 4.2 
Total 24 100 
Mean 5.3  
 
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. However, the king is not a figurehead, as is the 
case in some European countries, such as Britain, Holland, and Norway. According 
to article 28 of the constitution, the monarchy is ‘hereditary’ and reserved for the 
‘dynasty of King ‛Abdullah ibn Hussein, in a direct line through his male heirs’. 
Various articles in the constitution give the king the power to dissolve the HoD and 
HoN; he appoints and dismisses the prime minister; he is the supreme commander of 
land, naval, and air forces. The king is the executive branch, but according to the 
constitution, his power is exercised through ministers. However, he also has 
legislative power. According to article 25, the power to legislate is shared by the 
national assembly and the king, who is ‘immune from any liability and 
responsibility’, according to article 30 
The prime minister in Jordan is selected by the king, and is instructed to form a 
government guided by a letter from the king. He also dismisses the government 
whenever he chooses. Only once in the history of Jordan had the chosen prime 
minister been a member of the party which gained the largest number of seats in the 
HoD. This was in October 1956. Sulayman al-Nabulsi’s government won the 
confidence of parliament. However, it was a short-lived government, serving less 
than six months. King Hussein dismissed him. 
Considering that the elections do not give people control over government and its 
policies, it will come as a surprise if the government was found to be effective and 
responsive to the concerns of the people. However, one has to outline why the 
respondents feel that the government is not responsive. 
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One of the characteristics of dealing with problems is to be in a state of denial, or to 
downplay the problem. Polluted water in the Mafraq, Irbid, and Jarash areas caused 
hundreds of cases diarrhoea and high temperature. Two ministers had to submit their 
resignations in the aftermath of the outbreak in the Mafraq area. An old network of 
pipes was blamed for the outbreak. Jordan is also known for limited water resources, 
which leads to restricting water supplies to homes on specific days of the week. 
In 2007, there was an outbreak of food poisoning due to eating chicken shawarma, a 
popular meal sold at hundreds of restaurants throughout the country.2 The initial 
response was to downplay the extent of the problem. The government initially 
suggested that poisoning was limited to an area near Amman, and was due to selling 
shawarma before the meat was cooked to a sufficiently high temperature. However, 
after the number of cases exceeded 200, the government ordered a ban on selling 
chicken shawarma throughout the country. 
Fahd al-Rimawi (2007) did not limit his criticism to the performance of the 
government in handling these and other problems. He widened the criticism to 
include the way governments were formed and how they were copies of each other, 
irrespective of who was selected as a prime minister. Legal proceedings were 
initiated in 2007 after this editorial. The charge was ‘insulting an official body’. 
In the long questionnaire, four of the six assessors answered the question. The marks 
give are 1, 3, 3, and 5. The mean is 3. Refraining from giving a mark is likely to be 
indicative of scepticism about the responsiveness of the government. This was 
reinforced by the marks given by the four assessors who had answered the question. 
Subcategory 4: Democratic Effectiveness of Parliament 
The overarching question (Q8S, Q55L) asks: ‘Does the parliament or legislator 
contribute effectively to the democratic process?’ All twenty-four respondents 
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 The vast majority of restaurants are small shops either with a few seats or sell food ‘to go’. 
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answered the question. The lowest mark given is 0; the highest is 9. The mean is 4.7, 
which is close to the most frequent answer, 5. 
Table 7.4: Effectiveness of Parliament 
Mark Frequency Percent 
0 1 4.2 
1 1 4.2 
2 3 12.5 
3 2 8.3 
4 2 8.3 
5 7 29.2 
6 4 16.7 
7 2 8.3 
9 2 8.3 
Total 24 100 
Mean 4.7  
 
Parliament in theory is the supreme body in democratic countries. It is one of the 
three branches of government and is part of the system of check and balances. 
However, experiences vary from one country to another. In the UK, the PM and 
ministers are also MPs. In the US, the members of the House of Representatives are 
separate from the executive branch. Parliament can become docile and defer to the 
wishes of the president or PM. However, it can also assert its powers. In the USA, 
there have been two attempts at impeaching the president. In the UK, Parliament 
defied Tony Blair’s governments in 2005 and rejected its Anti-Terror Bill which 
sought to increase the limit on detention of terror suspects without charge from 
fourteen days to ninety. 
The official history of Jordan’s parliament shows that the HoD was dissolved several 
times, because it did not work well with the government. Contrary to the normal 
practice in democracies, the parliament is dismissed instead of the government. In 
other words, the legislative branch of government in Jordan is the weakest. 
The marks above reflect dissatisfaction with the performance of the parliament. The 
HoD of 1989 and 1993 can be credited with some achievements, such as the lifting 
of martial law, and adopting a political parties law. One important episode is 
particularly noteworthy. During the speakership of ‛Arabiyyat, the will of HoD 
prevailed when its views on a law were different from those of King Hussein. 
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‛Arabiyyat adhered to the first article in the constitution which states that Jordan’s 
‘system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy’. In ‛Arabiyyat’s 
view, this makes parliament’s power superior to the will of the king when both sides 
do not agree on a matter.3  
As ‛Arabiyyat pointed out, there was a difference of opinion concerning the law to 
make all the decisions of the state security court appealable. King Hussein sent the 
law back to the HoD, but under ‛Arabiyyat’s leadership, the HoD adhered to its 
position. Subsequently, King Hussein relented and signed the law. As it reads now, 
article 9-C gives an automatic right of appeal for those sentenced to death and those 
with prison terms longer than ten years. The appeal must be referred to the Court of 
Appeal within thirty days, even if a defendant does not wish to appeal. The 
beneficiaries of this law were several people, amongst whom were some students at 
Mu’ta University (a military college), who were accused in 1993 of planning to kill 
King Hussein when he delivered a graduation speech. 
A member of the Liberation Party, Yusef al-Sabatin, was amongst those who were 
accused of taking part in the plot. Al-Sabatin (n.d.) said, in his memoirs, he heard on 
radio a speech by King Hussein in which he mentioned the plot (p. 88). Later in the 
week, he read his name in a newspaper and realised that the plot had been fabricated 
because he had no involvement in it. In 1994, the state security court sentenced the 
students to death, but the sentences were commuted to life. The sentences of another 
three defendants, including al-Sabatin, remained the same (p. 90). In the meantime, 
the right of appeal had come into effect. When the appeal was considered, the entire 
case was dismissed. There was a period of seven years between the alleged plot and 
the decision to acquit the accused. 
The most important weakness of the parliament is that it has no control over its own 
fate. The king can, and did, dissolve it without warning or reason, as happened in 
November 2009. MPs tend to become intermediaries between the constituents and 
government officials and departments. The government takes advantage of the 
absence of parliament to enact provisional laws. When the elections of 2001 were 
postponed, the government of ‛Ali Abu al-Ragheb enacted 220 provisional laws. 
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 Personal interview. Amman, 7 June 2009. 
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According to al-Hammouri (2005) the provisional laws are constitutionally allowed 
only when there are certain situations such as an earthquake or epidemic (pp. 75-85).  
The HoD of 2007 was heavily criticised from all sides. Two writers who do not 
usually agree when writing about the same issue, Khalid Mahadin and Nahed Hattar, 
criticised the HoD. Hattar’s criticism was in terms that cost him his job as a cultural 
adviser at al-Ahli Bank. Mahadin published an article pleading with King ‛Abdullah 
II to dissolve the HoD, which did not endear itself to the public. Its Speaker, ‛Abd al-
Hadi al-Majali, initiated legal proceedings against Khalid Mahadin, but Mahadin 
won the case. A brother of an MP abused the official status given to his car and used 
it to smuggle drugs across the Syrian-Jordanian border. 
Although the HoD of 2007 was the outcome of a heavily-rigged process, it is 
interesting to observe that the criticism was directed at the HoD and not at the system 
which allowed the rigging to take place. A more credible position would have been 
to dissolve parliament as one of many steps, including political reform, and to put on 
trial the officials who rigged the elections—charged with political fraud. 
Moreover, I would argue that Jordan would have been better served by a lame 
parliament than by no parliament. Those who welcomed the decisions to dissolve the 
HoD were short-sighted and not democrats. This proved to be the case when a new 
parliament was in place after the elections of 2010. When the government of Samir 
al-Refa‛i asked for confidence of the HoD, it received 111 votes out of 120. 
Consequently, the HoD was the subject of ridicule for being submissive. 
In the long questionnaire, the six assessors gave marks, but were less generous than 
their counterparts in the short one. The marks given are 1, 2, 2, 3, 5, and 8. The mean 
is 3.5. The mark of 8 is not consistent with the rest of the marks, and considering the 
evidence in relation to the effectiveness of the parliament, this single mark does not 
seem justified. Nonetheless, a more realistic appraisal has emerged as a result of the 
marks by the other assessors, and the collective assessment is similar to that of the 
short questionnaire. 
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Subcategory 5: Civilian Control of the Military and the Police  
The overarching question (Q9S, Q60L) asks: ‘Are the military and police forces 
under civilian control?’ I anticipated that this was a question the respondents would 
not be comfortable with as the military, police, and the security services are another 
‘red line’. Because of the confusion surrounding this question, a table will not be 
helpful to understand the results. The marks and frequencies were 0 (10); 1 (3); 2 (1); 
3 (2); 6 (3); 8 (1); 9 (1); and 10 (10).4 The mark of 0 (zero) is meant to be a positive 
reply to the question. Therefore, it will be dishonest to suggest that the zero marks 
reflect a negative view of the issue of the question. 
In one way, the question was easy to answer in relation to Jordan. The king is the 
supreme commander of the army. The defence minister in Jordan is a civilian, often 
the prime minister. Therefore, there is no issue in terms of the control of the army. It 
would be naïve of those who devised the democratic audit to have assumed that 
civilian control of the army and military produces a satisfactory situation. Therefore, 
one has to look further than who is in control.  
According to Glubb (1948), the creation of the Jordanian army (the Arab legion) 
dates back to 1920, when it was formed by the British officer, Fredrik Peake. It 
started with 100 servicemen, and was increased to 1,000 in 1921. Glubb himself 
became the commander of the Jordanian army for two decades (1936-1956). Glubb 
was dismissed by King Hussein in 1956 in a move that was popular in Jordan, and 
referred to as the Arabisation of the army.  
The Jordanian army has its accolades. In 1948, it was able to keep East Jerusalem in 
Arab hands. In March 1968, it dealt the Israeli forces a severe blow in the battle of 
al-Karameh, which occurred soon after the defeat of 1967.5 Some of the Israeli tanks 
were left on the battlefield and were put in the public square near the municipality of 
Amman. 
The police force in Jordan was part of the army and remained so until 1956 when it 
was assigned its own commander, Bahjat Tayyara. In 1958, it became an 
                                                 
4
 Mark (frequency). 
5
 Palestinian resistance fighters, who were the intended target of the Israeli army, took part in this 
battle which made Fatah the most popular organisation. 
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independent force which comes under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. A law 
was enacted in 1965 to regulate the police force and delineate its tasks and 
responsibilities. 
In 2008, a new police force was created. To distinguish it from the regular police, it 
was given the name ‘darak’. Members of this force were deployed in cases of 
protests against the Israeli embassy in Amman during the war on the Gaza Strip in 
December 2008. They were also deployed to deal with a strike by workers at the Port 
of Aqaba. The darak forces are often deployed to keep the peace between feuding 
tribes, particularly after the murder of one member by another tribe’s member. The 
common factor in these situations is the use of excessive force.  
The overarching question in this subcategory does not mention other security corps, 
namely the intelligence services. I propose to include them in this subcategory. My 
focus will be on the GID. 
The GID was created in 1964. It has its own ranks, and its head is a general. For 
many years, the head of GID was a Palestinian, Muhammad Rasul al-Kilani. During 
this time, the headquarters of GID was euphemistically referred to as the hotel of 
Abu Rasul. The role of GID is not limited to intelligence gathering or counter-
intelligence. The role and influence affect the lives of Jordanians in many ways, 
including the ability to gain employment in the public sector. The practice of 
confiscating passports was widespread. It is used as a means to control a citizen’s 
ability to travel. 
The GID has the power to arrest individuals and hold them in its own prisons. When 
a person is arrested by the GID, he or she can be held up to six months without being 
charged. During this time, the arrested person cannot have access to a lawyer. Family 
members may be allowed to visit him or her. In 2008, HRW released a report which 
said the torture was still ‘widespread and routine in Jordan’s prisons’ (p. 1). The 
report identified the means of torturer (p. 2): 
Most common forms of torture include beatings with cables and sticks and 
the suspension by the wrists of inmates from metal grates for hours at a time. 
Guards flog the defenseless prisoner with knotted electrical cables, beat him 
with hoses and truncheons, or kick him with fists and boots.  
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In 2006, Amnesty International (AI) described Jordan as ‘key hub in secret CIA 
programme’ to torture terror suspects outside the USA. 
There is no committee to oversee the intelligence services. Although even in Western 
countries, intelligence services are given extensive powers, and intelligence matters 
are not discussed in public, the presence of an overseeing committee is necessary 
even if it is not a very effective safeguard. A committee may be able to ensure that 
intelligence departments do not operate without control, as secrecy is an open 
invitation to corruption and abuse of power. 
In the long questionnaire, five of the six assessors gave marks with a majority being 
low. The marks given are 0, 0, 2, 5, and 9. The mean is 3.2. I reiterate my earlier 
suggestion that the data related to this question should be considered unreliable. 
To conclude the discussion of this question, I should restate the fact that the king is 
the supreme commander of the army. The defence minister, usually a civilian, is 
nominally in charge of the army. This question should be revised by IDEA to include 
the security services, as a strict answer to the question will not include the 
intelligence services. 
Subcategory 6: Integrity in Public Life  
The overarching question (Q10S, Q66L) asks: ‘Is the integrity of conduct in public 
life assured?’ Twenty-three respondents answered the questions. The lowest mark 
given is 1; the highest is 8. Notable here is the absence of any 10. The mean is 3.8. 
Table 7.5: Integrity in Public Life (corruption) 
Mark Frequency Percent 
1 2 8.3 
2 5 20.8 
3 5 20.8 
4 3 12.5 
5 4 16.7 
6 2 8.3 
8 2 8.3 
Total 23 95.8 
Missing 1 4.2 
Mean 3.8  
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Allegations of corruption are rife in Jordan, and get mentioned frequently in the press 
and by politicians of the opposition. There is now a department in Jordan whose 
responsibility is to fight corruption. In 2005, King ‛Abdullah II instructed the Prime 
Minister, ‛Adnan Badran, to establish an independent department to fight corruption. 
A law was enacted for this purpose. The new department was ready to begin its work 
in August 2008. The acts that come within the definition of corruption include 
embezzlement, bribes, and exploiting position for material and other benefits. 
Although allegations of corruption are widespread, they sometimes prove unfounded 
when the cases are brought to trial. For instance, five high ranking officials in 
government departments and a bank were brought to trial in 2002. The allegations 
were related to a deal to buy rubbish collection equipment. The trial was concluded 
only in 2008 and they were found not guilty. 
Transparency International (TI) ranked Jordan at 49 out of 180 states. The mark 
given to Jordan was 5 out of 10. In comparison with other states in the Arab world, 
Jordan was fifth. As the Head of the of Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), ‛Abd 
al-Shakhanbeh, explains: ‘the rank in relation to other Arab states is good, 
considering the fact that the other states ahead of Jordan are rich’.6 The implication 
that rich states do better at fighting corruption, or there are fewer incentives for 
people in rich states to engage in corruption, is not necessarily correct. 
While the government tries to demonstrate a level of seriousness concerning the fight 
against corruption, there is often a reminder to people of the need to protect 
reputations from unfounded allegations. However, this kind or reminder is 
interpreted as lack of resolve.  
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 Personal interview. Amman, 25 March 2010. 
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In the long questionnaire, all of the six assessors answered the question. The marks 
given are 1, 1, 3, 5, 5, and 8. The mean of is 3.8, which is similar to that of the short 
questionnaire. 
How widespread is corruption? What levels in the state does it reach? Laith Shbailat 
goes further than anyone else in Jordan. He suggests that corruption has reached the 
royal court. A Lebanese TV channel, al-Jadid, aired a long interview with Shbailat in 
February 2011. There were references in the programme to the lavish lifestyle of 
Queen Rania as indicative of corruption. One of the examples cited as an indication 
of corruption reaching the royal court was the decision by the government of ‛Ali 
Abu al-Ragheb in 2001 to register hundreds of dunams of state land in the name of 
King ‛Abdullah II. In a television interview in April 2011, Abu al-Ragheb said he did 
so after receiving a letter from the royal court. He further said he acted lawfully. 
In December 2011, the Jordanian a news agency, Petra, reported that two officials 
from the royal court, its head Riyad Abu Karaki and media adviser Amjad al-
‛Adayleh, met the editors of the daily newspapers and others to reveal the facts of the 
land registration. The royal court acknowledged that during 2000-2003 some land 
(4827 dunams) was registered in King ‛Abdullah’s name. Most of it is outside 
Amman and earmarked for development. Ownership of some of the land was 
transferred from the king to the armed forces and to the municipality of Amman. The 
two officials said this process would continue, as the purpose was to expedite 
decisions of developing the pieces of land in question.  
Jordan’s fight against corruption needs to widen its scope to include practices which 
do not come within the official definition of corruption. For example, in 2008, the 
government decided to exempt MPs from customs duty on new cars. Other practices 
include allocating cars to ministers and other people in senior posts to be used for 
private purposes such as taking children to school. These practices encourage a 




This chapter presented and discussed data of the second broad category in the 
democratic audit: representative and accountable government. The six subcategories 
within in it were; free and fair elections; democratic role of political parties; 
government effectiveness and accountability; democratic effectiveness of parliament; 
civilian control of the military and police; and integrity in public life. The averages 
of the marks of these subcategories ranged from one to slightly over five out of ten. 
The next chapter will complete the macro-analysis and will cover the two remaining 
broad categories of the democratic audit: civil society and popular participation; and 
democracy beyond the state. 
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Chapter 8 
Democratic Audit: Civil Society and Democracy Beyond the State 
 
 
In this chapter, I continue the presentation and discussion of the data of the 
democratic audit. Two categories of the audit are included: civil society and popular 
participation; and democracy beyond the state. As in the previous chapter, the 
overarching question is stated; the marks are given; and the results are discussed. 
PART 1: CIVIL SOCIETY AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION 
This is the third major category in the audit. It asks questions in three areas: the 
media in a democratic society; political participation; and decentralization.  
Subcategory 1: The Media 
 
The overarching question (Q11S, Q72L) asks: ‘Do the media operate in a way that 
sustains democratic values?’ The highest mark given is 10; the lowest is 0. The mean 
is 5.1, which is close to the most frequent mark. 
Table 8.1: The Media and Democracy 
 
Mark Frequency Percent 
0 1 4.2 
1 2 8.3 
2 1 4.2 
3 3 12.5 
4 2 8.3 
5 6 25 
6 1 4.2 
7 3 12.5 
8 2 8.3 
9 2 8.3 
10 1 4.2 
Total 24 100 
Mean 5.1 
The marks reflect a relatively high level of dissatisfaction with the media. It is 
necessary to take a closer look at the media scene in Jordan to in order to identify the 
possible reasons. 
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Newspapers and magazines are the oldest type of media in Jordan. Jordanian radio 
broadcasting dates back to 1948. Its news bulletins used to be dominated by the news 
according to hierarchy of positions, starting with the king, prime minister and then 
the ministers. The news would be about who visited what; who opened which project 
and other news items that professional editors would not usually consider 
newsworthy. News programmes improved in recent years, by changing formats and 
broadcasting reports by correspondents, but the official line remains dominant. 
Jordan had its first TV channel in 1966. Its main news bulletin is at 8pm. It used to 
be dominated by official news. Changes, however, have been introduced, such as 
news headlines or short bulletins on the hour. The main bulletin is still in the same 
time slot. Although TV started to have political discussion programmes, the 
participants in many cases are former officials. A discussion of an external issue, 
such as the Palestine question, will pay its dues to the wisdom of the king. 
Both broadcasting services, radio and TV, are state-owned. An attempt to make 
Jordan attractive to media organisations had a limited success. A media village did 
not prosper as did its counterpart in Dubai which became a magnet for various Arab 
media outlets. However, the media scene has changed to some extent. In 2002, the 
government created the Audio-Visual Commission (AVC) and empowered it with 
licensing private radio and TV stations, subject to the approval of the government. 
There are now private local FM stations, specialising in music and phone-in contests. 
The army and police also have their own FM radios. Obtaining a licence to establish 
an entertainment station is much easier than one that wishes to broadcast news, as 
can be seen in the conditions stipulated by the AVC. 
Jordan has a national news agency which is referred to as Petra, instead of Arabic or 
Latin acronyms. The agency supplies local papers with official news, which the daily 
papers publish as it is. For many years, there were two dailies in Jordan; Al-Rai and 
Ad-Dustour. This was the result of a move by the government to merge several 
dailies which used to be published in the West and East Bank.  
After the elections of 1989, many weekly newspapers appeared on the scene. 
However, after the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, the government of ‛Abd al-Salam 
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al-Majali changed the press law to increase the capital required to continue to 
publish. Many of the weeklies failed to meet the requirement and shut down. One of 
the weeklies which managed to survive was al-Majd, but was subjected to censorship 
or legal action on several occasions. The Islamic weekly, Assabeel, received 
permission in 2008 to publish daily and it did so in February 2009. 
The advent of the Internet offered opportunities to provide news without having to 
own presses or employ many people. There are now several websites which provide 
news. The new media outperform the traditional media in being faster with their 
news, and posting pictures that the dailies do not, because they still avoid the risk of 
antagonising the government. The effect of the new media on newspapers is a change 
in attitude which has led the papers to rely on their websites, after resisting the 
Internet and arguing that it affects sales. The daily papers now update their websites 
but not in the same degree as the exclusively online news sites. In 2010, the 
government of Samir al- Refa‛i wanted to control what the online news sites could 
publish. The owners opposed al-Refa‛i’s attempt and succeeded in forcing him to 
abandon it. Credit was given to the personal intervention of the king. 
Having followed Jordanian news websites during the course of the research, I noted 
that they still lavishly praise the king and the Hashimites. They republish items from 
Jordanian, Arab, and international papers. It is often clear where the item was 
originally published. Occasionally, the original source is not acknowledged. 
Those who are in new media are not in it solely to contribute to democracy. The 
Internet and the development of digital technology made it possible to enter the 
media field with minimal capital in order to make money from advertisement and 
sponsorship. During the campaign for elections of 2010, news sites were full of 
pictures of candidates. Moreover, the multitude of media outlets does not necessarily 
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mean a variety of opinions. Without freedoms enshrined in the constitution and 
practised without fear, the media will seek to have a niche that guarantees a certain 
income, and will become more restrained in their coverage. 
Although the media contribute to democracy, they can also play a counter-productive 
role. In the case of Rwanda, for example, the media went as far as inciting genocide. 
In Jordan, some new media outlets contribute to the alienation of citizens of 
Palestinian origin, by publishing provocative articles and comments by the readers. 
Moreover, for the media to contribute to democracy, there are various issues that 
have to be taken into consideration, including ownership and independence. This is 
not an irrelevant debate in the case of Jordan. For instance, the site ammonnews.net 
is co-owned by Samir Hiari, who is also the chairman of the board and editor-in-
chief of the largest daily al-Rai. The same man is in charge of two different editorial 
policies at the same time. I suggest that his position in al-Rai will prevent him from 
departing too much from the official line in ammonnews.net. 
In the long questionnaire, three of the six assessors answered the question. The marks 
are 2, 3, and 6. The mean is 3.7, which is lower than the mean in the short 
questionnaire. The refrain from giving marks is likely to be a reflection of 
dissatisfaction. The mark of 6 given by one of the assessors is probably a reflection 
of the fact that the media scene has changed in Jordan considerably. However, 
overall there is a long way to go before one can say the media ‘sustain democratic 
values’ in Jordan. This applies equally to new media. 
Subcategory 2: Participation in Public Life 
The overarching question (Q12S, Q77L) asks: ‘Is there full citizen participation in 
public life?’ I anticipated that this question would be vague without clues concerning 
what was meant by full participation. The long questionnaire has the clues, so I 
added an explanation under the question in the short questionnaire. The ‘full 
participation’ was referring to the diversity of civil society groups; the participation 
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of women and their ability to hold office; and ability of people from all social groups 
to hold public office. 
Table 8.2: Participation 
 
Mark Frequency Percent 
2 4 16.7 
3 3 12.5 
4 2 8.3 
5 6 25 
6 3 12.5 
7 3 12.5 
9 1 4.2 
10 2 8.3 
Total 24 100 
Mean 5.1  
 
Democratic theorists emphasise various aspects of democracy to make it work in a 
satisfactory manner. For instance, Shapiro (2003) and Benhabib (1996) emphasise 
the need for deliberation; thus, there is a ‘deliberative democracy’ approach. Another 
emphasis is on ‘participation’. Macpherson (1977, p. 94) argues that ‘low 
participation and social equality are so bound with each other that a more equitable 
and humane society requires a more participatory political system’. 
Hourani (2010, pp. 5-8) points out that there has been a considerable improvement in 
the ability of CSOs to operate in Jordan. After 1989, many new societies have been 
formed, such as human rights organisations and research centres. He further notes 
that when Jordan implemented a privatisation programme in the 1990s, which 
entailed removing subsidies, CSOs stepped in to help alleviate poverty. The CSOs 
also contributed to women empowerment, community development, and youth 
training. The data cited by Hourani show that there are 3,200 CSOs, with more than a 
million members. 
Although Hourani’s figures suggest the existence of diversity and a high level of 
involvement, the law regulating CSOs prevents charitable organisations from 
engaging in political activities. As Jamal (2007) points out, CSOs in Jordan are 
‘divided according to political access, clientalism, the availability of funding and 
relationship with the regime’ (p. 115). Her observation is correct. One notable aspect 
of political access is the attendance of activities by ministers or members of the royal 
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family. The availability of funding is best seen in CSOs which belong to European 
and American organisations, or have collaborative agreements with them. The 
connection also provides a level of protection for these CSOs when they do not agree 
on some issue with the government 
Moreover, for a CSO to prosper there is usually an attempt to seek some royal 
patronage. For instance, a women’s society would seek support from Princess 
Basma. To illustrate this point, two organisations can be mentioned. The first is the 
Jordanian Women Union, and the Arab Women Media Centre. Both have Princess 
Basma as their honorary president.  
Jamal (2007) correctly notes that despite the increase in CSOs, due to ‘a system of 
rewards and sanctions founded on support for the government,’ the CSOs end up 
being ‘supportive of the palace, or […] marginalised in their civic spheres’ (p. 119). 
Therefore, the appearance of diversity is not a reliable indicator of a lively political 
participation. Other issues, such as the laws regulating the sector of CSOs, should be 
examined. 
With regard to the participation of women and their ability to hold office, the points 
to recall are that women rose to high ranks through the nonelected path. In 
competitive elections, women failed to win outright, except in a few cases. The first 
was in 1993, where competition was limited to members of the Circassian 
community in Jordan. Toujan Faysal won. The second was Falak Jam‛ani. She was a 
doctor with the rank of general (liwa’) in the army’s medical corp. She won in the 
governorate of Madaba in 2007. The third woman was Reem Badran who ran in one 
of Amman’s constituencies in 2010. The failure to win in outright competition led to 
reserving six seats to women in 2003. The number was increased to twelve in 2010. 
Through this route, women entered the HoD according to a formula based on a 
percentage of the votes in the governorates not on the absolute number of votes won. 
In relation to the ability of social sectors to hold office, I will focus on the positions 
of prime minister and minister. Given the fact that governments are appointed, rather 
than elected, the trend in forming the government is to try and satisfy different 
regions of the country, the tribes, and the palace. If a minister is selected from the 
northern part of the country, another from the southern region is chosen. In 2007, 
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‛Adnan Badran tried to form a government without these considerations. His 
government lasted several months only. Members of some families often hold 
ministerial posts; for example, the Touqans, Majalis, and Refa‛is. 
Political participation in the senses outlined above is limited. I will now examine 
participation in a more procedural sense, namely, regarding the number of registered 
voters and the voter turnout. 
The elections of 1989 were held without an officially-recognised presence of parties. 
The number of registered voters was 1,020,444. The number of those who cast their 
votes was 541,426 (53.06%).1 In 1993, the elections took place after the enactment of 
the political parties law, but under a new elections law which prevented multiple 
votes in a multi-seat constituency. The number of registered voters was 1,501,279. 
The number of those who cast their votes was 822,294 (54.77%). 
In 1997, IAF/MB and other parties boycotted the elections. The number of registered 
voters was 1,489,000. The number of those who cast their votes was 702,260 
(47.45%). In 2003, all parties took part. The number of registered voters was 
2,325,496. The number of those who cast their votes was 1,342,999 (57.75%). The 
elections of 2007 were preceded by disputes between the government of Ma‛ruf al-
Bakhit and the MB/IAF. A boycott by IAF/MB was a strong possibility. However, 
IAF/MB did not boycott, and won six seats. The number of registered voters was 
2,455,686. The number of those who cast their votes was 1,326,070 (54%). 
The elections of 2007 was characterised by the use of money. The term ‘political 
money’ surfaced in Jordan after it was used in Lebanon in reference to al-Hariri 
phenomena, which bought Rafiq al-Hariri and his son, Sa‛d, political leadership 
through the use of money, whether in the form of hand-outs to the poor, employment 
in Hariri-owned foundations, or in projects implemented by Hariri’s company, 
Solidaire. 
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 The data are taken from IDEA.  
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In 2010, the government of Samir al-Refa‛i toughened the severity of the penalty for 
the use of money for political purposes, but there were ways to use money indirectly. 
There were many claims of illegal use of money in this round of elections, but the 
government said it dealt with all the cases that were reported. 
The elections of 2010 were boycotted by MB/IAF. The impact of the boycott was 
most visible in the low voter turnout in Amman, which was under 40%. However, 
the government aggregated the percentages across the country. This produced an 
average of 53%, which the government considered satisfactory. This percentage is 
based on 2,370,000 votes cast. 
The manipulation of the electoral process leads electors to lose interest. Candidates 
try to stimulate participation through appeal to tribal connections. Others use money 
to acquire votes by giving a certain sum for a vote, or by facilitating transport to and 
from polling stations. Legally, the use of money is not allowed. However, candidates 
offer incentives in a variety of ways. For example, they offer food, or pay the 
expenses of travelling to Saudi Arabia to perform religious rituals. These practices 
are of limited success because, in the absence of change in the political atmosphere 
and the decision-making processes, people refrain from registering and voting. 
In the long questionnaire, all six assessors answered the question. The marks given 
are 0, 2, 3, 3, 5, and 7. The mean is 3.3. Given that the assessors had the benefit of 
looking at more questions in this subcategory, and not only at the overarching 
question, I would suggest that their assessment reinforces the scepticism about 
political participation. The high mark of 7 by an assessor is most likely due to the 
active involvement in the field of CSOs. However, the positive view is not shared by 
the rest of the assessors. 
Subcategory 3: Decentralization 
The overarching question (Q13S, Q81L) asks: ‘Are the decisions taken at 
governmental level the most appropriate for the people affected?’ All twenty-four 
respondents answered the question. The highest mark is 10; the lowest is 2. The 
mean is 5.1, which is close to the most frequent mark. 
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Table 8.3: Level of Decisions 
 
Mark Frequency Percent 
0 1 4.2 
1 1 4.2 
2 2 8.3 
3 2 8.3 
4 2 8.3 
5 9 37.5 
6 1 4.2 
7 1 4.2 
8 4 16.7 
10 1 4.2 
Total 24 100 
Mean 5.1  
 
The question takes it for granted the decentralisation is good, irrespective of the size 
of a given country. The underlying assumption is flawed. For instance, decisions to 
provide services will depend on budgets. When funds are tight, councils reduce or 
cease to provide services. One example to illustrate the point in the UK is the 
collection of rubbish, which used to happen every week. However, councils changed 
that to once every two weeks, which caused some fears concerning the impact on 
sanitation. Moreover, the quality of services provided by local authorities may not be 
as good as when they are provided centrally. As regards Jordan, there are municipal 
councils, but they may not be able to take the decisions that affect their areas. The 
councils are at times appointed; at other times they are elected. Therefore, there is no 
consistency in this regard. 
This question also assumes that decentralisation is universally welcome. There are 
good arguments for decentralisation, but a plan to decentralise government was 
vehemently rejected in Jordan. It was introduced in 2009 by the Prime Minister, 
Nader al-Dhahabi. The plan divided the country into three regions: northern, central, 
and southern. However, it faced opposition from all sides, including the MB/IAF, 
because it was considered  part of a bigger plan to resolve the Palestinian question. 
After the strength of opposition was appreciated, King ‛Abdullah II signalled in May 
2009 that the plan would be implemented at the governorate level instead.  
In the long questionnaire, all six assessors answered the question. The marks given 
are 1, 2, 2, 4, 5, and 6. The mean is 3.3, which is substantially lower than the mean in 
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the short questionnaire. The two groups agree that the decisions are not taken at the 
appropriate level. The tendency in Jordan is for central authorities to make decisions, 
but to expect implementation to take place locally. Also, the government intervened 
in the work of local councils through appointments. In 2001, the government forced 
councils to merge. In 2011, the government of Ma‛ruf al-Bakhit implemented a 
selective demerger which caused protests in some municipalities to demand 
separation. The Prime Minister, ‛Awn al-Khasawneh, who succeeded al-Bakhit, 
calmed the situation by setting a deadline for applications to demerge. 
PART 2: DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE STATE 
This is the fourth and final major category in the democratic audit. It examines the 
external influences on democracy in Jordan as well as Jordan’s influence abroad in 
support of democracy in other countries. 
Subcategory 1: External Influences on Jordan 
The overarching question (Q14S, Q85L) asks: ‘Is the impact of external influences 
broadly supportive of the country’s democracy?’ Twenty-three respondents answered 
the question. The lowest mark is 0 and the highest is 10. The mean is 4.8. 
Table 8.4: External Influences 
 
Mark Frequency Percent 
0 2 8.3 
1 2 8.3 
2 3 12.5 
3 1 4.2 
4 1 4.2 
5 3 12.5 
6 5 20.8 
7 2 8.3 
8 1 4.2 
9 1 4.2 
10 2 8.3 
Total 23 95.8 
Missing 1 4.2 
Total 24 100 
Mean 4.8  
 
Jordan has been allied with Western powers since its inception; first with the UK, 
then with the US and the West generally. Ostensibly, the external influence of the 
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UK, EU, and US is supportive of democracy in Jordan. For instance, under the 
heading of ‘Democracy and Governance’ USAID outlined in 2005 its achievements 
in Jordan in the following terms: 
USAID’s programs focus on increasing judicial independence and 
accountability, expanding civic participation, improving governance, and 
enhancing local-level decision-making authority. As a result, 100 percent of 
Jordan’s civil courts have been automated. Programs also fuel a demand for 
democratic reform by promoting independent media, representative political 
parties, free and fair elections, an engaged civil society, and support for 
gender equality and human rights. For example, USAID supported the 
development of a new community radio station in Karak and provides 
training and organizational support to all community stations in the country. 
In the same year (2005), USAID identified five priorities: ‘legislative strengthening’, 
which aimed to provide MPs with training; ‘rule of law’, which aimed to provide 
judges with training; media liberalization; improving the status of women; and 
increasing civic participation. 
Various NGOs in Jordan have close cooperation with other foreign foundations, such 
as the German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI). 
Research centres in Jordan, such as al-Urdun al-Jadid and al-Quds Centre for 
Political Studies, work with these and similar organisations. The local societies and 
centres which establish good contacts with foreign organisations do well in terms of 
having financial resources to organise conferences and publish reports and books. 
Nonetheless, foreign funding is not entirely welcome in Jordan. Critics of individuals 
or local NGOs mention the issue of foreign funding.  
In the long questionnaire, all six assessors answered the question. The marks are 2, 2, 
4, 6, 7, and 7. The mean is 4.7. The assessment of the six respondents is similar to 
that by the respondents to the short questionnaire. 
There are benefits in programmes that seek to help women, manage scarce water 
resources better, and other initiatives. However, the overall impact on the nature of 
political system is limited. Government, whether in Jordan or elsewhere, will not be 
receptive to initiatives that can be seen to have overt political goals. 
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Although the above-mentioned influences are supportive of democracy, there are 
other external counter-influences, namely in relation to the war on terror and the 
peace process in the Middle East. In 2006, Amnesty International described Jordan 
as a ‘key hub’ in a secret American programme known as ‘rendition’. This entails 
holding individuals without a legal arrest procedure; the transfer of such individuals 
from one country to another; and the use of torture to extract confessions. 
Subcategory 2: Jordan’s Impact Abroad 
The overarching question (Q15S, Q90L) asks: ‘Do the country’s international 
policies contribute to strengthening global democracy?’ Twenty-two respondents 
answered the question. The highest mark is 10; the lowest is zero. The mean is 4.9. 
Table 8.5: Democratic Impact Abroad 
 
Mark Frequency Percent 
0 1 4.2 
1 3 12.5 
2 2 8.3 
3 1 4.2 
4 4 16.7 
5 1 4.2 
6 3 12.5 
7 3 12.5 
9 2 8.3 
10 2 8.3 
Total 22 91.7 
Missing 2 8.3 
Total 24 100 
Mean 4.9  
 
The notion of ‘global democracy’ implied in the question is explained by Held 
(2000, p. 28) who has argued that ‘the nature and prospects of the democratic polity 
need re-examination’. His justification is based on the premise that ‘we live in a 
complex interconnected world’. Therefore, he argues, ‘a democratic order can no 
longer be simply defended as an idea suitable to a particular closed political 
community or nation-state’. Moreover the question becomes ironic when it is related 
to a country which is not democratic itself. However, the intention here is not to 
dispute the premise of the question, but to present the data and discuss it. 
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Jordan’s foreign policy has been a contentious domestic issue throughout Jordan’s 
history. For instance, in the 1950s, the Baghdad Pact was one issue which led to 
disturbances in the country. The views of the people do not usually shape the foreign 
policy decisions. Adab al-Su‛ūd, a former MP (women quota, 2003) explains that 
‘the foreign policy is the prerogative of the king’.2 One issue of contention is peace 
with Israel, and the peace treaty of Wadi ‛Araba (1994). The calls for the abrogation 
of this treaty have not ceased. 
The foreign policy of Jordan towards some issues, such as the ones mentioned above, 
do not necessarily reflect popular sentiments. However, on one occasion, the foreign 
policy towards Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1989 was synchronous for a while. 
King Hussein attempted to reach an Arab solution for the crisis. Demonstrations of 
support for Iraq were allowed. However, the time given by the US to reach an Arab 
solution was very short, and a summit in Cairo undermined King Hussein’s 
endeavours. He was treated with hostility by the West. The episode demonstrates that 
it does not matter how friendly an Arab ruler has been with Western powers. If at any 
point a ruler’s position is not synchronous with theirs, the friendliness will turn into 
hostility, and no friend is indispensable. 
If, as suggested earlier, Jordan pursues a foreign policy without it being a reflection 
of domestic sentiment, a pressing question will be why the foreign policy towards 
Iraq was in line with popular sentiments. Had King Hussein disregarded popular 
feelings, it would not have been the first time. Moreover, it was often suggested that 
following the wish of the people led Jordan to enter the war of 1967 with Israel 
without being convinced it was the right move. Consequently, Jordan lost the West 
Bank. Analytically speaking, not following the popular sentiments in relation to Iraq 
would have been a reasonable position, because invading Kuwait could not be 
justified. The invasion was an unacceptable way to settle a dispute between two Arab 
countries. Moreover, the Arabs have argued against the Israeli occupation for many 
years on the basis that acquiring land by force contravenes international law.  
King Hussein’s policy was often explained on the basis that Jordan had been 
receiving free oil from Iraq, and that Iraq relied heavily on Jordan for its imports and 
exports during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Another factor can better explain 
                                                 
2
 Personal interview. Amman, 7 June 2009. 
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Jordan’s policy towards Iraq at the time. As Taher al-Masri explains, King Hussein 
‘developed a close relationship with Saddam Hussein, whom King Hussein visited 
many times, and praised him to Jordanian officers as being an Arab knight’.3 
Jordan’s relationship with the US and other Western countries deteriorated. The Gulf 
states withheld financial assistance they used to give to Jordan. King Hussein started 
the process of extricating himself from the situation, especially after a visit to Iraq 
during which Saddam Hussein spoke to the king about Allah being on Iraq’s side. 
King Hussein is reported to have said to his aides, ‘since matters are that bad, let us 
go home’.  
King Hussein started to repair the damaged relations. With regard to Iraq, Jordan 
changed tact, and went as far as receiving the defecting relatives of Saddam Hussein; 
a step that was thought to lead to the collapse of the regime in Iraq. In relation to 
peace with Israel, the Oslo Agreement removed all obstacles from Jordan’s way to 
reach formal peace with Israel. Once the PLO was willing to strike a deal with Israel, 
Arab states found a reason to say that they could not be more Palestinian than the 
Palestinians themselves. 
As the former Prime Minister, Taher al-Masri, explains, ‘King Hussein went to the 
other extreme, especially in relation to the peace treaty with Israel and the steps taken 
to normalise relations with it’. While his supporters were able to understand the need 
to reach a peace treaty, they did not feel it was necessary to engage in quick 
normalisation, especially because the people of Jordan were not only opposed to 
normalisation, but also to the peace treaty itself.4 
In the long questionnaire, the six assessors answered the question. The marks given 
are 0, 1, 2, 2, 5, and 6. The mean is 2.7, which is substantially lower than the mean of 
marks in the short questionnaire. 
If one were to treat Iraq as a case where democracy was in need of strengthening 
after the American invasion in 2003, it would be possible to suggest that Jordan did 
contribute to strengthening democracy, particularly in allowing Iraqi expatriates to 
vote in the elections which were held after the removal of Saddam Hussein. 
                                                 
3
 Personal interview. Amman, 4 January 2009. 
4
 Personal interview. Amman, 4 January 2009. 
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In the case of Palestine, Jordan followed the line of Western powers by preferring to 
deal with Mahmoud ‛Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority. As al-
Ma‛ayta (2008, pp. 11-13) explains, ‘this is due to the fact that King ‛Abdullah II 
does not have the personal contact his father had with the leaders of the MB. 
Moreover, the new king made it clear that Jordan has no ambitions in the West Bank 
and does not compete with the PLO for influence’.  
Conclusion 
The chapter has presented and discussed the data of two broad categories of the 
democratic audit. The first was civil society and popular participation. There were 
three subcategories within it: the media in a democratic society; political 
participation; and decentralization. The averages of the marks were between slightly 
over three to a little over five out of ten. The other broad category was democracy 
beyond the state which had two subcategories: external influences on the country’s 
democracy; and the country’s democratic impact abroad. The averages of marks 
were between slightly less than three and a little more than five.  
This chapter concludes the macro-analysis of the state of democracy in Jordan. It is 
now fair to note that the macro-assessment suggests that Jordanians are dissatisfied. 
The assessment, however, has a more detailed part, which will be outlined and 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9 
Democratic Audit: Microanalysis 
  
 
This chapter widens the scope of the assessment by examining more of the data 
collected in the long questionnaire, which has ninety questions. The limit on the 
word count of the thesis restricts one’s ability to go through all questions in detail. 
Therefore, I propose to cover two questions from each subcategory: the questions 
with the highest and lowest means. If there is a tie, I include the questions which tie. 
Consequently, more than thirty questions will be covered. Discussions of the 
questions will not go into the same depth of detail as before both for reasons of space 
and due to some overlap.1  
Category 1: Citizenship, Law, and Rights  
This part consists of four subcategories: nationhood and citizenship (1.1); rule of law 
and access to justice (1.2); civil and political rights (1.3); and economic and social 
rights (1.4). 
Subcategory 1.1  
There are seven questions in this subcategory. The highest mean, 7.7, belongs to 
question 1.1.2: ‘How far cultural differences are acknowledged, and how well are 
minorities and vulnerable social groups protected?’ All six assessors answered the 
questions. The marks given are 5, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 10. 
The cultural differences that can be identified in Jordan are between Muslim and 
Christian; Palestinian-Jordanian; urban, fellah, and bedouin; and Arab-nonArab. 
The cultures of Muslims and Christians in Jordan are largely similar. The religious 
practices differ, but the common factors such as language and sharing the same 
geographical roots compensate for these differences. Moreover, cultural differences 
between Palestinians and Jordanians are hard to discern as both are members of one 
culture: the Arab/Muslim. The cultural difference between urban, fellah, and bedouin 
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 Referring to data of the full questionnaire (appendix 2) will make this chapter easier to follow. 
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are in minor areas, such as costumes and pronunciation of the same Arabic words. 
With education and urbanisation, these differences have been disappearing. 
There are Circassian and Chechen communities in Jordan. Though they strive to 
retain a distinctive identity, they share the religion of the majority in the country. 
Both communities settled in Amman and Zarqa long before the State of Jordan was 
established. A Circassian leader, Sa‛id al-Mufti, received Amir ‛Abdullah in Amman 
in 1921. The palace guards in Amman don Circassian costumes. It is fair to say the 
Circassian and Chechen communities do not suffer from discrimination. Some of 
them managed to hold high posts in the government. Ministers of Circassian origin 
serve in government posts often. The Circassian and Chechen communities have a 
quota in the HoD: two seats for the residents of Amman and one seat for Zarqa. 
When the borders of constituencies in Amman were redrawn in 2010, there were 
calls for increasing their representation. 
Three other minorities exist in Jordan: the Armenians, Kurds, and Druze. According 
to al-Khatib and al-Ali (2005, pp. 12-13), there are about 30,000 Kurds in Jordan. 
Moreover, they are ‘nearly completely integrated’ into society. They have no quota 
in the HoD. The number of Armenians in Jordan is estimated at 3,000-5,000. They 
are Christians. A neighbourhood in Amman is named after them. They also have no 
quota in the HoD. The Druze are estimated at 18,000 and their biggest concentration 
is in al-Azraq area. They are considered Muslims in official statistics.2 
Another minority is that of Roma, referred to in Jordan as ‘nawar’, which is also a 
term of abuse when a person refers to another as such. Gharaybeh (2010) has called 
for their integration in the Jordanian society. In an article discussing their rights and 
duties, he points out that they live in poorly made tents on the edges of the cities. 
They resort to begging. Gharaybeh says some of the Roma have integrated 
themselves into society, and some of their young people observe Muslim practices. 
However, they face discrimination especially when it comes to marriage, and they 
are treated with contempt. Gharaybeh calls for the creation of an authority to look 
after the Roma, and follow the example of countries that made efforts to settle them. 
Gharaybeh correctly observes that it is not right that after ninety years of creating 
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 These numbers are based on estimates that vary from one source to another. There are also some 
Bahai’s and Turkmen in Jordan. 
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Jordan, the Roma continue to live in squalid conditions at the margins of society. A 
leader in the Roma community, Fathi ibn ‛Abdo, was a candidate in the elections of 
2010. However, he did not win. 
There are three other groups in Jordan that deserve a mention although they do not 
have citizenship: the Iraqis, Egyptians, and migrant domestic workers (MDW). The 
number of Iraqis swelled in Jordan especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The 
Jordanian Department of Statistics estimated their number to be 481,000 in 2007. 
The number of Iraqis has been fluid because Jordan is a stop on their way to another 
destination, or a temporary home until conditions improve in Iraq. They either return 
to Iraq when circumstances change, or they move on to other countries.  
The second group is the Egyptian workers, who in 2009, were about 300,000 
working in construction, agriculture, and services (such as in restaurants). Their 
numbers are reduced every year because of stricter requirements concerning work 
permits. Moreover, for a worker to bring his family, a bond of JD500 must be posted, 
and the children must be registered at schools. The third category is the MDWs. In 
November 2008, Amnesty International published a report which highlighted their 
isolation, abuse, and denial of rights. In September 2011, HRW released a report 
which indicated that there were more than 100,000 domestic workers: 40,000 from 
Indonesia, 30,000 from Sri Lanka, and 28,000 form Philippines. The report said: ‘A 
combination of deceit, debt, isolation, and lack of support disempowered MDWs and 
prevented them from seeking their rights’ (p. 6). 
The lowest mean, 3.8, in subcategory 1.1 belongs to question 1.1.5: ‘How impartial 
and inclusive are the procedures for amending the constitution?’ All six assessors 
answered the questions. The marks are 2, 3, 3, 5, 5, and 5.  
The amendment of the constitution requires a two-third majority in the HoD plus the 
approval of the king. Jordan’s constitution was amended in 1952 to give more power 
to the government and to take into account the merger with the West Bank. As Bani 
Salameh explained (2011), ‘the constitution of 1952 was amended twenty-nine 
times’, all at the request of the executive branch of government.3 In 1958, it was 
amended to change the person who would preside over the supreme council, a body 
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 The study was republished in part or whole in Jordanian news sites. The website arabellanews 
republished the full version, and indicated that it was originally published in an Egyptian journal. 
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which has the right to look at the constitutionality of some issues and to try ministers. 
The chair of the council was changed from the most senior judge in the country to 
the speaker of the HoN. As Bani Salameh explained, this amendment ‘changed the 
nature of the council from judicial to political, and damaged the judicial branch of 
government’. Another amendment approved in 1960 gave the king the right to extend 
the term of the parliament by two years. 
The constitution was a major issue during the protests of 2010-2011 to demand 
reform. Some people demanded a return to the 1952 version. Others demanded 
amendments to the current version. The government relented in April 2011. A royal 
commission was formed to recommend amendments. In August 2011, forty-two 
recommendations were made, and subsequently approved rather quickly. They 
included the establishment of a constitutional court; the creation of an independent 
body to supervise the elections; and the reduction of government’s powers to make 
provisional laws. Another amendment prevents Jordanian with dual nationalities 
from holding high office, such as membership in parliament or ministerial posts. 
Some members of the HoN stepped down as a result. The opposition groups, such as 
the MB/IAF, considered the changes to be unsubstantive. 
Subcategory 1.2 
There are seven questions in this subcategory. The highest mean, 6.2, belongs to 
question 1.2.5: ‘How far do the criminal justice and penal systems observe due rules 
of impartial and equitable treatment in their operations?’ All six assessors answered 
the question. The marks given are 3, 4, 7, 7, 8, and 8.  
Defendants in Jordan are allowed to be represented by lawyers. A court will appoint 
a defence lawyer if a defendant does not have one. The major areas of deficiency in 
this regard are the use of state security courts and cases related to the exercise of 
freedoms—especially when the views expressed are critical of the government. 
Moreover, the tribal traditions have distorted the implementation of the law. Tribal 
pressures can force the government to take appeasing measures such as relocating 
relatives of an accused of murder. Another area of deficiency is the room for 
leniency allowed in the law in cases of honour killings. Although the leniency is 
restricted in the law to cases of being caught in the act, the application is broadened 
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and applies in cases of murder committed on mere, unfounded suspicion, or the 
protection of honour is used as a pretext. 
The lowest mean, 5.2, in subcategory, 1.2, belongs to question 1.2.3: ‘How 
independent are the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are 
they from all kinds of interference?’ The marks given in this regard are 3, 3, 5, 6, 6, 
and 8. 
In theory, the judiciary is independent. The reality, however, is different. Judges 
started to express misgivings about their independence. In February 2011, about sixty 
judges in Jordan signed a letter to King ‛Abdullah II and requested improvements in 
their living conditions and benefits. The signatories called for the administrative and 
financial independence of the judiciary. The also wanted the Ministry of Justice to 
have no role in recommending the appointment of judges. In a committee hearing in 
the HoD, in March 2011, the Vice-Chairman of the Court of Appeal, Mahmoud al-
Rashdan, justified subjecting judges to a test after ten years of service by saying it 
was a way to exclude some of the ‘retarded judges’. He later issued an apology. 
Subcategory 1.3 
There are five questions in this subcategory. The highest mean, 7.8, belongs to 
question 1.3.3: ‘How secure is the freedom for all to practise their own religion, 
language or culture?’ The marks given in this regard are 3, 8, 8, 9, 9, and 10. 
The freedom to practise religion is enjoyed by Muslims. The Christians also practise 
their religion freely. However, building churches in Jordan requires permission. 
Also, missionaries are not allowed to operate in the country. Although Christians are 
free to practise their religion, no Christian has been selected to become prime 
minister or chief of the army. Muslims and Christians share the Arabic language. The 
Circassian and Chechen communities have their own languages, but Arabic is now a 
first language for them, having lived in the region form decades. Although people 
who renounce Islam are punishable by death if they do not re-embrace Islam, 
apostasy cases are not known in Jordan. In contrast, apostasy law was put into use in 
Egypt, most famously in the case of Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid. Although the mark of 10 
above is too generous, the mark of three is too low. The mean is closer to reality. 
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The lowest mean, 4.3, in this subcategory belongs to question 1.3.2: ‘How effective 
and equal is the protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and 
assembly?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 3, 3, 6, 6, and 6. 
Freedom of movement internally is not restricted unless it is sanctioned by a court 
order which may require a person to report to a police station daily or at certain 
periods of time. Travel abroad can be restricted by confiscating passports. This was a 
widely used practice. 
The freedom of expression is restricted as has been outlined in the macro-analysis. It 
can be restricted for political and religious reasons. Whether in the form of poetry, 
memoirs, or others types, books can be banned and their authors tried. In some cases, 
courts do not agree with the ban, such as the case of a book by Khalil al-Biss, whose 
memoirs were banned in September 2008. 
Jordan has professional associations for doctors, engineers, lawyers, and others. They 
share a headquarters in Amman. Membership is mandatory in order to practise in 
these and other professional fields. The government made attempts to audit their 
accounts, and to make membership voluntary. However, these associations 
repeatedly asserted their independence. Before political parties became legal in the 
country, they provided the platform for political opposition in Jordan. Trade unions 
also exist in Jordan. However, they did not have the same high profiles of the 
professional associations. 
For many years, the government opposed the creation of a union for teachers. 
However, the teachers actively campaigned for a union, especially since 2009. They 
organised marches and went on unofficial strikes on occasions. In 2010, they 
managed to force the Minister of Education, Ibrahim Badran, to resign after making 
disparaging remarks about the teachers’ appearance and their attire. This happened 
when the government officials were still resisting the call to form a union. The 
teachers won the right to form a union, and a law to that effect was promulgated in 
September 2011. The success of teachers in forming a union prompted some 
university teachers to meet to form an association. In June 2011, a committee 
submitted an application to the Minister of Higher Education, Wajīh ‛Eways, who 
forwarded it to the office of the prime minister for consideration. 
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Freedom of assembly is still restricted. Rallies must have permissions from the 
governors who can decline without giving reasons. Weekly demonstrations on 
Fridays became common in different parts of the country. In March 2011, a sit-in by 
youth in the square known as the Ministry of Interior Roundabout was broken up 
after three days. This was done by thugs, but in the presence of police.4 One man 
died. The government insisted he was not killed, but had a heart attack. In July 2011, 
a symbolic march towards Palestine was also broken up with force near the town of 
South Shuna. More than twenty of the participants were wounded. 
Subcategory 1.4 
This subcategory has seven questions. The highest mean, 7, belongs to question 
1.4.4: ‘How extensive and inclusive is the right to education, including education in 
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship?’ The marks given by the six assessors 
are 4, 5, 7, 8, 8, and 10.  
The right to education is extensive. The government offers twelve years of free 
education. The curriculum in the final year of secondary education includes a course 
which focuses on general knowledge. It covers history and old and modern issues. If 
one takes into account the fights that erupt at universities and between tribes, it is fair 
to say that the culture of rights and responsibilities of citizenship is weak. 
The lowest mean, 5, in this subcategory belongs to question 1.4.5: ‘How free are 
trade unions and other work-related associations to organize and represent their 
members’ interests?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 4, 5, 6, 6, and 7. 
As mentioned before, the government opposed the creation of a union for teachers. A 
union for university lecturers is still in the application stage. In the last several years, 
however, employees have been asserting their rights. Going on strike as a form of 
industrial action was rare. Now strikes are a common occurrence in the private and 
public sectors. 
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 The official name is Gamal Abdel Nasser Square. It is one of the busiest intersections in Amman. 
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Category 2: Representative and Accountable Government 
This part of the long questionnaire consists of six subcategories: free and fair 
elections (2.1); the democratic role of political parties (2.2); effective and responsive 
government (2.3); the democratic effectiveness of parliament (2.4); civilian control 
of the military and police (2.5); and integrity in public life (2.6). 
 Subcategory 2.1 
This subcategory has six questions. The highest mean, 4.8, belongs to question 2.1.3: 
‘How fair are the procedures for the registration of candidates and parties, and how 
far is there fair access for them to the media and other means of communication with 
the voters?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 4, 4, 5, 7, and 7.  
The registration of candidates does not seem to raise concerns. The cases of rejecting 
applications to run in elections are few. The procedure for registering parties is 
heavily regulated. A party must have a minimum number of members in several 
governorates. Access to official broadcast media, particularly TV, is limited. There 
was some improvement in discussion programmes, which started to invite figures 
from the opposition, such as Rohile Gharaybeh. In January 2011, Jordanian TV 
organised an unprecedented debate between Deputy PM, Ayman al-Safadi, and IAF 
Secretary General, Hamza Mansūr. Organising the debate deserved credit, but the 
debate itself was badly managed. Al-Safadi tended to dominate the discussion. 
Parties communicate with people through rallies organised on various occasions. 
During elections times, parties set up tents, distribute leaflets, and hang banners. 
They also hold press conferences which are usually covered by the daily newspapers. 
They also use the Internet to disseminate information. A daily newspaper, Assabeel, 
reflects the views of the MB/IAF. Overall, however, the media, primarily radio and 
TV, do not allocate parties air time to broadcast a message, as is the case in the UK. 
The lowest mean, 2.8, in this subcategory belongs to question 2.1.1: ‘How far is 
appointment to governmental and legislative office determined by popular 
competitive election, and how frequently do elections lead to change in the 
governing parties or personnel?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 2, 3, 3, 
3, and 4. 
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There is no room for better marks in this subcategory. The governmental positions 
are filled by appointment, not elections. Membership of the upper house of 
parliament is also by appointment. As of 1989, elections started to be held to elect 
members of the HoD. There should have been elections every four years, but the 
round scheduled for 2001 was postponed until 2003. The HoD can be dissolved by 
the king anytime, without giving reasons, as happened in November 2009. None of 
the rounds of elections enabled a party to form a government. 
Subcategory 2.2 
This subcategory has six questions. The highest mean, 5, belongs to question 2.2.1: 
‘How freely are parties able to form and recruit members, engage with the public and 
campaign for office?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 3, 5, 5, 5, 5, and 7.  
Although parties are legal, membership is weak. This can be attributed to their 
ineffectiveness, but in the current climate, it is hard to envisage how they can be 
more effective. I suggest that weak membership is not only the result of 
ineffectiveness. There is an element of distrust in the government. Older citizens still 
remember when parties were banned in the fifties. Members of parties used to be 
persecuted. They were encouraged, if not forced, to publish statements in newspapers 
to renounce their party membership and denounce the party they belonged to as 
destructive (haddam). It is conceivable that should the government decide at one 
stage that parties are to be banned, old ways will be reintroduced. 
The lowest mean, 0.3 (less than 1), in subcategory 2.2 belongs to question 2.2.2: 
‘How effective is the party system in forming and sustaining governments in office?’ 
Five of the six assessors gave zero, and one gave 2, which is very low.  
This is a damning assessment. Parties do not change governments, or sustain them in 
office. The king appoints them and keeps them in office. He also dismisses them 
whenever he wishes. Governments with short lives are common in Jordan. For 
example, the governments of ‛Adnan Badran, Samir al-Refa‛i, and Ma‛ruf al-Bakhit 
did not survive for long. The last government formed before the submission of this 
thesis was that of ‛Awn al-Khasawneh, who was a judge in the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). He engaged in some political consultations before forming his 
government, but there was little to distinguish it from previous ones. 
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Subcategory 2.3 
This subcategory has seven questions. The highest mean, 3.8, belongs to question 
2.3.4: ‘How accessible and reliable are public services for those who need them, and 
how systematic is consultation with users over service delivery?’ Five assessors 
answered the question. The marks given are 2, 3, 3, 5, and 6. 
Jordan always had a mix of private and public sectors. However, a programme of 
privatisation implemented in 1996 meant that the government was no longer in 
control of water supplies, electricity, and telecommunications, inter alia. The 
government also managed transport, which relied on fleets of buses. The private 
sector is now a major player in this arena. 
Public and private sectors provide health services. Private hospitals are now thriving. 
The government offers its employees health cover schemes which provide services at 
reduced rates. Free health services are provided for the poor who receive assistance 
from the government at some of its clinics, such as al-Bashir Hospital in Amman. 
Consultations with users are rare. For example, Jordanians rely on shared transport, 
such as buses or multi-passenger taxis (known in Jordan as sarvīs). These vehicles 
had for years known terminals: one is the Raghadan complex and the other al-
‛Abdali. However, in the name of developing them, the government moved the 
parking lots to less convenient locations. One impact of the change was weakening 
the business activities in the old areas. Also, the trip to downtown Amman has to be 
done in two stages. 
The lowest mean, 1.8, in this subcategory belongs to question 2.3.5: ‘How 
comprehensive and effective is the right of access for citizens to government 
information under the constitution or other laws?’ The marks given by five of the six 
assessors are 0, 1, 2, 2, and 4. 
The constitution does not stipulate that citizens have a right of access to government 
information. However, in 2007 Jordan enacted a freedom of information law. In 
November 2010, Majdulin ‛Allan, published a report on the law, coinciding with its 
third anniversary. She outlined the difficulties faced by those who seek to use the 
law. The reporter herself asked the office of the prime minister to see the minutes of 
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the cabinet meetings in relation to a plan adopted in 2007 to build a casino in Jordan. 
This was a controversial plan which was abandoned at a cost to Jordan for cancelling 
the contract. The answer she received stated that there were no minutes.  
‛Allan also resorted to courts to order the Department of Land Registry to release 
information about the transfer of ownership of state land. She sought to know to 
whom the land was transferred and at what price. The court, however, said the 
reporter was not eligible to receive the requested information for she was not 
recognised as a journalist because she was not a member of the Jordanian Press 
Association (JPA). The reporter then re-applied for a court order as a citizen.  
Moreover, ‛Allan’s report indicated that the second application to the court was still 
being considered. However, this issue proved controversial and subsequently 
snowballed. The royal court could not ignore it anymore. Officials from the palace 
met journalists in 2011 and revealed the facts in relation to the transfer and how the 
pieces of land were used. 
Subcategory 2.4 
This subcategory has nine questions. The highest mean, 5.5, belongs to question 
2.4.7: ‘How accessible are elected representatives to their constituents?’ The marks 
given by the six assessors are 2, 3, 6, 7, 7, and 8.  
The access itself is not a big problem because the social relationships prevailing in 
Jordan provide the means for personal contact. This would explain why some 
assessors gave relatively high marks. However, MPs do not have surgeries in their 
constituencies, such as the case in the UK. Therefore, the contact between MPs and 
members of their constituencies is not systemic. This would probably explain why 
some assessors gave low marks. 
The lowest mean, 2.3, in this subcategory belongs to two questions. The first is 2.4.3: 
‘How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or legislature to 
oversee the executive and hold it to account?’ The marks given by the six assessors 
are 0, 0, 3, 3, 3, and 5. 
The powers of the parliament are limited. It has no control over its own fate. It can be 
dissolved by the king without giving a reason. Therefore, its powers are neither 
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extensive nor effective. In the first parliament after the elections of 1989, there was a 
promising start. The HoD had its way when its views differed with King Hussein’s 
on the issue of right of appeal from the decisions of the state security court. 
Subsequent parliaments were tame. The government of Samir al-Refa‛i sought the 
confidence of the HoD in 2011. It received 111 votes out of 120 (almost 93%), which 
turned the HoD into a subject for ridicule. Al-Refa‛i formed a government twice; the 
first lasted less than a year, whilst the second lasted less than six months. His 
successor Ma‛ruf al-Bakhit formed a new government in February 2011; however, it 
was gone in October the same year. 
The lowest mean of 2.3 is also shared by question 2.4.6: ‘How extensive are the 
procedures of the parliament or legislature for consulting the public and relevant 
interests across the range of its work?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 1, 2, 
2, 2, 2, and 5.  
As already indicated, parliament has limited power. The king can dissolve it without 
giving reasons. The government drafts laws, and the most parliament can do is to 
scrutinise such laws. When parliament is not in session, the government takes 
advantage of the opportunity to enact provisional laws. When parliament reconvenes, 
the government asks it to approve them to become permanent laws. Neither 
parliament nor government consults the public on relevant interests. Views on 
proposed laws are expressed in newspapers. However, this does not qualify as 
consultation. 
Subcategory 2.5 
This subcategory has four questions. The highest mean, 8.7, belongs to question 
2.5.4: ‘How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary units, private 
armies, war lords and criminal mafias?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 8, 
8, 8, 9, 9, and 10. 
This is highest mean in the entire questionnaire. It was only between 1967 and 1971 
that Jordan experienced the presence of organisations which challenged the authority 
of the regime, when Palestinian factions chose Jordan as a base to resist the Israeli 
occupation. This situation led to frequent clashes which culminated in those of 
September 1970. Moreover, in 1971, there was further fighting which resulted in the 
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expulsion of all armed Palestinian forces from Jordan. Since then, Jordan has kept a 
tight control over the domestic situation. Jordan does not have any of the phenomena 
referred to in this question, which apply more to other countries such as Lebanon and 
Somalia (paramilitary units); Iraq (American private army); Afghanistan (warlords); 
and Columbia (criminal mafias). 
The lowest mean, 3, in this subcategory belongs to question 2.5.1: ‘How effective is 
civilian control over the armed forces, and how free is political life from military 
involvement?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 0, 2, 3, 5, and 8.  
The supreme commander of the military is the king. A civilian defence minister is 
also in charge, but the real power is in the hands of the king, not the civilian minister. 
Control over the army is effective in the sense that it is a professional army which 
acts when given orders. The concern about the interference of the military in political 
life stems from using members of the military to vote in certain constituencies to 
influence the results of elections. The government says in this regard that members 
of the military exercise their right to vote; the opposition says that members of the 
military are used en masse and provided with means of transport. 
The other form of interference in the political life comes from the GID. Although 
strictly speaking it is not ‘the military’ as envisaged in the question, it is a military-
like department and is run as such. The interference of the GID is pervasive. 
Reducing its role in political life was sought by ‛Awn al-Khasawneh, who made it 
known that it was his aim to restore the government’s powers that were appropriated 
over the years by the GID and royal court. 
Subcategory 2.6 
This subcategory has six questions. The highest mean, 3.3, belongs to question 2.6.1: 
‘How effective is the separation of public office from the personal business and 
family interests of office holders?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 1, 1, 2, 
3, 5, and 8.  
In theory, rules of separation exist, but their enforcement is another matter. In July 
2011, the Jordanian daily, al-Ghad, detailed a case of conflict of interest in relation 
to a housing project which was given the name ‘decent living’ (‛aysh karīm). The 
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Ministry of Public Works was put in charge of implementing the project in 2008. The 
minister at the time was Sahl al-Majali. When bids for building apartments were 
invited, two were received: one from a company owned by the armed forces; the 
other by a consortium which included a company owned by the minister himself. 
When the proposals were considered, the Accounting Office noticed the conflict of 
interest. The matter was raised in a letter. Bureaucratic manoeuvres, however, 
circumvented the objection, and the consortium won the tender. In February 2011, 
the government referred the project to the ACC for investigation. 
The lowest mean, 2.5, in this subcategory belongs to question 2.6.3: ‘How far do the 
rules and procedures for financing elections, candidates and elected representatives 
prevent their subordination to sectional interests?’ The marks given by the six 
assessors are 0, 2, 2, 3, 3, and 5. 
Candidates finance their own campaigns if they are not affiliated with parties. 
Therefore, the wealthier candidates can spend as much as they can afford. Vote 
buying has been mentioned a great deal during elections, despite it being illegal. The 
term ‘political money’ surfaced in Jordan during the elections of 2007. It has been 
used in Lebanon in relation to Rafiq al-Hariri, who gained leadership through the use 
of money, by assisting the poor or giving employment in institutions he owns. The 
Jordanian columnist, Ahmad Abu Khalil (2010), suggested that the definition of 
‘political money’ should be widened to include funds provided by embassies and 
foreign NGOs to spend on activities they sponsor, such as conferences and training. 
Money given by charities to the needy during elections with a recommendation to 
vote for a particular party should count as political money, he suggested.  
The subordination to sectional interests can be seen in two ways. First, when a tribe 
chooses one candidate for the HoD. In this case, the candidate will endeavour to 
return the favour. The other way is that pro-regime candidates are assisted behind the 
scenes by the GID. Therefore, when these candidates win, they vote according to the 
wishes of the GID and government. When 111 MPs out of 120 gave the government 
of Samir al-Refa‛i their confidence, it was a sign that they did not act spontaneously. 
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Category 3: Civil Society and Popular Participation 
This part of the long questionnaire consists of three subcategories: the media in a 
democratic society (3.1); political participation (3.2); decentralization (3.3). 
Subcategory 3.1 
This subcategory has six questions. The highest mean, 4.5, belongs to question 3.1.5: 
‘How free are private citizens from intrusion and harassment by the media?’ The 
marks given by the six assessors are 3, 4, 4, 4, 5, and 7. 
This is one assessment which I am unable to agree with. The editorial standards of 
some of the weekly magazines and the new media are not high. If the government 
disapproves of views expressed by individuals, its supporters write against the views 
and those who expressed them. I am not aware of a case of a media pack following a 
celebrity, or camping at the doorsteps of someone’s house. That Jordan has not 
known these phenomena does not imply it will not someday in the future. It is more 
than likely that these phenomena will come to Jordan, especially that the obsession 
with celebrity is widespread worldwide. 
The lowest mean, 2.7, in this subcategory belongs to question 3.1.4: ‘How free are 
journalists from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation?’ The marks given by 
the six assessors are 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, and 4. 
The Jordanian Centre for Defending Freedom of Journalists (CDFJ) published a 
report on the state of press freedoms in 2007. The report documented complaints 
reported to the CDFJ. The most frequent complaint (47 in 2007) concerned the 
prevention of journalists from covering newsworthy events. The journalists also 
complained about detention, beatings, and threats (pp. 115-139). 
The reporter of al-Jazeera, Yasir Abu Hilaleh, was beaten on two occasions. The first 
in January 2009, when he was covering a demonstration in support of the people of 
Gaza who were under attack by Israeli forces for three weeks. While being 
hospitalised, Abu Hilaleh received a call from King ‛Abdullah II to enquire about his 
well-being. The second occasion was in July 2011 while he was covering a 
demonstration demanding reform in Jordan. He lost composure and threatened to 
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bring his tribe from Ma‛an to burn half of Amman. This was used against him in the 
press and websites. 
Moreover, in June 2011, the offices of the French News Agency (AFP) were attacked 
after the agency reported that the procession of King ‛Abdullah II was pelted with 
stones in Tafila. Randa Habib, the agency’s bureau chief, was threatened. The royal 
court made a complaint to AFP against Habib, but the agency restated its confidence 
in her reporting. 
When a rally was organised in the Palms Square in Amman in June 2011, the police 
advised journalists to wear reflective jackets. To their horror, they realised that this 
made them an easier target. In December 2011, the offices of the daily newspaper, 
al-Ghad, were attacked after the paper published a report about a ship carrying maze 
not fit for human consumption. The vessel was detained at the Port of Aqaba to 
investigate the matter. However, it was allowed to leave before the investigation was 
completed. 
Subcategory 3.2  
This subcategory has four questions. The highest mean, 5, belongs to question 3.2.4: 
‘How equal is access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they 
represented?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 5, 5, 5, 6, and 7.  
Public office is open through patronage and loyalty, not through competition. 
Different social groups benefit through this route. However, there is now a class 
which supplies the government with high-ranking officials, from families such as the 
Touqan, to tribes such as al-Majali. When a government is formed, attempts are 
made to satisfy different regions and tribes. 
The lowest mean, 3, in this subcategory belongs to question 3.2.1: ‘How extensive is 
the range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc. and how 
independent are they from government?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 
2, 2, 3, 5, and 6. 
The diversity of voluntary organisations improved dramatically during the twenty 
years under assessment. However, the most prosperous are the ones supportive of the 
government’s line. Members of the royal household participate in voluntary 
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organisations, often as honorary presidents. This brings benefits to the organisations, 
such as funding and media interest, but limits their independence. 
Subcategory 3.3 
This subcategory has four questions. The highest mean, 3.7, belongs to question 
3.3.3: ‘How extensive is the cooperation of government at the most local level with 
relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation and implementation 
of policy, and in service provision?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, and 7. 
In a study of participation of civil society in the programme to reform the public 
sector, Musa Shtaiwi (2006?) suggested that participation and consultation of citizens 
occurred through several mechanisms. For instance, the government might seek the 
views of a professional association, or assign seats to CSOs on certain bodies, such 
as the one in charge of social security, whose council has four seats reserved for 
workers and four for employers. Another way to consult is by creating special 
bodies, such as the National Committee for Women Affairs, which recommended a 
quota for women in the HoD. Shtaiwi also points out that CSOs make their views 
known through media campaigns, protests, workshops, and conferences. 
The mechanisms and patterns of consultation identified by Shtaiwi amount to limited 
consultations, and appeared to be elitist in most cases. If one recalled the plan to 
divide Jordan into regions, and the hostility with which it was met, one would have a 
typical example of the government’s approach. It first devised a plan, and then it 
tried to sell it to the public. Sometimes a plan was abandoned, such as the case of 
regionalisation; at other times, a plan was imposed despite opposition, such as the 
case of merging municipalities in 2001.  
I have searched for cases in which the government, or one of its departments, issued 
a consultation paper on a certain issue and specified a period of time to receive views 
on it from all interested groups, especially those who work at grassroots level. I was 
unable to locate a paper of this type. I suggest that the absence of consultation in this 
manner is a reason why the assessors gave low marks in response to this question. 
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The lowest mean, 2.3, in this subcategory belongs to question 3.3.2: ‘How far are 
these levels of government [sub-central tiers of government] subject to free and fair 
electoral authorization, and to the criteria of openness, accountability and 
responsiveness in their operation?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 1, 2, 
2, 2, and 7. 
The governors of Jordan’s governorates are appointed. The mayor of Amman is 
unelected. Municipal councils were elected at times, and appointed at others. The 
government resorted to appointing members of municipal councils instead of electing 
them. Consequently, that accountability will only be to the higher authorities, not to 
the public. The responsiveness will vary from one place to another, as this will 
depend of the management and conscientiousness of the individuals in charge.  
Category 4: Democracy Beyond the State 
This part of the long questionnaire consists of two subcategories: external influences 
on the country’s democracy (4.1); and the country’s democratic impact abroad (4.2). 
Subcategory 4.1 
This subcategory has four questions. The highest mean, 4.3, is shared by two 
questions. The first is 4.1.2: ‘How equitable is the degree of influence exercised by 
the government within the bilateral, regional and international organizations to 
whose decisions it may be subject?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 3, 5, 
5, 5, and 6. 
Jordan has bilateral agreements with Arab countries. It is a member of the Arab 
League and UN. In bilateral agreements with Arab states, the influence will be 
mutually agreed. The Arab League is not known to be an effective body, especially 
in relation to agreements over political issues. At the UN, the influence will be 
similar to other developing countries. Permanent members of the UN Security 
Council have more influence than any other member state. 
The other question which shares the highest mean of 4.3 in this subcategory is 4.1.3: 
‘How far are the government’s negotiating positions and subsequent commitments 
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within these organizations subject to effective legislative oversight and public 
debate?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 6. 
The legislative oversight is limited when it exists, as has been stated repeatedly. 
Parliament can be dissolved anytime by the king without giving reasons. The public 
debate can take place whether the government wishes or not. If an issue was not 
debated in the press, it would be debated in the private sphere.  
The lowest mean, 3.3, belongs to question 4.1.1: ‘How free is the country from 
external influences which undermine or compromise its democratic process or 
national interests?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 1, 2, 4, 4, 4, and 5. 
There are external influences that supposedly promote democracy in Jordan through 
CSOs by organising conferences and training related to issues such as human rights, 
gender equality, and good governance. However, there are other influences which 
undermine reforms that can lead to a meaningful democratic process. The most 
influential factor is Jordan alliance with the US and the West. Jordan took upon itself 
to take part in the ‘war on terror’ and felt this was justified, especially after the hotel 
bombings in Amman in 2005. Whether this kind of external influence undermines 
the national interests depends on the perspective. The government considers its 
position to be in the national interest. The opposition thinks otherwise. 
Subcategory 4.2 
This subcategory has five questions. The highest mean, 7.3, belongs to question 
4.2.2: ‘How far does the government support the UN and agencies of international 
cooperation, and respect the rule of law internationally?’ The marks given by the six 
assessors are 5, 6, 6, 7, 10, 10, and 10.  
Jordan is respectful of UN resolutions, and is cooperative with various UN agencies. 
For instance, UNESCO and UNDP have offices in the country. Jordan also 
contributed forces to UN peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra 
Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The size of the force varies from 
one region to another, and sometimes the involvement includes medical assistance. 
There are Jordanian forces in Afghanistan. The government considers this a 
contribution to peacekeeping and a form of assistance to a Muslim country. 
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However, people in opposition see it as involving Jordan in the American ‘war on 
terror’. In 2010, a committee of ‛ulamā’ affiliated to IAF issued a fatwa which 
considered the participation of Muslim forces with NATO in the fighting in 
Afghanistan to be contrary to Islamic principles. The government and supporters 
reacted with anger. They insisted that the participation was part of peacekeeping and 
had a humanitarian purpose. 
The lowest mean, 3, in this subcategory belongs to question 4.2.4: ‘How far is the 
government’s international policy subject to effective parliamentary oversight and 
public influence?’ The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 1, 2, 3, 3, and 6. 
The international policy is not subject to parliamentary supervision. The king plays 
an active role in Jordan’s international policy. The government assists rather than 
initiates or supervises. The public influenced Jordan’s policy towards Iraq for a 
limited period in 1990, as public sentiments were synchronous with King Hussein’s 
desire to find an Arab solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990. His attempt failed. Jordan and King Hussein were ostracised for a while by the 
Gulf and Western states. He endeavoured to repair Jordan’s damaged relations with 
them. The peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and the eagerness to normalise 
relationship with it were steps in that direction. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a more detailed assessment of the state of democracy in 
Jordan. The mean of marks in many cases was low. In addition, because Jordan 
lacked most of the features of the ‘ideal’ democratic system, as envisaged by the 
democratic audit, the discussion of the data contained what could be considered 
repetitive information. This was due to the design of the questionnaire, whose 
questions would benefit from a re-examination to see how the same questionnaire 
could be used to assess democratic and undemocratic countries.  
However, the more detail assessment in this chapter was necessary to avoid basing 
the appraisal on fifteen questions only. Moreover, the detailed examination of the 
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state of democracy in Jordan provided the opportunity to recognise some positive 
features. There were means higher than seven, and one was close to nine. Without 
this detailed appraisal, these could not been identified. Although the assessment did 
not cover all the questions, the full data are available in the appendices.  
After more than half of the questions from all the subcategories had been outlined 
and discussed, a fair picture of the state of democracy emerged: the system of 
government was not democratic after twenty years of ‘the resumption of democratic 
life’ in 1989. Therefore, the next chapter will discuss why democracy has not yet 





In this concluding chapter, I examine why democracy has failed to take root in 
Jordan to date. I will outline several reasons often cited to explain the failure, and 
scrutinise the plausibility and limitations of each. I will then identify the reason that I 
consider the most plausible. 
Characterising the Change in Jordan 
The democratic audit presented and discussed in previous chapters had established 
that Jordan was not a democracy. Therefore, there remains one point to discuss: How 
can one describe the process that started in 1989? The most appropriate 
characterisation is that Jordan has undergone a process of liberalisation, according to 
the definitions theorised by Huntington (1993) and Martins (1993). The former 
defines liberalisation as a process that entails ‘the partial opening of an authoritarian 
system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive election’ 
(p. 9). A state wishing to liberalise its system may ‘open up some issues for public 
debate, [and] loosen censorship’. These, and other measures described by 
Huntington, have indeed taken place in Jordan. 
In addition, Martin’s definition of liberalisation applies to what happened in Jordan, 
namely ‘the adoption of formal democratic institutions’ without ‘consensus 
concerning the rules of the [democratic] game, political accountability of the rulers, 
the right of ample political representation, and alternation of power’ (1993, p. 88). 
The Jordanian government remains in charge of the ‘rules of the game’. The 
elections law has continued to change without resulting in a system that is fair to all 
players. The government is also in charge of organising the elections, counting the 
votes, and announcing the results. 
Moreover, political accountability to the people is limited at best. The king is 
considered above accountability, and the governments are accountable only to him. 
Political representation is restricted according to the wishes of the government. The 
number of Islamist candidates that should sit in the HoD, or the number of MPs that 
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should represent the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin is a matter decided by 
the government. No alternation of power has taken place in Jordan since 1989. 
Governments come and go at the discretion of the king. 
Why democracy failed to take root in Jordan so far 
I shall now examine several explanations reasons for the failure of democracy to take 
root in Jordan so far. I shall outline each explanation and assess its plausibility. In 
addition, I shall identify the most plausible amongst them. 
1. Islam  
This reason is based on the claim that democracy and Islam are incompatible for 
arguments outlined and discussed in chapter 2. The logic used to explain the failure 
is that Jordan is a Muslim majority state, and is ruled by a descendent of Prophet 
Muhammad. If Islam and democracy are incompatible, then it is inevitable that 
democracy will fail in Jordan.  
This explanation is problematic because it overlooks other important factors: first 
and foremost, the Jordanian state was created on the British model—a monarchy but 
with a parliament, political parties, and a democratic system of government. 
Moreover, during the period of 1990-2010, there have been frequent references in 
Jordan to a ‘democratic process’. Two points can be made in this regard. The first is 
to assume that the king and people of Jordan strictly follow Islam’s teachings. If 
Islam is incompatible with democracy, the king would refrain from calling the 
process ‘democratic’. Similarly, the people in Jordan would refrain from engaging in 
this process because it contradicts Islamic teachings. What actually happened was 
that the process was described as democratic, and an Islamic political party 
participated in it. 
The second point is that strict adherence to Islamic teachings is not always possible. 
There are practices that can be introduced in a Muslim majority state despite 
arguments regarding their compatibility with Islam. Banking is a case in point, 
particularly banks which deals with interest on loans and savings. In both cases, 
interest is considered un-Islamic. However, banks operating in this manner have 
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existed in Jordan since its inception. Therefore, there is a need for further 
clarification. 
The presence of these non-Islamic banks can be justified on two bases. One is that 
the economy cannot function without banks. In other words, there is an overriding 
need that justifies implementing a system that is considered incompatible with Islam. 
King Hussein talked about a ‘democratic process’ which implied that he saw no 
incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Otherwise, different terms would 
have been used, such as ‘shura process,’ or he would need to justify why it was 
necessary to launch a democratic process even though it is not compatible with 
Islam. Therefore, citing Islam as the reason for a lack of democracy in Jordan is 
unsound. 
2. Islamism 
The second reason suggested for the failure of democracy to take root is the ideology 
of Islamism. As discussed in chapter 2, Islamists are not believed to be committed to 
democracy. There are also concerns that they will change the democratic nature of 
the system if they come to power. This explanation of the failure, however, 
overlooks three facts.  
First, the MB/IAF never managed to obtain a majority in parliament. Therefore, they 
were never in a position to change the political system or alter its democratic nature 
(which is non-existent). The representation of MB/IAF continued to decline, and they 
were therefore increasingly incapable of introducing changes. Second, the MB/IAF 
played by the rules of the democratic process; in other words, they accepted the 
outcome of elections, and did not replicate the Algerian example. The most drastic 
action they took to protest was to boycott the elections in 1997 and 2010 to persuade 
the government to introduce changes that would help democracy, not hinder it. Third, 
one can disagree with MB/IAF ideologically, but one cannot deny the fact that MB 
and IAF manage their affairs on a democratic basis, as has been demonstrated by 
Brown (2006). Therefore, if democracy is not good for Jordan, it will not be good for 
the MB/IAF. These reasons undermine the conclusion that Islamism in Jordan may 
be the reason why democracy failed to take root. 
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3. A State Dependent on Serving a Role  
The failure of democracy in Jordan is explained by arguing that the state was formed 
in order to serve a role in the region. This role was to stem the French expansion in 
the area (Wilson 1988, p. 44); to be a sort of ‘buffer’ zone (Lucas 2005, p. 14); and 
as a reward for Amir ‛Abdullah for his family’s contributions to the efforts to bring 
down the Ottoman Empire (Wiktorowicz 2001, pp. 50-51). 
Two of the three roles above are no longer valid, as the British and French left the 
area decades ago. However, it is still possible to pursue this explanation further by 
saying that roles change over time. One role was the fight against communism, 
which King Hussein cited in his decision to dismiss the government of Sulayman al-
Nabulsi in 1957. Another role is for the state to have peace with Israel, or to be part 
of the war on terror. The role, therefore, depends on international developments in 
which Western countries require support from their allies. Fahd al-Rimawi (2008) 
subscribes to this explanation.1 In his view, the role of Jordan at present is to provide 
protection for Israel, and to act as an intermediary between the latter and the Arab 
states which do have diplomatic ties with Israel. While it is a state with a role, Jordan 
cannot develop into a democratic country. 
This theory of ‘a state dependent on a role’ is plausible as Jordan does play a role 
when asked by the West. Only rarely does it refrain from cooperation with the West, 
such as during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990-91). The lack of cooperation 
damaged Jordan’s relations with the West and other Arab countries. This 
explanation, however, cannot resolve the matter satisfactorily, as states can be 
democratic and serve a role. Western European countries have been democratic 
while serving a role in the Cold War. These countries distinguished themselves from 
states run by communist parties by being democratic. Therefore, a state that plays a 
role does not have to be undemocratic. 
The third reason for establishing the State of Jordan, namely as a reward for King 
‛Abdullah I, requires some clarification because it is valid to some extent, but should 
not be accepted at face value. First, as a political act by Winston Churchill, it is true 
historically speaking. However, neither Churchill personally nor Britain owned the 
                                                 
1
 Personal interview. 14 April 2008, Amman. 
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territory and thus did not have the right to give parts of it away as a reward. Second, 
the notion that a king or queen owns the land, its resources, and the people is 
outdated.2 However, even if a monarch entertains any illusion in this regard, 
historically these types of kings or queens have had to give up some or all of their 
powers. Therefore, the ‘reward’ explanation is unsatisfactory.  
4. Political Feudalism 
Another reason for the failure of democracy suggests that Jordan is controlled by 
‘political feudalism’. On 12 January 2010, a statement signed by more than seventy 
figures of different political orientations criticised Jordan’s involvement in the war in 
Afghanistan (Efranews 2010). They demanded the ‘lifting of the tutelage of political 
feudalism’, and the creation of a political climate that would lead to ‘real political 
reform and democratic transformation’. 
This explanation is not without its merits. The king does appoint and dismiss the 
government at will. King ‛Abdullah II has dissolved parliament without giving 
reasons. For instance, in 2007, the royal decree to dissolve the HoD simply said ‘the 
HoD is dissolved as of Monday, 20 August 2007’. However, this explanation fails to 
recognise that King Hussein had to make concessions on three occasions: in 1956 
when parties contested elections and a government reflecting such results was 
formed. The second was after the 1967 war when he had to tolerate the presence of 
the Palestinian resistance organisations for three years before deciding to eliminate 
their presence. The third was in 1988, when the April Uprising (habbat nīsan) took 
place, and he decided to ‘resume democratic life’. 
5. ‘Certain forces’ Work Against Change 
One of the often-cited reasons for the failure of democracy to take root is that there 
are ‘forces’ in Jordan which have no interest in democracy. The king, therefore, has 
to proceed with caution and balance the various interests. The explanation does not 
identify the forces at work, but one of the frequently used terms in this context is 
‘forces pulling in the opposite direction’ (qiwa al-shadd al-‛aksi). One can speculate 
that these forces include the beneficiaries of an undemocratic system, such as those 
                                                 
2
 The ruling dynasty in Jordan is referred to as ‘al-‛āl’la al-mālika’ not ‘al-‛āl’la al-malakiyya’. The 
first literally means the ‘owning family’. The latter means the royal family. 
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who are appointed prime ministers, ministers, high-ranking officials, and special 
advisers. They will have no interest in a democratic system, in which they have to 
compete to hold such positions, and be accountable to the electorate. Without a 
democratic system, they simply have to pledge loyalty and intervene when called 
upon, whether to launch a crackdown, privatise industries, or sign a peace treaty. 
Other ‘forces’ that may appear to have no interest in democracy will be the 
intelligence service (GID), tribes, and people in the business sector. The role of GID 
was pervasive in Jordan. Despite improvements in the past twenty years, activists 
continued to be detained during the period of protests (2011/2012). In some cases, 
they were referred to state security courts. With regard to tribes, the government 
continued to encourage tribalism, and relied on members of the tribes to oppose 
organising rallies and protests in their areas. Moreover, in relation to people in 
business, it may be argued that without the accountability that comes with 
democracy, businesspeople have the freedom to strike deals and run their affairs on 
the basis of personal connections with people in power. 
The explanation of undemocratic forces has its limitations. The forces that seek 
privilege are not so powerful a force as to block democracy, as privilege-seeking 
occurs irrespective of whether the system of government is democratic or not. 
Assuming that these people have worked together to maintain a special status, their 
effect can be easily neutralised if the king chooses to change the status quo. 
Similarly, the GID may advise the king against adopting a wholly democratic system 
of government, or to proceed with caution. The king can reject this advice. In this 
case, the GID cannot defy the will of the king and people at the same time. 
With regard to tribes, although the government encourages tribalism, the demands 
for change come from all sectors of the population. Opposition figures are invited to 
rallies organised by tribes. There is not a single attitude that represents all the tribes, 
or all members of a single tribe. In relation to the business sector, certain people will 
prefer doing business through contacts with people in power. However, a great deal 
more will prefer to be able to compete fairly in order to succeed in business. 
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6. Rentierism 
Another reason for the failure of democracy to take root in Jordan is suggested by 
‘rentier economy’ theorists. According to this explanation, the population of a rentier 
state tends to be depoliticised. As Brynen (1992) explains in this regard ‘the state is 
expected to provide a certain level of economic security, in exchange for which 
society grants state leaders considerable political autonomy’ (p. 75). This explanation 
has severe limitations, even when it refers to the rich countries of the Gulf, where 
there is no taxation. Shambayati (1994) argued that ‘rentierism’ did not depoliticise 
the population, and that the Shah of Iran lost his throne in 1979, because he alienated 
the bazaaris for ideological reasons. Specifically, he considered them ‘greedy, 
backward, reactionary, and unwilling to contribute to the country’s development. 
There was no room for them in a modem Iran’ (p. 323). Because the bazaaris did not 
depend on the state, as did other sectors, they ‘had both the financial and the 
organizational autonomy to challenge the state’ when the revolution started (p. 320). 
When the rentier explanation is applied to Jordan, it becomes harder to sustain. First, 
Jordan is not as rich as the oil-producing countries in the Gulf or Iran. This is why 
Brynen describes Jordan as a ‘semi-rentier’ state. However, it has provided ‘a certain 
level of economic security’, referred to above. ‘At the mass level,’ Brynen (1992) 
explains ‘the Jordanian state became a central supplier of both social services and 
employment. Extensive health and education programmes were developed’ (p. 81). 
Nonetheless, as happened in Iran, not all sectors of society have benefited. For 
instance, the widespread claims of corruption in Jordan are indicative of the level of 
alienation felt across all parts of the country.  
Moreover, Jordan introduced a tax collection system in the 1980s. Although the 
government claims that the majority of the population is exempt from paying taxes, 
this statement is true in part at best, because everyone pays indirect taxes on many 
things, and those who do not pay income tax do not earn enough money to bring 
them into the tax-paying bracket. Since the Jordanian citizen has become a taxpayer, 
the demand for representation has been made on this basis. 
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The rentier state argument does not satisfactorily explain the failure of democracy in 
Jordan. The reasons in summary are that the state has not managed to sustain a level 
of economic security that will pacify the people (poverty in Jordan is widespread); it 
has alienated many people in the country, including the tribes; and it is not possible 
to depoliticise the population of any state, let alone the people in Jordan. 
7. Arab-Israeli Conflict  
The Arab-Israeli conflict has been used by rulers to justify the undemocratic nature 
of Arab governments. In the case of Jordan, the argument was that it would not 
possible to hold elections while one part of the kingdom, the West Bank, was 
occupied. As has been discussed in chapter 1, regarding the definition of democracy, 
elections are only one of the elements necessary in a democratic state. Moreover, 
holding elections in the West Bank ceased to be an obstacle because Jordan decided 
to sever links with the West Bank. Ironically, after the peace treaty with Israel in 
1994, one of the first things Jordan was willing to sacrifice was the process of reform 
which started in 1989. As Robinson (1998, p. 388) observed: ‘the end of the Arab-
Israeli conflict may well usher in a new era of authoritarianism in Jordan.’ Had there 
been a commitment to establish a democratic system of government, neither the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, nor the peace treaty with Israel in 1994 
would have prevented the fulfilment of this goal. 
8. The West is Responsible 
The absence of democracy in the Arab world as a whole is due to an external factor: 
the US in particular and the West prefer it this way. AbuKhalil (2011) argues that 
regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are supported by the West despite being 
undemocratic; that Husni Mubarak, for instance, stayed in power so long only with 
Western support. This argument is valid to some extent. In its support, one can cite 
the example of the attitude towards the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections 
in 2006. However, my response to this argument is similar to the one I made earlier 
in relation to considering Jordan as a state formed to serve a role: being democratic 
and maintaining friendly relations with the West are not mutually exclusive. 
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9. Rustow’s Antecedents 
I have argued that all of the above reasons are flawed. I propose, finally, to apply 
Rustow’s modernisation theory to test whether it can better explain the failure of 
democracy in Jordan. As outlined in chapter 1, Rustow (1967, p. 228) identified four 
antecedents of democracy. I shall apply these antecedents to Jordan’s case in order to 
establish the extent to which they apply. If they do not, then Rustow is wrong. If they 
do, I will argue why Rustow’s theory is better than the reasons outlined above at 
explaining why democracy has failed to take root in Jordan. Any limitations 
concerning Rustow’s explanation will be identified. 
In relation to the first antecedent, although Jordan’s modern history spans more than 
forty years, this is at the lower end of Rustow’s range of years (40-130) of 
administrative and educational modernization. Jordan would require another sixty 
years to reach the other end. The first university in Jordan was established only in the 
1960s. However, more universities have been established in Jordan, and now there 
are many private universities. 
It is possible to argue that Jordan has satisfied this antecedent because the state has 
existed for more than seventy years. Conversely, one can suggest that Rustow’s 
lower and higher ends of the range of years (40-130) are too far apart, and therefore, 
this antecedent is flawed. Two responses are possible. One is that the circumstances 
in countries making the transition to democracy cannot be identical. Therefore, it is 
not abnormal to make the transition at different speeds. The other response is that the 
transition is not assumed to be automatic once the lower end of the scale is achieved, 
as this antecedent is one of four. 
More importantly, one has to look at what else happened during the relevant years. 
The expansion in education at all levels was not matched by weakening tribal 
traditions, for example. The universities became scenes of frequent fights between 
members of different tribes. Despite the abundance of universities in Jordan, they 
lack the freedoms that students enjoy in democratic countries. On one occasion in 
May 1986, for example, the students of Yarmouk University organised protests 
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against increasing tuition fees. The police dealt with them aggressively, and three 
students were killed. In contrast, students in the UK frequently demonstrate against 
increasing fees, not only on campuses but also on the streets of cities. 
Therefore, it is not the mere number of years of education, but the extent to which 
such education has contributed to moving the state and society a step closer towards 
modernity. Moreover, the antecedent of education alone is not sufficient, as there are 
three other antecedents to be satisfied. 
The second antecedent is concerned with ‘stable geographical contexts’. The 
geographical context of Jordan’s political system did not remain the same since its 
inception. It expanded in 1950 after the merger with the West Bank. The merger 
meant an increase in the population which more than doubled. In 1967, the 
geographical context decreased after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. It was 
further reduced politically in 1988 after the decision to sever links with the West 
Bank (in effect a demerger). After the decision, the notion of Jordanian citizenship 
was thrown into confusion. Therefore, the second antecedent is not satisfied.  
Rustow’s third antecedent is related to political parties. One can say that there is now 
one generation of political parties, but this does not satisfy the third antecedent 
because Rustow mentions two or three generations of parties. There was a 
discontinuity in the presence of parties between 1957 and 1991. Although parties 
operate legally now, they do so with severely restricted freedoms. If this remains the 
case for two more generations, parties will not make any difference. This is one 
limitation in Rustow’s explanation. However, he must have taken it for granted that 
the parties will be operating in a free environment—not in a restricted one. 
The fourth antecedent is the presence of ‘a tenacious conflict’. It is not satisfied. The 
conflict of September 1970 was short. The uprising of 1988 in southern Jordan was 
significant and produced changes, but it was short too and lacked leadership. Signs of 
a tenacious conflict started to appear before the uprisings erupted in the Arab world 
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at the end of 2010. It can also be seen in protests by workers to assert their rights and 
improve their conditions, as happened in Aqaba in August 2009. Other workers who 
work without contracts also protested at the Ministry of Agriculture in 2010. 
Moreover, the government could not stop or outmanoeuvre the campaign for a 
teachers’ union. 
These indications can be regarded as belonging to a bottom-up process that may lead 
to the democratisation of the political system in the country. Jamal (2007, p. 137) has 
concluded that ‘the bottom-up approach to democracy is seriously flawed.’ The 
context of her conclusion was the assumption made by foreign donors who wish to 
develop civil society because without it ‘there can be no democracy’. Within the 
context of her conclusion, she is right. However, the bottom-up process unfolding in 
Jordan is of a completely different nature. It was initiated by teachers, workers, and 
others who decided to assert their rights without the assistance of foreign donors. 
An important corollary of Rustow’s antecedents is that they should take place in the 
context of embracing modernity, especially its intellectual aspects. Education, 
geographical context, parties, and a tenacious conflict will not lead to democracy if 
modernity is not ingrained in the political system. Rustow claimed that religious 
denominations in Lebanon were the substitute for parties. He was mistaken, as could 
be recognised from the Lebanese Civil War. Moreover, the various religious sects in 
Lebanon prevent the development of a democratic system based on equality of 
citizens. Similarly, tribes in Jordan cannot be a substitute for parties. When the 
government changed the elections law to have more MPs from the tribes, it achieved 
its objective. However, it also caused divisions within tribes. Moreover, the 
encouragement of tribalism has produced a situation in which tribes fight each other, 
and frequently clash with the police. 
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Despite the limitations identified in the discussion above, Rustow’s antecedents 
better explain why democracy has failed to take root in Jordan. Unlike the 
essentialist or cultural explanations, Rustow’s modernisation theory does not imply 
that Jordan will remain undemocratic permanently because of Islam or Islamism.  
In conclusion, the thesis has achieved its two objectives of assessing the state of 
democracy in Jordan between 1990 and 2010, and revisiting the claims of 
incompatibility between democracy and both Islam and Islamism. The democratic 
audit delivered a detailed appraisal, which identified the unsatisfactory aspects. 
However, it also provided the opportunity to recognise positive features, particularly 
those reflected by means higher than seven marks out of ten. Moreover, Rustow’s 
modernisation theory provided the criteria that challenged the Islam-democracy 





I mentioned in the introduction that a series of events erupted in the Arab world at 
the end of 2010. They had dramatic consequences such as the removal of the rulers 
of Tunisia and Egypt under the pressure of the people; the overthrow and death of the 
ruler of Libya with active military assistance from NATO; and the negotiated 
removal of the ruler of Yemen after a long stalemate. In Bahrain, however, protesters 
were violently dispersed. Forces from the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) assisted the Bahraini government. In Syria, a stalemate prevailed while this 
thesis was being finalised.  
In Jordan, demonstrations in various parts of the country have taken place. The 
response to them was mixed: (a) allowing them to proceed peacefully (and 
distributing bottles of water); (b) subjecting them to attacks by thugs, thus enabling 
the government to deny that they are members of the security forces; and (c) 
enlisting the support of members of tribes to call for the cancellation of 
demonstrations and rallies. When the IAF refused to cancel the demonstration 
scheduled in Mafraq on Friday, 23 December 2011, the demonstrators were attacked 
and the offices of IAF in the city were burned. 
Meanwhile, elections took place in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco in 2011. In all three 
countries, Islamist parties achieved good results. The surprise in Egypt was that there 
were two strands of Islamist parties: one was the MB, and the other was Salafi. 
These developments subjected my thesis to a test of time shortly before it was ready 
for submission. I explained in the introduction why my thesis could not and should 
not deal with fast-moving events. However, there is a compelling case to discuss 
their impact on my arguments and conclusions, particularly in relation to the 
compatibility of democracy and both Islam and Islamism, and what may happen if 
the Islamists come to power. Consequently, I will revisit the major themes addressed 
in this thesis and discuss them briefly in light of the above-mentioned developments. 
I shall begin with the argument about the notion of Arab and Muslim exceptionalism 
which tolerates dictatorships. It appears that the proponents of this view were wrong 
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all along. Moreover, the uprisings in several Arab states at the same time provided 
overwhelming evidence of the anger of the Arab peoples at the dictatorships that 
ruled over them. 
With regard to the compatibility of Islam and democracy, the uprisings have 
provided ample evidence that they are compatible. The participation of a Salafi party 
in the Egyptian elections is significant. My contention will be challenged on the 
ground that it is too early to judge, and a lot will depend on the behaviour of the 
Islamist parties in power. This is a valid counter-argument, but it has its flaws. First, 
it continues to be based on the notion of Arab and Muslim exceptionalism, which has 
been used by some scholars such as Stepan and Robertson (2003 and 2004) to 
explain the absence of democracy in the Arab states. The notion is analogous to the 
claim of incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Second, it continues to 
assume that the Arab and Muslim peoples are not interested in developing 
democratic systems of government, ignoring the fact that people did not sacrifice 
their lives simply to replace one dictator with another. 
This leads again to the argument that Islamism, not Islam, is incompatible with 
democracy. The uprisings have shown that this line of argument is flawed. Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Morocco have not yet developed into democracies. What hindered 
democracy in the past was not Islamism, but dictators allied with the West. If after 
the Islamists come to power through the ballot box, they decide to change the nature 
of the system, those who previously expressed concern may feel vindicated. But this 
vindication will be momentary. 
Democracy was avoided using pretexts such as that the Islamists could not be 
trusted. Ideologically, one can disagree with the Islamists, but to block their 
participation in the political systems is inconsistent with democratic principles. A 
democratic process will be lively if parties of different ideologies compete. The 
presence of strong parties is good for democracy as well, because they can provide 
alternatives in styles and programmes of government. 
The elections that took place in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt substantiated the claim 
of the Islamists that they enjoyed public support, and that they could win in free and 
fair elections. However, voting for them was influenced to some extent by a factor of 
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sympathy because the Islamist parties were banned or restricted before the uprisings 
of 2010-11. The sympathy cannot be taken for granted, and is likely to recede once 
the elections became a regular event. Therefore, in order to retain the same level of 
popularity, the Islamists will have to re-earn the confidence of the same group of 
people. If they want to appeal to other segments of society, they cannot be rigid in 
their ideas and electoral manifestos. The Islamists were not a political force to 
contend with after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. If other parties and coalitions adopt 
appealing policies and programmes, they can gain the confidence of the people at the 
expense of the Islamists. 
Will the Islamists change the nature of the system after they are in power? The 
straightforward answer to this question is that the Islamists have sent contradicting 
signals. Therefore, those who were suspicious would remain so. 
The Tunisian al-Nahda was presented as a moderate Islamist party that had 
reconciled democracy and Islam since the early 1980s. Their positive image was 
undermined when Hammadi Jabali, a leader in al-Nahda, felt nostalgic for the 
caliphate, and spoke about the creation of a sixth caliphate. Although he contended 
that he was quoted out of context, the matter gave others the ammunition to criticise 
him and al-Nahda. In the inaugural address on 13 December 2011, the new interim 
President of Tunisia, Muncef Marzūqi, promised the Tunisian people that they would 
enjoy all the rights mentioned in the International Convention of Human Rights. Al- 
Marzūqi is not an Islamist, but is supported by al-Nahda. 
In Morocco, the leader of the Justice and Development Party, ‛Abd al-Ilah bin Kiran, 
sought to allay fears by saying that the party would not interfere in the personal lives 
of the people. In Egypt, is not yet clear whether a combination of MB and Salafi 
Islamism will coexist and cooperate or compete and fight. 
I have indicated that in Jordan, in the twenty years under assessment, the MB/IAF 
demonstrated a case of democratic paradox in reverse. I adhere to this conclusion in 
relation to the relevant time. After the uprisings in the Arab world, and the 
conflicting signals about what the Islamists would do after the positive results they 
achieved, it became harder to argue that the Islamists would continue to call for 
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democracy and respect its rules when they are in power. Nonetheless, I shall address 
the question of whether the Islamists will change the nature of the system, by 
imposing a stricter adherence to Islamic teachings as they interpret them. 
My answer to the question is twofold. One is that political parties who win elections 
try to implement their programmes, whether socialist or capitalist. When they win, 
they argue that they have a mandate to change. It should not come as a surprise if an 
Islamist party made a similar argument: that it had won a majority, and acquired a 
mandate to implement more or all of shari‛a. The notion of acquiring a mandate 
through elections is problematic, and therefore, whether all changes a governing 
party introduces are really mandated is open to question. The same applies to 
Islamist parties in the Arab world. I therefore think that winning a majority will not 
automatically mean the implementation of shari‛a or a limited form of it. However, 
what will happen if they try; can they do it? This leads to the discussion about the 
other forces in society, such as political parties, civil society organisations, and 
concerned citizens. 
If the Islamist parties in power change the system and impose a strict one, they will 
be treated with the same hostility any other party would face should it choose to 
impose its will and ideology on the people. Even if these parties succeed initially, 
they will eventually fail. The communist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe failed. The Ba‛th in both Iraq and Syria failed. Even less ideological parties, 
such as the National Party of Egypt failed. The opposition to a ‘more Islamic’ system 
of government is already vociferous. Critics point out that issues of unemployment or 
inflation cannot be dealt with by making references to verses in the Qur’an. Others 
show opposition by mocking the Islamists’ attitude towards the arts. Therefore, 
although it is still premature to say that the Islamists will change the nature of 
government, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that if they try, they will face 
opposition from all quarters. If they try to impose their programmes, their future is 
foretold. 
Another point I would like to make is that the involvement of the Islamists in politics 
should have been welcomed a long time ago. I make this argument for two reasons. 
One is that it is better to engage with them in the political arena, rather than leaving 
them to preach in mosques and homes, where their views will not be open to public 
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discussions. In the political arena, statements made by an Islamist party or a 
politician will be reported and dissected. With other opinions being expressed at the 
same time, people can consider other views before they make up their minds. My 
second reason for welcoming the Islamists’ involvement in politics is that the extent 
of their adherence to principles will become known, and this will be the subject of 
my next point. 
When Bin ‛Ali, Mubarak, and others were still in power, the West found excuses for 
these rulers. The exclusion of Islamists from political processes was justified and 
even encouraged. Western governments went further than that, and refused to 
recognise the government of Hamas even though it won a majority in elections 
judged by international observers to be free and fair. After the Arab uprisings of 
2010-11 and the changes of circumstances, the exiled Islamists were able to return. 
The Islamist parties participated in both the uprisings and the elections. After the 
dawn of new realities in the Arab world, both the West and the Islamists realised 
they could not maintain old, rigid attitudes towards each other. The Islamists in 
Egypt and Tunisia sent reassuring messages to the US in relation to attitude towards 
Israel. Rachid al-Ghannouchi visited the US and spoke at the Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy in December 2011. In Egypt, both the MB and the Salafi party 
sent reassuring messages in relation to the Camp David Accords. 
I do not agree with people who expect a total change of policies overnight. It will be 
imprudent of the MB or other parties to say they will abrogate the peace treaty once 
they are in power. This means the Islamists have not learned any lessons from the 
Algerian case. However, seeking to please the West in such a manner shows that 
once parties are competing in a political arena, Islamist or otherwise, principles are 
secondary. Moreover, Western states reverted to expediency, even though the West 
had opposed the Islamists and raised doubt about their commitment to democracy. 
The Western governments changed their attitudes and accepted the new reality. More 
importantly, the West joined forces with Islamists in Libya. With regard to Syria, the 
West does not mind supporting the opposition in which the MB is a major player. 
Furthermore, the Islamists’ expediency is evident in their attitude towards foreign 
intervention, whether in Libya or in Syria. The Islamists of Jordan opposed foreign 
intervention in Iraq, but supported it in Libya and Syria. 
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Before I focus my discussion on Jordan, I would like to point out that after the Arab 
uprisings, some commentators have suggested that they were instigated by the West. 
Others also ridiculed the notion of democracy. In a Jordanian context, Taher al-Masri 
declared that people in Jordan were not yet ready for democracy. In the wider 
context, some people, such as Muna (2011) and AbuKhalil (2011), have expressed 
scepticism about democracy.  
The bloody change in Libya reminded people of the gruesome consequences of the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The objections to imposing democracy are valid. Its 
imposition deprives it of its very nature. As Beetham (2009) has argued in relation to 
Iraq, imposing democracy does not work. However, to take a hostile attitude towards 
democracy because it was given a bad name in Iraq or elsewhere is a misguided 
position. As Rustow (1967, p. 236) says: democracy is about ‘self-government’.  
Jordan’s own protests to demand change also demonstrated that there was no 
Jordanian exceptionalism. When Bin ‛Ali was toppled, supporters of Mubarak said 
Egypt is not Tunisia. Supporters of regimes in other states said the same. There 
would always be similarities and differences in circumstance between countries. 
However, what happened in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere could happen in Jordan as 
well. The protests continued in Jordan even after constitutional changes were passed 
and the government of ‛Awn al-Khasawneh was formed. 
The difference between the situations in Tunisia and Egypt on the one hand and 
Jordan on the other is that the demands in Jordan have a lower ceiling: reform, not 
the removal of the head of state. This gives the regime more room to manoeuvre, and 
less incentive to use massive force. I suggest that the room for manoeuvre is 
shrinking all the time. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the ceiling of demands 
will remain low. Therefore, the incentive to use more force becomes stronger. The 
level of force required will also have an impact on whether the military will think it 
is part of its duty to supress demonstrations. Both options are open: a crackdown 
using the army, or the regime finding itself unable to count on the army for such a 
task. 
The outcomes of uprisings and revolutions cannot be guaranteed for the 
revolutionaries or the regimes. So far, Jordan has tried to manage the situation with 
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some coercion and a lot of political manoeuvring, which has included changing the 
government. However, this tactic is losing its effectiveness in calming the people. 
Mubarak changed the government to appear to be making changes, as demanded by 
the people. However, this measure failed. He had to give up his powers to a military 
council, and he was put on trial soon after he resigned. If the situation is mishandled 
in Jordan, one should not exclude the possibility that a loss of control could lead to 




Data of the Macro-Analysis 
 
 
The macro-analysis is based on fifteen overarching questions. These were the only 
questions answered by the twenty-four respondents. The same questions appear 
amongst the ninety questions of the long questionnaire, which was answered by six 
assessors. A slash (/) is used when the respondent or assessor gave no mark. The 
mean is in bold font. 
 
PART 1: CITIZENSHIP, LAW AND RIGHTS 
1.1. Nationhood and citizenship 
Q1S 
Is there public agreement on a common citizenship without 
discrimination? (.../10) 
1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 
5 5 5 5 6 6 6 8 8 9 10 10 5.0 
 
Q7L 2 2 5 6 7 / 4.4 
 
1.2. Rule of law and access to justice 
Q2S 
Are state and society consistently subject to the law? (.../10) 
1 2 2 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 
6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 5.8 
 
Q14L 3 6 6 6 6 / 5.4 
 
1.3. Civil and political rights 
Q3S 
Are civil and political rights equally guaranteed for all? (.../10) 
1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 
5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 10 5.0 
 




1.4. Economic and social rights 
Q4S 
Are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all? (.../10) 
1 1 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 
5 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 5.3 
 
Q26L 4 5 6 7 8 / 6.0 
 
PART 2: REPRESENTATIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 
2.1. Free and Fair Elections 
Q5S 
Do elections give the people control over governments and their 
policies? (.../10) 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 7 7 3.1 
 
Q33L 1 2 2 2 2 3 2.0 
 
2.2. The Democratic Role of Political Parties 
Q6S 
Does the party system assist the working of democracy? (.../10) 
1 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 
5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 9 9 10 5.0 
 
Q39L 0 2 / / / / 1.0 
 
2.3. Effective and Responsive Government 
Q7S 
Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its 
concerns? (.../10) 
1 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 8 9 5.3 
 




2.4. The Democratic Effectiveness of Parliament 
Q8S 
Does the parliament or legislature contribute effectively to the 
democratic process? (.../10) 
0 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 9 9 4.7 
 
Q55L 1 2 2 3 5 8 3.5 
 
2.5. Civilian Control of the Military and Police [DATA NOT RELIABLE] 
Q9S 
Are the military and police forces under civilian control? (.../10) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 2 3 3 6 6 6 8 9 10 / / 2.5 
 
Q60L 0 0 2 5 9 / 3.2 
 
2.6. Integrity in Public Life 
Q10S 
Is the integrity of conduct in public life assured? (.../10) 
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 8 8 / 3.8 
 
Q66L 1 1 3 5 5 8 3.8 
 
PART 3:  CIVIL SOCIETY AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION 
3.1. The Media in a Democratic Society 
Q11S 
Do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values? (.../10) 
0 1 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 
5 5 5 6 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 5.1 
 




3.2. Political participation 
Q12S 
Is there full citizen participation in public life? (.../10) 
2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 
5 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 9 10 10 5.1 
 




Are decisions taken at the level of government that is most appropriate 
for the people affected? (.../10) 
0 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 5 6 7 8 8 8 8 10 5.0 
 
Q81L 1 2 2 4 5 6 3.3 
 
PART 4:  DEMOCRACY  BEYOND  THE  STATE 
4.1. External Influences on the Country’s Democracy 
Q14S 
Is the impact of external influences broadly supportive of the country’s 
democracy? (.../10) 
0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 9 10 10 / 4.8 
 
Q85L 2 2 4 6 7 7 4.7 
 
4.2. The Country’s Democratic Impact Abroad 
Q15S 
Do the country’s international policies contribute to strengthening 
global democracy? (.../10) 
0 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 
6 6 6 7 7 7 9 9 10 10 / / 4.9 
 









The microanalysis used a questionnaire of ninety questions. Six assessors answered it. 
The marks are presented in ascending order, not by assessor. The figure in bold font 
is the mean. A slash (/) is used to indicate the assessor gave no mark. 
 
PART 1: CITIZENSHIP, LAW AND RIGHTS 
1.1. Nationhood and Citizenship 
Q1 1.1.1. How inclusive is the political nation and state citizenship of all 
who live within the territory?  (…../10) 
3 5 5 5 9 9 6.0 
 
Q2 1.1.2. How far are cultural differences acknowledged, and how well are 
minorities and vulnerable social groups protected? (…../10) 
5 5 7 9 10 10 7.7 
 
Q3 1.1.3. How much consensus is there on state boundaries and 
constitutional arrangements? (…../10) 
3 5 9 10 / / 6.8 
 
Q4 1.1.4. How far do constitutional and political arrangements enable major 
societal divisions to be moderated or reconciled? (…../10) 
4 4 5 7 7 8 5.8 
 
Q5 1.1.5. How impartial and inclusive are the procedures for amending the 
constitution? (…../10) 
2 3 3 5 5 5 3.8 
 
Q6 1.1.6. How far does the government respect its international obligations 
in its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, and how free from 
arbitrary discrimination is its immigration policy? (…../10) 
2 2 6 8 8 9 5.8 
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Q7 Overarching question: Is there public agreement on a common 
citizenship without discrimination? (…../10)  
2 2 5 6 7 / 4.4 
 
1.2. Rule of Law and Access to Justice 
Q8 1.2.1. How far is the rule of law operative throughout the territory? 
(…../10) 
4 5 6 7 7 7 6.0 
 
Q9 1.2.2. To what extent are all public officials subject to the rule of law and 
to transparent rules in the performance of their functions? (…../10) 
2 3 6 6 7 8 5.3 
 
Q10 1.2.3. How independent are the courts and the judiciary from the 
executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference? (…../10) 
3 3 5 6 6 8 5.2 
 
Q11 1.2.4. How equal and secure is the access of citizens to justice, to due 
process and to redress in the event of maladministration? (…../10) 
3 3 6 6 7 7 5.3 
 
Q12 1.2.5. How far do the criminal justice and penal systems observe due 
rules of impartial and equitable treatment in their operations? (…../10) 
3 4 7 7 8 8 6.2 
 
Q13 1.2.6. How much confidence do people have in the legal system to 
deliver fair and effective justice? (…../10) 
3 4 5 7 7 7 5.5 
 
Q14 Overarching question: Are state and society consistently subject to 
the law? (…../10) 
3 6 6 6 6 / 5.4 
 
1.3. Civil and Political Rights 
Q15 1.3.1. How free are all people from physical violation of their person, and 
from fear of it? (…../10) 
3 5 6 8 9 9 6.7 
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Q16 1.3.2. How effective and equal is the protection of the freedoms of 
movement, expression, association and assembly? (…../10) 
2 3 3 6 6 6 4.3 
 
Q17 1.3.3. How secure is the freedom for all to practise their own religion, 
language or culture? (…../10) 
3 8 8 9 9 10 7.8 
 
Q18 1.3.4. How free from harassment and intimidation are individuals and 
groups working to improve human rights? (…../10) 
2 3 6 7 8 8 5.7 
 
Q19 Overarching question: Are civil and political rights equally 
guaranteed for all? (…../10) 
3 5 5 7 / / 5.0 
 
1.4. Economic and Social Rights 
Q20 1.4.1. How far is access to work or social security available to all, 
without discrimination? (…../10) 
3 4 5 7 7 8 5.7 
 
Q21 1.4.2. How effectively are the basic necessities of life guaranteed, 
including adequate food, shelter and clean water? (…../10) 
3 4 5 6 8 8 5.7 
 
Q22 1.4.3. To what extent is the health of the population protected, in all 
spheres and stages of life? (…../10) 
4 5 5 8 / / 5.5 
 
Q23 1.4.4. How extensive and inclusive is the right to education, including 
education in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship? (…../10) 
4 5 7 8 8 10 7.0 
 
Q24 1.4.5. How free are trade unions and other work-related associations to 
organize and represent their members’ interests? (…../10) 
2 4 5 6 6 7 5.0 
 
Q25 1.4.6. How rigorous and transparent are the rules on corporate 
governance, and how effectively are corporations regulated in the public 
interest? (…../10) 
3 5 5 6 7 8 5.7 
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Q26 Overarching question: Are economic and social rights equally 
guaranteed for all? (…../10) 
4 5 6 7 8 / 6.0 
 
PART 2: REPRESENTATIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 
2.1. Free and Fair Elections 
Q27 2.1.1. How far is appointment to governmental and legislative office 
determined by popular competitive election, and how frequently do 
elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel? (…../10) 
2 2 3 3 3 4 2.8 
 
Q28 2.1.2. How inclusive and accessible for all citizens are the registration 
and voting procedures, how independent are they of government and 
party control, and how free from intimidation and abuse? (…../10) 
3 3 4 5 5 8 4.7 
 
Q29 2.1.3. How fair are the procedures for the registration of candidates and 
parties, and how far is there fair access for them to the media and other 
means of communication with the voters? (…../10) 
2 4 4 5 7 7 4.8 
 
Q30 2.1.4. How effective a range of choice does the electoral and party 
system allow the voters, how equally do their votes count, and how 
closely does the composition of the legislature and the selection of the 
executive reflect the choices they make? (…../10) 
0 2 3 4 6 6 3.5 
 
Q31 2.1.5. How far does the legislature reflect the social composition of the 
electorate? (…../10) 
2 3 3 6 6 8 4.7 
 
Q32 2.1.6. What proportion of the electorate votes, and how far are the 
election results accepted by all political forces in the country and 
outside? (…../10) 
2 3 4 4 4 / 3.4 
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Q33 Overarching question: Do elections give the people control over 
governments and their policies? (…../10) 
1 2 2 2 2 3 2.0 
 
2.2. The Democratic Role of Political Parties 
Q34 2.2.1. How freely are parties able to form and recruit members, engage 
with the public and campaign for office? (…../10) 
3 5 5 5 5 7 5.0 
 
Q35 2.2.2. How effective is the party system in forming and sustaining 
governments in office? (…../10) 
0 0 0 0 0 2 0.3 
 
Q36 2.2.3. How far are parties effective membership organizations, and how 
far are members able to influence party policy and candidate selection? 
(…../10) 
1 2 2 2 3 5 2.5 
 
Q37 2.2.4. How far does the system of party financing prevent the 
subordination of parties to special interests? (…../10) 
1 1 2 2 2 4 2.0 
 
Q38 2.2.5. To what extent do parties cross ethnic, religious and linguistic 
divisions? (…../10) 
1 1 2 2 4 7 2.8 
 
Q39 Overarching question: Does the party system assist the working of 
democracy? (…../10) 
0 2 / / / / 1.0 
 
2.3. Effective and Responsive Government 
Q40 2.3.1. How far is the elected government able to influence or control 
those matters that are important to the lives of its people, and how well is 
it informed, organized and resourced to do so? (…../10) 
2 2 3 4 7 / 3.6 
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Q41 2.3.2. How effective and open to scrutiny is the control exercised by 
elected leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and 
other executive agencies? (…../10) 
2 2 2 3 3 / 2.4 
 
Q42 2.3.3. How open and systematic are the procedures for public 
consultation on government policy and legislation, and how equal is the 
access for relevant interests to government? (…../10) 
0 2 2 2 4 / 2.0 
 
Q43 2.3.4. How accessible and reliable are public services for those who need 
them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service 
delivery? (…../10) 
2 3 3 5 6 / 3.8 
 
Q44 2.3.5. How comprehensive and effective is the right of access for citizens 
to government information under the constitution or other laws? (…../10) 
0 1 2 2 4 / 1.8 
 
Q45 2.3.6. How much confidence do people have in the ability of government 
to solve the main problems confronting society, and in their own ability 
to influence it? (…../10) 
1 3 3 3 3 / 2.6 
 
Q46 Overarching question: Is government effective in serving the public 
and responsive to its concerns? (…../10) 
1 3 3 5 / / 3.0 
 
2.4. The Democratic Effectiveness of Parliament 
Q47 2.4.1. How independent is the parliament or legislature of the executive, 
and how freely are its members able to express their opinions? (…../10) 
2 2 2 3 5 5 3.2 
 
Q48 2.4.2. How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or 
legislature to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation? (…../10) 
3 3 3 3 5 5 3.7 
 
Q49 2.4.3. How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or 
legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account? (…../10) 
0 0 3 3 3 5 2.3 
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Q50 2.4.4. How rigorous are the procedures for approval and supervision of 
taxation and public expenditure? (…../10) 
1 2 2 3 3 6 2.8 
 
Q51 2.4.5. How freely are all parties and groups able to organize within the 
parliament or legislature and contribute to its work? (…../10) 
2 2 2 3 7 8 4.0 
 
Q52 2.4.6. How extensive are the procedures of the parliament or legislature 
for consulting the public and relevant interests across the range of its 
work? (…../10) 
1 2 2 2 2 5 2.3 
 
Q53 2.4.7. How accessible are elected representatives to their constituents? 
(…../10) 
2 3 6 7 7 8 5.5 
 
Q54 2.4.8. How well does the parliament or legislature provide a forum for 
deliberation and debate on issues of public concern? (…../10) 
0 2 2 3 5 7 3.2 
 
Q55 Overarching question: Does the parliament or legislature contribute 
effectively to the democratic process? (…../10) 
1 2 2 3 5 8 3.5 
 
2.5. Civilian Control of the Military and Police 
Q56 2.5.1. How effective is civilian control over the armed forces, and how 
free is political life from military involvement? (…../10) 
0 0 2 3 5 8 3.0 
 
Q57 2.5.2. How publicly accountable are the police and security services for 
their activities? (…../10) 
0 1 1 5 7 8 3.7 
 
Q58 2.5.3. How far does the composition of the army, police and security 
services reflect the social composition of society at large? (…../10) 
3 4 6 7 8 8 6.0 
 
Q59 2.5.4. How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary units, 
private armies, war lords and criminal mafias? (…../10) 
8 8 8 9 9 10 8.7 
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Q60 Overarching question: Are the military and police forces under 
civilian control? (…../10) 
0 0 2 5 9 / 3.2 
 
2.6. Integrity in Public Life 
Q61 2.6.1. How effective is the separation of public office from the personal 
business and family interests of office holders? (…../10) 
1 1 2 3 5 8 3.3 
 
Q62 2.6.2. How effective are the arrangements for protecting office holders 
and the public from involvement in bribery? (…../10) 
1 1 3 3 5 6 3.2 
 
Q63 2.6.3. How far do the rules and procedures for financing elections, 
candidates and elected representatives prevent their subordination to 
sectional interests? (…../10) 
0 2 2 3 3 5 2.5 
 
Q64 2.6.4. How far is the influence of powerful corporations and business 
interests over public policy kept in check, and how free are they from 
involvement in corruption, including overseas? (…../10) 
2 2 3 3 3 6 3.2 
 
Q65 2.6.5. How much confidence do people have that public officials and 
public services are free from corruption? (…../10) 
1 1 3 3 4 4 2.7 
 
Q66 Overarching question: Is the integrity of conduct in public life 
assured? (…../10) 
1 1 3 5 5 8 3.8 
 
PART 3:  CIVIL SOCIETY AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION 
3.1. The Media in a Democratic Society 
Q67 3.1.1. How independent are the media from government, how pluralistic 
is their ownership, and how free are they from subordination to foreign 
governments or multinational companies? (…../10) 
2 3 3 3 5 6 3.7 
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Q68 3.1.2. How representative are the media of different opinions and how 
accessible are they to different sections of society? (…../10) 
2 4 5 5 5 5 4.3 
 
Q69 3.1.3. How effective are the media and other independent bodies in 
investigating government and powerful corporations? (…../10) 
0 2 2 4 5 5 3.0 
 
Q70 3.1.4. How free are journalists from restrictive laws, harassment and 
intimidation? (…../10) 
2 2 2 3 3 4 2.7 
 
Q71 3.1.5. How free are private citizens from intrusion and harassment by the 
media? (…../10) 
3 4 4 4 5 7 4.5 
 
Q72 Overarching question: Do the media operate in a way that sustains 
democratic values? 
2 3 6 / / / 3.7 
 
3.2. Political participation 
Q73 3.2.1. How extensive is the range of voluntary associations, citizen 
groups, social movements etc. and how independent are they from 
government? (…../10) 
0 2 2 3 5 6 3.0 
 
Q74 3.2.2. How extensive is citizen participation in voluntary associations and 
self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity? 
(…../10) 
0 2 2 4 6 6 3.3 
 
Q75 3.2.3. How far do women participate in political life and public office at 
all levels? (…../10) 
0 2 2 4 5 7 3.3 
 
Q76 3.2.4. How equal is access for all social groups to public office, and how 
fairly are they represented? (…../10) 
2 5 5 5 6 7 5.0 
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Q77 Overarching question: Is there full citizen participation in public 
life? (…../10) 
0 2 3 3 5 7 3.3 
 
3.3. Decentralization 
Q78 3.3.1. How independent are the sub-central tiers of government from the 
centre, and how far do they have the powers and resources to carry out 
their responsibilities? (…../10) 
1 2 3 3 3 6 3.0 
 
Q79 3.3.2. How far are these levels of government subject to free and fair 
electoral authorization, and to the criteria of openness, accountability and 
responsiveness in their operation? (…../10) 
0 1 2 2 2 7 2.3 
 
Q80 3.3.3. How extensive is the cooperation of government at the most local 
level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the 
formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision? 
(…../10) 
1 2 3 4 5 7 3.7 
 
Q81 Overarching question: Are decisions taken at the level of government 
that is most appropriate for the people affected? (…../10) 
1 2 2 4 5 6 3.3 
 
PART 4:  DEMOCRACY  BEYOND  THE  STATE 
4.1. External Influences on the Country’s Democracy 
Q82 4.1.1. How free is the country from external influences which undermine 
or compromise its democratic process or national interests? (…../10) 
1 2 4 4 4 5 3.3 
 
Q83 4.1.2. How equitable is the degree of influence exercised by the 
government within the bilateral, regional and international organizations 
to whose decisions it may be subject? (…../10) 
2 3 5 5 5 6 4.3 
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Q84 4.1.3. How far are the government’s negotiating positions and subsequent 
commitments within these organizations subject to effective legislative 
oversight and public debate? (…../10) 
2 3 4 5 6 6 4.3 
 
Q85 Overarching question: Is the impact of external influences broadly 
supportive of the country’s democracy? (…../10) 
2 2 4 6 7 7 4.7 
 
4.2. The Country’s Democratic Impact Abroad 
Q86 4.2.1. How consistent is the government in its support for, and protection 
of, human rights and democracy abroad? (…../10) 
0 1 2 2 6 10 3.5 
 
Q87 4.2.2. How far does the government support the UN and agencies of 
international cooperation, and respect the rule of law internationally? 
(…../10) 
5 6 6 7 10 10 7.3 
 
Q88 4.2.3. How extensive and consistent is the government’s contribution to 
international development? (…../10) 
2 2 4 7 8 9 5.3 
 
Q89 4.2.4. How far is the government’s international policy subject to 
effective parliamentary oversight and public influence? (…../10) 
0 1 2 3 6 6 3.0 
 
Q90 Overarching question: Do the country’s international policies 
contribute to strengthening global democracy? (…../10) 






 cibarA ni snoitseuQ gnihcrarevO
  ي الأردنـلام فـية والإسـراطـن الديمقـث عـبح




  عن البحث:
  
مل الإسلامي يھدف البحث إلى تقييم التجربة الديمقراطية في الأردن وتقييم مشاركة الإخوان المسلمين وجبھة الع
فيھا، بمناسبة مرور عشرين عاما على بدء التجربة. أما الإطار الأوسع للبحث فھو مدى توافق الإسلام والإس/لام 
  السياسي مع الديمقراطية.
  
  عن الأسئلة المرفقة:
  
لتقي//يم م//دى ديمقراطي//ة بل//د م//ا، والأس//ئلة ج//زء م//ن منھجي//ة طورھ//ا  خمس//ة عش//ر س//ؤالاأدن//اه  الاس//تبيان ض//مي
ث/ـام وس/توارت وي/ر، وق/د تبن/ت المنھجي/ة المؤسس/ة الدولي/ة لمس/اعدة ـيـديميون م/ن بريطاني/ا م/ن بي/نھم ديفي/د بأكا
  (، التي يوجد مقرھا في العاصمة السويدية، ستوكھولم. tni.aedi.wwwالديمقراطية والانتخابات )
  
  عن الباحث: عدلي الھوراي 
  
وحت/ى ع/ام  7891رب/ي م/ن ھيئ/ة الإذاع/ة البريطاني/ة م/ن ع/ام عم/ل مق/دما ومع/دا ومنتج/ا للب/رامج ف/ي القس/م الع
قام بتغطيات صحفية خاصة من قبيل قمة الشرق الأوسط الاقتصادية في الأردن ومصر ومحادثات سلام  .3002
متفرغ حاليا للبحث الأكاديمي الھادف إلى الحصول على درجة دكتوراه من جامع/ة  الشرق الأوسط في واشنطن.
  دن.وستمنستر في لن
  
  للمزيد من المعلومات:
  
 للمزي//د م//ن المعلوم//ات ع//ن الباح//ث وبحث//ه، الرج//اء زي//ارة الص//فحة التالي//ة عل//ى موق//ع جامع//ة وستمنس//تر:
للمزي//د م//ن المعلوم//ات ع//ن المؤسس//ة الدولي//ة لمس//اعدة .  0542-egap/lhss/ku.ca.nimw.www//:ptth
يم الديمقراطي/ة ف/ي دول عدي/دة، الرج/اء زي/ارة تقي/ وع/ن منھجي/ة البح/ث المس/تخدم ف/يالديمقراطية والانتخابات، 
  tni.aedi.www//:ptth الموقع التالي:
  
  كيفية الإجابة عن الأسئلة:
  مثلا( 01/7امنح درجة من عشرة للسؤال العام، )
  ثم اكتب ما تعتقد أنھا السلبية الأكثر في موضوع السؤال، واكتب الايجابية الأكبر، وقدم اقتراحا للتحسين.
  (01/7: ما مدى اھتمام الحكومة بحماية البيئة في الأردن؟  )سؤال
  إعادة التدوير.الإيجابية الأكبر:    .رمي الناس للنفايات في كل مكانالسلبية الأكبر: 
  .سن قانون لحماية البيئة وفرض غرامات على رمي النفاياتاقتراح للتحسين: 
  تھا لي بالبريد الإلكتروني.عشر أدناه، وإعاد الرجاء الإجابة عن الأسئلة الخمسة
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  (.01/- - -)  تمييز؟ ون= ھل يوجد اتفاق عام حول المواطنة المشتركة بد1=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  (.01/- - -) والمجتمع لحكم القانون باستمرار؟ ة= ھل تخضع الدول2=
   الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  (.01/- - -) للجميع بشكل متساو؟ والمدنيةالسياسية  الحقوق= ھل تتوفر 3=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  (.01/- - -) ل متساو؟كبشللجميع والاجتماعية مضمونة  الاقتصادية= ھل الحقوق 4=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
   ترح للتحسين: مق
  (.01/- - -) سيطرة على الحكومة وسياستھا؟ال= ھل تعطي الانتخابات للشعب 5=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  (.01/- - -) = ھل يساعد النظام الحزبي على توفير الديمقراطية؟ 6=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  : مقترح للتحسين
  (.01/- - -) = ھل الحكومة فعالة في خدمة الشعب والاستجابة لاھتماماته؟7=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  (.01/- - -) البرلمان يساھم بفاعلية في العملية الديمقراطية؟= ھل 8=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  (.01/- - -) يخضع الجيش وقوات الشرطة لقيادة مسئولين مدنيين؟= ھل 9=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  852
 
  (.01/- - -) = ھل ممارسة المسؤوليات العامة خالية من الفساد؟01=
    الايجابية الأكبر:          السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  (.01/- - -) عليھا؟تدعم الديمقراطية وتحافظ م بطريقة = ھل تعمل وسائل الإعلا11=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  (.01/- - -) = ھل توجد مشاركة كاملة في الحياة العامة؟21=
وتولي المناصب في ؛ مشاركة المرأة في الحياة السياسية الطوعية ومدى المشاركة فيھامعيات تنوع الجالمقصود ھنا مدى )
  كل المستويات؛ المساواة بين أبناء الطبقات الاجتماعية في تولي المناصب العامة؛ وما شابه ذلك(. 
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  (.01/- - -) ؟اتبالقرارعلى المستوى الحكومي الأنسب بالنسبة للمتأثرين  = ھل تؤخذ القرارات31=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           سلبية الأكبر:ال
  مقترح للتحسين: 
  ن الھيمنYة الخارجيYة؟ـYـع ادـYـة حسYب المعYايير الديمقراطيYة، وبعيـYـل تسير العلاقات الخارجية للدولــ= ھ41=
  (.01/- - -)
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
  مقترح للتحسين: 
    (.01/- - -)في تعزيز الديمقراطية عالميا؟  ولةسياسات الخارجية للدال = ھل تساھم51=
  الايجابية الأكبر:           السلبية الأكبر:
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